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ttadh has be«a wxitfm cm tbh* Conmmal politics in 
India but no sariooa and t^Jective study has so far bsan aads 
on tha attitttda of Indian Haticmal congrass towards Nuslias 
and thair pr^^lans* Iha study of its attituda towards tha 
largest flU.nority of tha Country during fraadom stmggla is 
ii^portant bacause this party was laading tha oioveaiant. Ho 
national aovaaant can trualy succeed unless it has full 
confidence of all Iniportant sections of tha pa^la. the esctant 
to which tha Congrass tried and succeeded to win over thia 
confidence and oo<9eratioa is the baroMetar of its success* 
Tha study is relevant in the sense that frott 1947 onwards tha 
MttsliiM have h99n bltfMd for tha partition of India. Thay have 
suffered a lot and are still suffering froa this stigaa.I hava 
taken up this subject for aqr dissertation to reacdi sowawhara 
near tha truth through objective analysis of the events and 
ciremstances. In these pages an effort has alao bean aada to 
identify various forces working at different lavels«and their 
influence on tha dacision iiaking process of the Indian national 
Congress* 
The Indian National Congrass was aatablished as a loyal 
oppoaitite party to tha than British govenuaent of India but it 
turned into an indepaadenca aoveiaant in later period. It fou^t 
for and «f<m ind^endence but at the cost of unity of tha country 
• - l i -
l t Is Interesting to stud^ th«t tina«r i4»st clrcu«st«H»e»s • party 
eoemittsd to unity and Integrity of India did otliarwlsa* naai 
has baan written oo the sabjact bvt unfortonateXy objectivity 
l a %r«itln9« 
In a country llk« India iihere a great diversity of 
Intermit exist on acMMmnt of Ita wnltl-religleiia* Msltl-reslal 
aad anltl-llnqpial diaraeter* the differences waong th9 p e ^ l e 
are bound to arlae* fhe aolntlon of the pr<M>l«ns degMMki on tlM 
way they are tabled* 71M r l ^ t ai^roach to the pr^XeRw MMtt«m 
and not the slnple professlim of Ideals, ffe wil l wcanlne In 
the following chapters t^iether the c«mgreas attlfaide towards 
the pr(^le«s w«s correct, the partition Itaelf proved tidat 
there was ^methlng wrong In It* Had I t dealt wlt^ tlie rival 
and conflicting Interests without bias and tackled title adnorlty 
predion with tttsnst patience and wlsdon the situation ««Kild 
not have deteriorated to anc^ an extent, the lack of flrau 
elear*cat and conaistent stand on the Minority pr<^len proved 
fatal iBO the preapect of a United India* 
X an extr«MBely grateful to ary snpecvlaor Dr*Moinnssafar 
lCh«i for hla Valuable guidance* aoggestlons and conatruotlve 
crltlelsM ^ l e h enabled aw to coaiplete this work. I can not 
anapress ay gratitude In %#orda for the affection, eocouraganant 
and help he extended to flM». 
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The f i r s t war of IndepenrJence, as I t I s chilled was 
crushe<3 by B r i t i s h f o r c e s r u t h l e s s l y . The "naln t a r g e t s of 
s u p p r e s s i o n wer© most ly Muslim r u l e r s and nasses who led 
and p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e s t r u n l c , i=*long wi th such Hindu 
ch ip f t a in . ? aa Rftnl of jh^^m* ^''^^^ Saheb, ""unwar Sinsih of 
J a ^ d i s h p u r , f a n t i a Topi and o t h e r s . This c r e a t e d s t r o n g 
r e a c t i o n e'non^ t h e m s l l ^ s snd Hindus ^giainst t h e B r i t i s h 
r u l e . . s Asok^ l eh t a in h i s book ' IBS? - The i r e n t 
R e b e l l i o n ' no t ed , "when t h e r e b e l l i o n b tgan , Hindus and 
'Juslitis p a r t i c i p a t e d in I p r ^ e numbers. I t was n >t -i r e b e l l ion 
of one consni-iity. But t h e ^ussalmens, f o r h i s t o r i c a l .=?nd 
i d e o l o g i c a l rf asons were n»ore v i o l e n t l y a n t i - B r i t i s h than 
1 
t h e Hindus . " So, n a t u r a l l y , " t h e hand of r e p r e s s i o n €«11 
h r a v i l y on t h e l u s l i m s . - Many of t h e i r l - a U n j nen such 
es M?»wab of Jh 'Jj-nr, Ballabcjarh, Fftrukna^-^r .^ nd Parukabod -
Wfr^ re hanjed or r x i l e d . Tw* n ty four shahzad-^s were handed 
7 
i n Delhi on >^ovf'"nber 1957." In s'^^veral p l a c e s t h e o n t i r c 
' 'uslim p o p u l a t i o n was nissacr^Pd .md t h r l r l e a d e r s were 
e x e c u t e d . Hundreds of t h e n , Includinqj s e v e r a l d i s t l n - j u l shed 
3 
Ulema were blown by t h e cannon. On Decenber 7A, 1357, 
1 . s ^ k a K i ^ t * « 1857 - The gr : a t R e b e l l i o n , <^'tn<3[-.i,. K 
P u b l i s h e r s , ' lo^biy 1945) p . 6 9 . Kit«D« 
2 , I b i d . 
3 . : ^ . i . / s h r a f t l u s l im f U v i v a l i s t s nd Revol t of 1857^ in 
P.C. J o s h l (ed . ) R c b r l l i o n 1857 - r Symposium. ( P e o p l e ' s 
P u b l i s h i n g House, D e l h i , 1957) p . 13, 
- 2 . 
speaking In h i s Council Lord Canninci described the r n t l r e 
s i t u a t i o n in the following words t "• . t h e i n d l s -
crlTilnat© hanging* not only of pt^rsons of . 11 shades of 
^uil t» Injt of those whos<? g u i l t was a t the l e a s t very 
doubtful , and the general burning f*nr\ plund<»r of v i l l a g e s 
without regard t o a^ < or sex were In.Hs-
4 
c r i n i n a t e l y unlshed " ' ^ s l i m property H'QS widely 
conf iscated, danHf^ grd and dest royed. Although Hindus were 
allowed t o r t t u r n t o Delhi, but the 4usli'ns were not 
allow^^d t i l l 135«?, In the Delhi d iv i s ion nlonp Muslims 
had to give up one fourth of th i r property as penalty 
t o the governtient while the Hindus were reauired to surrender 
5 
only ten per c e n t , 
rhese records a«»ply show not only the ideologic'-^ 1 
reasons but the r e a l secular reasons for ^ s l l - n ' s hatred 
and d i s t u r s t of th« a r i t i s h Raj, The pol icy of repress ion, 
neglect nnd economic ruin of ^usll-ns, adopted in 1357 
continued vitUout any i n t e r r u p t i o n , No contefnpor?»ry record 
i s avallahl© which says i^bout nny ch??nge in t ^e po l i cy . 
Muslisu hatred aga ins t the B r i t i s h , th i r cu l tu re nnd t h e i r 
lanju-ge e l so cont inued. 
4 , caward Ihonpsonj rhe o^her s ide of the Medal (London 
I'^SS) p.-, 73-74 quoted b / P.C.Joshi j 1857 in our 
History, Rebellion 1857 - A S^posium o p . c i t . , p ,16? , 
5 . >soka ^fh ta , c ^ . c i t . , pp. 69-70. 
• 3 -
It was In this envlrontient that the Indian Nationnl 
Congress \*as oorn in D«»c*'naber 1385, *io body can deny the 
fact thrit two En^ ltsh-iien* '^.O, Hume an<S w«^ dderburn v^re 
Instrumental in Its fon>aticm# Hiey were people of the 
same race --rtiich had let loose the relqfn of t^ 'rror ajainst 
all the nationalistic forces who ntte-npted to expel! the 
foreijn rrglme. True, the Con?|res9 became a nationalist 
«ove!oent for liberation In later period out its birth was 
and will always renain doubtful. "It was, in short, a 
vast gathering of the Indian people. Every race and ©very 
sect was there represented and the proceedings, exceedingly 
earnest and enthusiastic, were remarkable for their 
6 
expression of loyalty to the crown,* 
Itie congress in 1886 was a party of British loyalist 
begging for certain concessions from a government which 
had ruth* It'ssly suppressed the Indian National 'lovertient 
for liberation and whos*' suppression was continuing against 
the vast saction of the Indian population, i.e. Muslims. 
It was a party which was expressing loyalty to t e British 
throne in almost p^ very session till "^ aul^ na Muhamiiad 11, 
Kahatma 3andhi and Nehru took over the leadership, "rtiis 
observation is coroboreted by the report of its proceedings 
in the ssme newspaper as {?uot€»d above. It was neither a 
6. rhe Sunday statesman, December 29, 1985y Birth of the 
Congress <-- Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition; From our 
1836 File, p.6. 
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tnass -novpw^ nt for the uplift of the v?st nn^ asea of the 
Indian people living In the vill«<jes« "The assembly.••• • 
was not on«? composed of vlliege parnells* tiet together for 
the purpose of givini vent to lisloyal feelin |S* or 
expressing their discontent with the government of the 
country (hear* hear) i but to take advantage of the Jubllp-s 
year for ilvini expression to thtlr feelings of loyalty 
to the throne (loud che. ers) # to off ^r thinks giving ind 
prayer, for the incalculable benefits which have been 
conferred on them by Hi.r Gracious Majesty's 3overnment to 
lay at the foot of Lhe throne their humbe suggestion for 
the 1 nprovement of such administrative rneasurt^ s^ as they 
humbly thought had not kept pace with thP spread of 
7 
education. .•••••** 
Hie Congress as <=> party of beggars asking for 
certain benefits and in the same breath expressing its 
utmost loyalty in the humblest possivjle lanjuage to a 
government which was nothing rnore than an exploiter. 
vlTi.-it it asked for in the first and subsequent 
sessions was to provide more Jobe through recruitment in 
the I.C.S. for & handful of English educated Indians. In 
return it was ready tr^  give fullest cooperation to the 
7. Ibid. 
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foreign rulers beslt^ es as pointr-d out Its nBtionaHstlc 
credentlftble w»re not very clear. Nor was it represen-
tative of various sections of the populatlcm. It was 
actually « f^fthprln<3 of English educated upper class of 
the Indian society whose sons and daughters aspired for 
high posltK^n In the government as the said report observes 
rather coatcnizuously that the assembly over which Oada ahai 
Haoroji was requested to preside, was not one of vlll.->ge 
parnells. It is surprising to note that »n ssse-nbly of 
such highly respectable people did nev^r nsk the govern-
ment, nor ever expressed sympathy with the victims of 
British suppress!«} since 1857. 
The ><lusllm apathy towj^ trds such an organisation was 
but natural. How could they Imagine to be loyal to the 
enemies of the country and begging for positions in «n 
r:)dnini strati on greatly hostile to them. It was not only 
the fear of further suppression at the hands of foreign 
rulers hut the strong hatred against those who were 
usurpers and cruel. Hie Congress with the way it was 
bom see-aed to the •luslims as illegitimate child of 
loyalist Indians and tricky Englishman. 
There were others also *Aio <^posed and refused to 
Join this party, though for different reasons. The Hindus 
also took an acti>^ part in its opposition. A long list 
. 6 -
Of th« names of a nuattMrr of ia^ portant Hindu Rajas, Rai 
liahacSurs, Talugdars, Zamindars and othsr Inqportant and 
Influential parsons, publlshsd in th« Appandix of tha 
3 
aooic "tha seditious Character of Indian !3ati(mal Congress", 
as the Donors, members of Indian Patriotic Association, 
inambers of different associations formed in opposition to 
the Congressf represents the real picture of <n>pesiticm 
that congress faced* 
Here it becomes quite clear that the wrath and 
antagonism that arose against Congress was having a multi* 
facet character which needs some discussion* 
Certain sections of Hindus, especially the feudal class 
was the bitter critic of the aims, c*Jectlves rtnd various 
demands for administrative and constitutional concessions, 
pressed by the Congress* M^araja Shiva Prasad of Banares, 
Raja Uday Partab Singh of ahinga and Munshi tiaval Kishore 
9 
were amcmg the Iniportant Hindus who were opposed to Congress* 
sd^olars like Pandit Ram Shastri and Pandit Chunaman Rao 
Dhar were also highly critical of the Congress* They 
8* Seditious Character of the Indian National Cwiaress* 
(Pioneer Press Allahabad 1888)* 
9* Rafiq 7'alcariai Rise of i^ uslims in Indian Politics* 
(Somaiya Pub.Pvt* I«td* Bombay 1971), p*64* 
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provided Juatlfieation for their attitude towards Congress* 
10 
from Puranas » the sacred books of Hindus. 
Here renalns no doubt that Hlfutes were also having 
their own reservations against the Congress* itie sane 
applies to certain sections of HusXlas who had their own 
doubts aiainst Congress* Congress was founded with the 
blessings of Lord Dufferln* the Viceroy of India* by A*C. 
Huiae who In a letter to sir Auckland Colvln* the Ueutenant 
3ovemor of the north-weatem Provinces* described the 
Congresri as "« safety valve for the escape of great and 
11 
growing forces* generated by our own action*" This reveals 
the true character of the Congress and the real notlve of 
Huflie as an attempt to abort the revolutionary upsurge in 
Zndla* The aeaaiona of the Congfma used to be attended by 
British governors end high officials* and the first resolu-
tion always used to be one of deep loyalty to the arltish 
government* the Congress even had some Englishmen as 
Presidents of Its sessions* for Instance 3eorge YUle (1888)1 
Sir wllUtfii ^ -Jedderbum (1889 and 1910) i Alfred webb (1894) f 
Sir Henry Cotton (1904)* the Congress deliberately chose 
)ritons as Presidents to prove its loyal character* tt»e 
10* Seditious Oltaraeter of Indian Watloaal Congress* op*clt** 
Appendix* xxxEV* 
11* Pioneer Mail* 7 November 1888* 
12* s*R*»4ehrotrai Towards India's Freedom and Partition* 
(Vlkas Publishing House Pvt* Ltd* 1^7^) p*6$* 
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already opprmis«<3 ^ fuslims also feard the loss of job 
opportunities in case selection by eoo^petitive exasnination 
had been introduced for vfhich Congress was striving by 
passing resolutions in its meetings and requesting their 
acceptance. 
All this was creating suspicicms aaong Muslins about 
the real laotives of the Congress and alienating them from 
the party. 
Britishers deliberately adopted such policies «rhi<^  
had for their aim the eeonooiic ruin of •fuslins* and their 
13 
intellectual stagnation and general degenerati<m« Itie 
educational policy of aritish in a way "was responsible 
for the increase of unetaploytaent and the closing of other 
avenues for the !4uslims« The economic policy impoverished 
the Indian <^u8lims• In the army# their recruitment was 
limited in arts and crafts they were crippled and rendered 
14 
helpless* ** Their ruin was complete as the government 
started reexamination of rent free tenures that had been 
granted by .Mughals to trusts and foundations for heritable 
and educational purposes* Ihe confiscations that followed 
brought great r€»venues* In this process^ the Muslim upper 
13* M.Nomani Muslim India *^i»f V^_^^?*'^^_'^^ ^^* ^ ^^ 
India Jiuslim League (Mli^abad 1942)»p*23* 
14. Ibid* 
- 4 . 
clpas waa Impoverished, their education suffered and "the 
15 
miadle classes vfere turned Into paupers,•* 
Itjus a policy of systematic suppression of '^sllms 
wes successfully pursued. TSie British were "dctr^ rmlned 
to cut them root and branch and to reduce them to « position 
16 
of complete political and economic servility." itie condi-
tion of abject misery to which the l^usllms were reduced Is 
Tilrrored b/ the Calcutta Persian Paper, Our 31n of July 14# 
1869. It wrote* *all sorts of employtnent, gre'^ t and small 
ere being gradually snatched away from the Muhammedans« 
bestoiwed on man of other races particularly the Hindus. 
The government is bound to look upon all classes of its 
subjects with r«n equal eye, yet the time has now came. 
when it publicly singles out the Muhammadans in its Gazettes 
for exclusion from official post. Recently whcm several 
vacancies occured in the office of the Sundarbf^ns Com-nlasloner, 
that official in 'Sdvertislng them in the government dasette 
stated that the appointment would be given to non but Hindus. 
In short, the '^hamnedans h've ntjw sunk so low, that even 
when qualified for government employ, they are studiously 
kept out of It by government notifiCr:^ tion8. No body notice 
of their helpless condition, and the higher authorities 
15. Ibid., pp. 26*27, 
16. Chaudhrl ic i^ammad All i Emery?nce of Pakistan (rondon 
1967) p . 7 , """^ 
- 10 -
17 
do not d«ign even t o acknowl«K3^e t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , " 
These expres s ive p o l i c i e s of the govema»nt created 
a viide -lulf bt'tween the t^uallrns and the <jovernnent. whi le 
other com-minitles were marching hen?d the Muslims were 
s ink ing down. Therefore, "the ^ s l i m s hr» i s u f f i c i e n t 
cause for d i scontent • • • • • they w<?re d e l i b e r a t e l y bt ing 
isolat«^d frotn a l l p l a c e s of p o s i t i o n and p r e s t i g e and 
c o n s t a n t l y kept out of governtwent s e r v i c e s . The excuse 
was that Muslims t h e n s e l v e s were re spons ib l e for t h i s 
s t « t e of a f f a i r s * for they kept on c l i n g i n g t o the old type 
of educat ion and re tra ined frc«B j o i n i n g the new s c h o o l s , 
3ut t M s i s an a l l e g a t i o n without any foundation; and i f 
i t be accepted, wh^t treatment was mated out t o them when 
they s t a r t e d learning English? They a l s o des i red t o enter 
the s e r v i c e s of the C<M^any lut they rece ived only d i s c r i -
mination, sometimes w i l d , of ten r u t h l e s s , nnd the door 
was c l o s e d aga ins t them. Consequently the number of Muslim 
e t ^ l o y e e s went on decreas ing and t h e i r economic condi t ion 
deterior-^ted from bad t o worse , In 'bengal, Sihar, o r i s s a 
and 1 t e r in the United Provinces everywhere they were 
18 
Ignored nd kept behind," Such a s t a t e of a f f a i r s was bound 
17, w.WoHunter t 'The Indian 'tesalmana** {the caarade 
Pub l i ca t ions Calcut ta , 1<J45), p , l 6 7 , 
19 , S iya-ul -Hasen Faruqui « the Peob nd School ^^ nd the 
Pern nd for Pakistan (^sia Publ i sh ing ftouse, 1963) , 
pp. 13-14 , 
. It -
to sp«ll disastrous consequences and as suc^ "To a jreat 
ext«nt th« future political find economic developments th t 
were to take pl.-^ ce In the Indian subcontinent* were due to 
this uneven and unbalanced development of the two major 
19 
ccximunities.** This* in the words of Jawaharlal Mehru 
"created new problems and prob bly the beginning of the 
20 
new lUndu-^Blim problem can be traced to it." 
It was at this point of Indian history whc?n the 
ce tury long patronage of the new power had ni?^ de the one 
section of our population highly educated* prosperous and 
above all politically conscious* while the other one was 
reeling under the heels of suppression for its fault of 
playing a leading role in the first war of independence 
for our country. Sir Syed* being convinced that the British 
rule h d come to stay in this country s the antl-aritish 
forces had been co<i^letely suppressed* "he made frantic 
effort to arrest the overflowing tide of suppression against 
21 
•^usalmans." He succeeded in convincing the British rulers 
that general discontent against their wrong policies 
rather the Muslim's instignations were responsible for the 
22 
revolt of 1957, 
1«?. Ibid., p. 16. 
20 . Jawaharlal Nehni t 'The Discovery of India** (London 
1951) , p . 2 8 2 . 
2 1 . z . A . S u l e r i t ?fv Leader (A Lion Publ i ca t ions 1945* 
Lahore) p . 1 9 . 
22 . Ib id .* p . 2 0 . 
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s i n c e 3y€d h:n. d Khan b e l i e v e d t h a t econoTilc 
s a l v a t i o n and r e g e n e r a t i o n of ius l i -ns l ay only in western 
e d u c a t i o n , he devoted h imse l f t o t h i s c ^ u s e . He founr?ed 
t h e tohamnsd n Ang lo -Or i en t a l Col lege a t Al iqarh In 1877. 
As l u s l l n s were -already suppressed encwgh, h i s adv ice 
t o l u s l l n s was no t t o be involved in n t i -gove rm»en t 
p o l i t i c s and t o c o n c e n t r a t e "Al l t h e i r e n e r g i e s on 
e d u c a t i o n nd t o s t r i v e t o cot»e up t o t h e l e v e l of o t h e r 
24 
c o m u n i t l e s i n l e a r n i n g and s c i e ' t i f i c ach ievemen t s . " 
S i r Syed in one of h i s l e c t u r e s s a i d " I a s s u r e you l a d i e s 
and gent le t ien , t h e only t h l n 7 which v/ould r a i s e t h e 
i u s l i n s t o t h e h i g h e s t p i n n a c l e of p r o i r e s s i s h igh 
e d u c a t i o n ; and u n t i l and u n l e s s we produce* men wi th high 
e d u c a t i o n we would c o n t i n u e t o be downtrodden nd would 
never rf?«ch t h e honourab le p o s i t i o n which would l i k e t o 
25 
r e s c h . " 
In Deceftiber 1835 the 'Indian National Congress* was 
forned 'snd Sir 3yed chose to oppose it. His stand should 
be understood in the light of his e^ irly views on political 
aqltation and representative government. In f ct Sir syed 
?3. v',.^ .^ UzHrT^ iI Svvld Ahnnad Khan (Public tion Division, 
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1^90) p.147. 
24. I b i d . , p . 1 4 2 . 
2 5 . K.K.Shcrwnni : Th*. AH^^rh ^ove-nent. ( S i r Syed 
lennorial Lec tu re 1069) p . 3 3 . 
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from t h e ve ry b e ^ l n n l n j was In favour of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
t o the I t j i s l a t u r e , "8u t a t t h e sane t l t i e S i r Hyed d id 
n )t in t h i s Gont' x t ^^verlook t h e r e a l i t i e s of t h e Ind ian 
s i t u a t i <n . . . . . ne f- 'vourrd t h e Tieth<^ j<3 of ncKnin?irtlon s 
t h e peop le wf>re d i v i d e d and i l l i t e r a t e . "h i s was prob bly 
because r , i r Syed thou7ht t h a t no s e c t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n 
26 
ghoul 3 70 u n r e p r e s e n t e d . " In 1393 wh i l e speaking an 
c e n t r a l i r o v l n c c s l o c a l s e l f jov« rmien t 3 i l l » he s a l d i 
" In > coun t ry l i k e I n d i a vvhe-re c ^ s t e d i s t i n c t i o n s s t i l l 
f l o u r i s h where t h e r e i s no fualon of v a r i o u s r e c c s , where 
rel iqrio 'J« d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e s t i l l v i o l e n t , where educr3tion 
in i t s naotiern sense has not aiade an equa l or p r o p o r t i o n a t e 
p r o g r e s s among a l l t h e s e c t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , I ana 
convinced t h a t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of 
e l e c t i o n pure anJi s i n p l e for r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of v a r i o u s 
i n t e r e s t s on the l o c a l 3oards and d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l s , would 
be a t t e n d e d wi th e v i l s of j r e i t e r s i g n i f Icaf^ce than p u r e l y 
27 
economic cons idera t ion .** 
This vf^ry f a c t t h a t c o n t r a r y t o h i s views on t h e 
i s s u e s Congress v^as s t r i v i n g fo r r e p r e s e n ' a t l v e 70verm»ent 
76 . Moin Shaki r 1 K h i l a f - t t o P a r t i t i o n (Mew l ^ l h l l?70) 
p . 2 1 . 
27, P roceed ings of t h e Counci l of t h e 3overnor -Genera l of 
I n d i a , Vol .22 (1883) . pp . 19»20. ouotf^d bv V.K.Snxenat 
•fuslims and t h e Ind i an ?7atlonal Congress (Difscovery 
L-elhi 1985) Foot n o t e s , p p . '^1-82. 
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oastd on only e l e c t i o n , attract*^d S i r Syed'a o p p o s i t i o n . 
On December 23, 1887 at the MuhamTiad^n Fducatlonal 
Confer^'nce at Lucknow he tiade h i s f i r s t pub l i c speech 
28 
aga ins t Congr«»ss, which decided once for a l l the a t t i t u d e 
29 
of the whole community towards the Congress. He opposed 
the demand of the Congress th^^t "-11 post in the subordi-
nate s e r v i c e s , frail that of Tahsildar t o subor'iJlnate 
30 
Jud^e should h j lven by compet i t ive exa'ninetions,* He 
further s t i d "a country in which there are d i f f e r e n t 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s which arc on unequal f o o t i n g as reiisrds the 
competi t ion", such a sys ten i s not s u i t a b l e . Tie further 
pointed out that the Muha?Tsnad'''ns have not a t ta ined "a 
p o s i t i o n as regards hi jher En-jlish educat ion, which i s 
nece^ss^'ry for hl'jher appointments, as t o put them on 9 
31 
l e v e l with flindas," 
In an another speech at ieerut on March 16, 1888 
he expressed n^ore or less s^me views on Congress ^nd its 
demands. He advised the '^ tusliins th t "ve should held 
ourselves aloof from this political uproar and reflect on 
our condition that we are behind the;n in education and are 
32 
deficient in wealth,** Kihile writing in the All^arh 
39, V,K, S?»xena, op,clt,, p,47, 
29, Mohd, ^oman, op,clt,, p, 40, 
30, Shan Muhamnad i Writings • nd Speeches of Sir Syed,p,207. 
31, Ibid,, p,20a, 
32, Ibid,, p, 194, 
- 15 -
I n s t i t u t e S s a e t t e , S i r Syed declared " the Congress ®qjita-
t i on i f i t i 3 unchecked, vjill end in a iiutiny followed 
b / hor rors and raass c res in conparis ion to which the 
nutiny of 1357 was «»re a c h i l d ' s pl<y and mny 
f i n a l l y end in a d i s a s t rous c^tastrophs.** In a l e t t e r t o 
the Edi tor of pioneer he wrote " the proposals of the 
Congress would be ^xtrenely p r J u d i c i a l t o the interf^sts 
34 
of the :4oha«nraadan8 " But here i t fnust be c l ea r t h a t 
'*Sir 3 yyed 's a t t i t u d e to the Congress was not bom of 
ny h o s t i l i t y t o w r d s Hindus or of fee l ings of loya l ty to 
the a r i t i s h " , as most of the !Jl8toriens and w r i t e r s h ve 
Tiade i t t o bel if 'vc, "but sole ly of the reason t h ^ t he wanted 
•luss 1-nans t o jc t the chance to r thinl< t h e i r though s . 
Any ant I-government aqjit^tlon in the c; se of "lussalmans would 
Inev i tab ly throv.; the^^ b:'C*t to reac t ionary move-tients 
aga ins t wcstern thoughts , apar t fron the suffer ings 
35 
Invoi/ed In such c move for them." thus , " the only cons i -
dera t ion t h a t d lca ta ted h i s pol icy was the i n t e r e s t of 
36 
t h e ^.uss Itnana", and not "hie anxiety t o keep the Br i t i sh 
happy", z .A . su l e r i r i g h t l y observed "having rescued them 
frosn the c lu tches of a century long tyrannicpsl po l icy . 
33, Aligarh I n s t i t u t e Sazet te (search 1st 1890) • 
34, SygKJ'a l e t t e r to Pioneer (Mlahab d, 8 Auqfust 1381, 
Published on 10th August 1388), 
35, Z.A.Suler i , o p . c i t , , p , 27, 
36, I b i d , , p , 24, 
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Sir fjyed was loath to reopen the flood-gates of supore-
ssion Any course of action which sought to line up 
aj-lnst ti0 f|overn.TK?nt was suicidal. Hence the ^ ussal^ans-
the jreat lead* r ripcldpa - should tak* their own time to 
37 
tmster uu strength and denaarcste their line of action." 
fhe Indian National Conqrress was championing the 
cause of the English educ ted people who for^ aed a micro-
scopic (Tjlnority of the tnfUan population, f it would 
have championed the cause of all classes of Indian 
society, it would certainly have taken into account the 
pathetic condition of Muslinns in India while formulating 
its various dem nds, 3ut, as Muslims were averse to 
^n^llsh education* its demands of representative govern-
nnent by election nd appointment by competitive exa-nina-
tion threatened the existence of Muslims in various local 
bodies and government jobs, Muslims therefore apposed these 
demands. Inspite of their opposition the Congress was 
striving to get these demands accepted by passing resolutions 
in its various meetings. As such it created suspicion 
among Mv^ slims about its real motives -nd contriiwted much 
in alienating the Muslims fro;a Congress, 
Tn face of such n opposition. Congress desperately 
tried to defend Itself, 3-^ druddln Tyabji, the President of 
37, Ibid., p, 26, 
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Indras Congr«»8 in 1987, A,0,Huai» and w,c. Bannerjee made 
sincere effort* to wean Sir Syed fro.-n the path of opposition 
38 
to that of cooperation with the congress. In a letter 
dated 13th January 1888 Tyabjl saidt "It does seem to 
me to be a great pity that on matters affecting all India 
ra a whole, any section of the Musalnan community should 
keep aloof from the Hindus and thus retard the national 
progress of India as a whole. I understand your objection 
to be that the Hindus being more advanced than ourselves 
would profit ?nore by any concessions made by the government 
•••••if any proposal is made which would subject the 
Musalmans to the Hindus or would vest the inclusive power 
in Hindus to the detriment of the Musalmans, I should 
appose it with all my strength, but the Congress proposes 
to do no such things. Its aims are and -mist be for the 
benefit of all cotiniunities equally and -ny proposition 
that is disliked by the ^ohattaadans as a body nmist be 
39 
excluded from it^ ** In reply Sir Syed wrote Tyabji on 19th 
Feburary I8881 ••I do not understand what the words 
'National Congress mean ••••• you regard, tc doings of the 
misnamed *Maticmal Congress* as beneficial to India, but 
v.K.Saxena, qp^clt., p^ 53^ 
39, Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement 
in India, collected from <)cxnbay 3ovemment records; 
Vol.II, 1895-1920, p^ 68. 
- 13 -
I an sorry to nay that 1 regard them AS not O' Iv injurious 
to my own commirjity but also to India at large" 
rn f^n another letter to Tyabjl, published in ioneer. 
Sir 5yp'J wrote: "1 asked my frien<i aadruddin Tyabjl to 
lenve aside those insignificant point in the prc^osals of 
the Congress in which Hindus and Moharamadans agree^ and to 
tell me what fundata«bt«l political principles of the 
congress are not opposed to the interests of -^ici^amix^Sanam 
The first is th^t the snerabers of the Viceroy's Counicl 
should be chosen by election on which stress was laid in 
the recent Congress of Madras* over which my friend 
ladruddin Tyabji Presided, I proved In my LucVnow speech 
thcit whatev* r system of election be adopted there will be 
four tines as many Hindus as Mohammadans* and all their 
demands will be gratified* and the power of legislation over 
the whole conwninity will be In the h :nds of Bengalis or 
of Hindus of Bengali type, and the Mohanmad^ns will fall 
41 
into a condition of utmost degradation," 
thus* "ir Syed remained stuck to his old stand, 
under his leadership educated Muslims largely remained 
aloof from the Congress, The bulk of Muslim masses under 
the influence of I'lema v«*io were against the English 
40, Ibid., p. 71. 
41, The Pione^f (Allahabad, 9th April 1388), Also 
Shan Muhammadt op.cit., p, 233, 
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education and hence against all forms of collaboration 
with the reqrlme, kept away both froTi the R-^ j and the 
Ccmgress« which was already suspected in their eyes. Thus 
"his co-religionists who differed from his views on religion, 
educational and social matt rs .?nd opposed him violently 
followed hioa in politics and preserve-d their isolation 
42 
from the Congress." 
HusliiB* s opposition to Congress was so intense that 
in laas T/a&jl aske^ Hu«e, the founder Secretary of the 
Congress to suspend its ctivlties for five years. Tyabji 
noted? The fact exists and whether we like or not we must 
base our proceedings upcm the fact that an overwhelnning 
majority of iohairrjedans are against the rnovement ••••• if 
then the '4ussalnian Contnunlty as a whole is against the 
conjress - rightly or wrongly does not flatter - it follows 
that the tnov«'?nent ipsofacto ceases to be a general or 
43 
naticHial Congress." 
In the fourth Congress of 1388 at Allahabad* a 
resolution was adoptecl that such "resolutions should not 
be introduced for discussion if one comitiunlty strongly 
objected, or be passed if such objection became apparent 
42, -f.Hom-n, op,cit,, p, 40, 
43, Source Materials for a History of Freedom Movement 
in India. Vol, II, p,81. 
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44 
during discussion^'* Tribune observed! "After this 
assurance let us hope our Mohairenriidan £riend vill no longer 
hesitate to Join their Hindus fellow subjects* Nothing 
can '^e a stronger proof of the good faith of the Congress 
than this resolution •••••• 'nd let us hope that the fear 
45 
of the raore suspicious ?1u8lims brethren h ve been removed," 
In fact behind ?11 these appeals "there was the realisation 
that unless Muslims were won over and their fears about 
Hindu dominaticm allayed# they would place obstacles in the 
46 . 
path of reforms." with the same intention a scheme of 
reforms was ad<H>ted in the Congress of 1889 at BO!id>ay which 
sug^ jested that "whenever the Parsees* Christians* Mbhamma* 
dans or Hindus, as the csae may be# elected to the provin-
ci-a legislature, shall not, so far may lie possible bear 
a less prc^ortion to the total number of members elected 
there to, than the total number of Parsees, Christians, 
Hindus or '^ ohanamadans as the case may in such electoral 
47 
Jurisdiction bear to the total population," 
44, H.H.Dodwell (cd,) The Cambridge History off India, 
Vol.VI, (New Delhi, 1064), p.541, 
45, Tribune, 23 January 1899, 
46, i^ lushirul Hasan t Nationalism and Communal Politics 
in India 1916»1928. (Manohar 1979) p.32, 
47, A, Moin Zaidi and Sh'hefla Zaidi (ed,) The Encyclopaedia 
of Indian National C^gygagf Col, one (S, Chand and 
Company, New Delhi 1977) p,335. 
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Yet 311 these attempts failed because of Muslim 
attitude of hatred as the discontent against the British 
?*nd distrust against the Conaress. The grievances of 
Muslims were more deep*rooted than to be eradicated by 
mere pious words. Even the death of Sir Syed in 1998 
did not bring immediate change in Htuslim's attitude 
towards Congress. Tixm Muslim ccJMnmunity b/ and large 
followed the advice of Sir Syed ;^ hmad Khan and remained 
aloof from politics. Jawi^arlal Nehru rightly remarked 
"He wanted no diversions or distraKstions from other direc-
tions* The beginnings of a nov nationalism*sponsored 
by the Hindu Bourgeoisie seemed to him to offer such a 
distraction* and he opposed it. The <!indus# half a century 
ahead in western education could indulge in this pastime 
of criticising the government* but he had counted on the 
full cooperation of the government in his educational 
undertakinis and he was not goinj to risk by any premature 
steps ..... Sir Syed*s decision to concentrate on western 
e^cation for Muslims was undoubtedly a ri^t one. without 
that they could not have played effective part in the 
building up of Indian Nationalism of the new type* and 
they would have been deemed to play second fiddle to the 
Hindus with their better education and for strong economic 
position. The r<fuslims were not historically or ideologi-
cally ready then for the bourgeoisie nationalist movement 
• 22 •• 
as they had developed no bourgeoisie* as the Hindus had 
done* Sir Syed*0 activities* therefore* although seemingly 
48 
very moderate* were in the right revolutionary direction." 
The dewn of 20th century witnessed the revival of 
Urdu-Hindi controversy which "disturbed the still waters 
49 
of /lijarh." The decision of Lt, Oovernor Sir Anthony 
Hacdonell sanctioning the use of Hindi in Devanagri script 
as the official vernacular drew stiff opposition from 
Nfuslims* "as the resolution threatened 'lusUms more than any 
vested Interest in government service* wrote Robinson* 
"because f^usliras did not come across the Negri script in the 
50 
normal course of their educatlcnr^ . ** misllms were also to 
be seriously affected by this resolution in matters of 
51 
"education* trade* cotwoerce law and other professions** 
Nawab f4c^ sinul Mulk* Secretry of the i4,A.o,College* 
Aligarh was leading the agitation* as the Secrp'tary of the 
48. Jawaharlal Nehru t An Autobioqrraphv (London 1955) op, 
461-62. 
49. Ram Oopal j int^ fan Husllms - A Political History 
i 1858-1947) (Asia Publishinqi House 1<^ 59> p,84. 
50. Francis Robinsont separatigm Among Indian Muslims 
(Vikas Pub. 1975) p.44. 
51. vi.Noman* op.cit.* pp. 58-59. 
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n«wly founded central Urdu Defence Association, against 
the decision of the government but he had to jlve up his 
activities in this regard because of the displeasure of 
the Lt. Oovemor, sir Anthony Macdonell, and his threat 
52 
to stop the goverroient subsidy to the College. Such an 
attitude of the government "was terribly shocking to the 
Muslims as a whole, partlc larly the younger generation 
at Allgarh was completely disillusioned and became aus-
S3 
plcious Of fhe British professions of friendship for them." 
AS a consequence of all this "it was finally decided that 
the vtusllma must form a political association to safeguard 
54 
their interests.* In a letter to Nawab Mohsln-ul-MulK, 
Nawab Vlqar*ul->^ tolk wrotei 
••The manner in which 'luslims rights are being 
treacled and attacked from all sides and tone of the 
nuoOier of articles that are being published against us, 
it is Impossible : or the Muslims to keep tbeir tongue tied 
and be a mere passive observer, v^o can deny that by 
such moves liuslims will not be hit hard? To remain 
indifferent to this and to be stagnant and to concentrate 
in 
all our energies /making mere education popular la an 
55 
ideal i^ossible to achieve and act upon.** 
52. Shaikh Muhammad Ikraai Maul-i-Kauthar (Karachi 4.d.) 
p.m. 
53. Z.H.Paruqi, op.cit., p. 47. 
54. Mtohd. Ncmant c ^ . c i t . , p .62 . 
55. Ibid. 
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He then took the task and formed the political 
56 
nd social organisation of the Huslims at Aligarh to 
defend their rights but this organisation failed due to 
various reasons* the 24uslims began to think and talk 
seriously on the same line. Asrar-i-«Jadid in May 1903 
wrote "owing to the want of such an association the 
interests of the !4a8lina» community h^ve already suffered 
57 
in a variety of ways and still trampled under foot * 
The paper also pleaded for cooperation with Congress an 
the Issues o£ common interest. Various resolutions of the 
Congress passed in 1888 and 1898 to win over the Muslim 
support had at least made their impact on the minds of 
Muslim youth. 9y this time the congress had established 
itself fully. The government by accepting some of its 
it 
resolutions had givettilf a credibility as a forum for 
airing the grievances of the various sections of the 
Indian people. Muslims problems required a national plat-
form nnd the Coniress had alr<?8dy given assurance in its 
resolution in 1888 that no disputed matters between the 
cammunities will be debated and discussed in the form of 
resolution. The mood of young Muslim generation had 
changed. They were willing to get Involved in agitation 
56. Ibid., p. 63. 
57. Asrar-i-Jadid (Meerut) M.^ y 1903 UPHNK 1903. 
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to safeguard their interests* They began to wish for a 
political organisation like the Congress which could 
espous4» their cause* 
Mohsin^ul-Mulk adnitting this change wrote to 
Archbold th# Principal of Aligarh College "Mohanmiadans 
feeling is very much changed ••*•• (and there is general 
feeling) that the Hindus succeeded owing to their agita* 
tion# «?nd the Mohafwnadans have suffered for their silence* 
The Moha-nmadans have generally begun to think of organising 
58 
•••••and foradng theaselves into political agitation." 
In the meantime Hohsin-ul*!4ulk came to know that 
British Oovemiient was going to introduce constitutional 
reforms, so he "felt concerned regarding the position of 
59 
the ^slins under these reforms,*' AS Secretary of H.A.O* 
College he directed Ht, Archbold* the Principal of College 
to get "an early appointment for a representative deputa-
tion which woUld place the !4uslim point of view before the 
60 
Viceroy* in connection with the forthcoming reforms*" The 
Viceroy agreed to receive the deputation* !^hsin*ul-Mulk 
58* 4^ohsin->ul-l4ulk to Archbold* 19 August 1906* quoted in 
R.Wasti* Lord Hinto and the Indian National Movement 
1905-10 (Oxford 1964) p*231* 
59, ^ History of the Freedom Movement, Vol.Ill, 1906-36 
Part I*(Pakistan Historical society Pub, Karachi 
1961), p*32* 
60* Ibid. 
- 26 • 
organised the deputation and at his suggestion Aga Khan 
was n<Miinated th« leader of the Jeputation. On October 1, 
1906, 35 prominent Musliaas led by Age Khan presented a 
nemoranduni to Lord ^^into, the Viceroy of India. 
T^e deputation put forward the following demandsi 
(1) The electoral system for the elective bodies should 
be such as to provide for the rights of the Muslims 
to elect their own representative from special 
constituencies* 
(2) Keeping in view their historical iniportance and 
political position the 'lusliiis should be givcm more 
seats than are warranted by their peculation 
strength. 
(3) The Muslims should be ?lven appolntmcmts in gasetted 
and non gazetted services "according to a certain 
proportion. They should be appointed as judges of 
High Courts and Chief Courts and members of the 
Ex€>cutive Councils. 
(4) Some seats should be reserved for Muslims in the 
Syndicates and senates of the Universities. 
(5) Aid should be given for the establishment of the 
iiuslim University."61 
The .most important of all these demands was a 
system of separate electorate for Muslims which was to 
cast everlasting Influence on Indian politics in coming 
years. In fact Simla Deput^ftion was the culmination of 
worst fears of exclusicM) from elective bodies i.e. the 
legislative councils, district boards -?nd municipalities. 
There was general discontent among Muslims that the Muslims 
are not elected to these bodies, because of their being in 
61. Ibid., p. 34. 
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62 
minority in electoral bodies. Even in Muslim majority 
63 
provinces like Sind they were not ade ••: :^i/ represented, 
becmise of lack of education and poor economic conditions. 
Ttie Viceroy Lord Mint© in the course of his reply remarkedi 
*I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any 
electoral representatlcm in India vould be doomed to 
mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal 
enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions 
of the communities conqposiqo the population of this 
64 
continent* ** 
After their meeting with the Viceroy the members of 
the Deputation held consultations among themselves regard-
in r the possibility of forming a political association. 
'*Nawab Sir Salim-ullah of Dacca published his notes about 
65 
his idea of an all India Muslim confoderacy.** At the 
conclusion of the annual session of the All India !^slim 
EduC'^ticmal Conference at Dacca on DeccMober 30* 1906« a 
political association called "All India Muslim League" 
was established by a resolution which statedi 
62. Address presented to Lord^into« Viceroy of India* 
quoted by Ram Oopal* op.clt.« Appendix a«pp.330o31* 
63. Ibid., p. 332. 
64. Mary Minto, India, Minto and Horley, pp. 47«>48, 
quoted by Ram a<9al, op.cit., p.100. 
65. History of Freedom Movements op.cit., p. 35. 
"Resolved that this (fleeting coniposed of ^salmans 
from all parts of India* assembled at Dacca# decid<p that 
a political associaticm be formed, styled All India 'luslia 
League* ^or the furtherance of the following objects! 
(1) To proaiote atoong the Musalmans of India feelings of 
loyalty to the aritish Oovemment and to renove any 
misconception that may arise as to the intention of 
govemiaent with regard to any of its measures* 
(2) TO protect and advance the political rights and 
interests of the Husalmens of India and to respect-
fully represent their needs taid aspirations to the 
government* 
(3) To prevent the rise, a^ nong the Husalmans of India 
of feeling of hostility towards other comrmmities, 
without prejudice to the other aforementioned <^Jects 
66 
of the League." 
The first resolution passed by the All India Huslin 
League expressed loyalty to the British <3ovemment« and 
the fortninj of a party to express their grievances, was 
in conformity with the Congress itself, as pointed out 
earlier in the chapter. 
66. The PiQnf>f ^ (All^abad, 2nd January 1907) also 
Sharifuddin Pirsadai Foundation of Pakiatanf 
Vol. I, p.6. 
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The Congress supported the agitation for the 
annulment of the partition of Bengal which had resulted 
into the formation of a Muslim majority province* Thus» 
in view of these develppments "the Muslims were left with 
no alternative but to form a political party of their 
67 
own to safeguard their interests*" 
Since the day of partition of Bengal in October 
1905» Hinc^s were agitating for its withdrawal* Muslims 
on the other hand« had supported this measure because it 
provided them a Muslim majority province with greater 
share in educatlcm* government services* and the pro-
68 
fessicms than they could ever hope in an united Bengal* 
The partition proved to be a blessings for the Muslims of 
East Bengal as they were benefitted by this measure* 
file nuiift>er of literates in the province increased from 
12,455 (14*53 per cent) in 1905, to 35,688 (21*43 per cent 
in 1910*11* There was a corresponding increase in the 
69 
number of Muslim educational officers and teachers* There 
were similiar gains in public appointments* In 1901, 
Muslinui held one-eighth of the 1,235 gazetted appointmentSi 
67* V*K*Saxena, op*cit,, p* 93* 
63* Rafiq Zakaria, op*cit*, p* 100* 
69* s*Ahmadi Muslim Cotnmunity in B^maal 1884»1912 (Dacca, 
1974), pp* 288-95 quoted by Mufl^irul Hasan, op*cit*, 
p . 52* 
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70 
In 1917, they occupied on« flft5 of the 2,305 such pos t s , 
'4u3lifa8 v#ere a l so winning sea t s in t he m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 
In Cownila d iv i s ion , they secured e i^h t of the tw^'lve s e a t s , 
71 
and in Sylhet six of the ten vacancies in 1906-07. In 
the triennial election of Dacca municipality, eight out 
72 
of the fourteen candidates elected were Muslims, 
Contrary to Huslim stand, Hindus were crulte opposed 
73 
to partition as they called it "A irave National disaster", 
and an attack on the 7rowlng solidarity of Bengali 
n-tionalisni. Tut a deep insight into the controversy 
reveals that the hue and cry over partition was nothing 
but and attenmpt to perpetuate "their dominance in the 
74 
public services n^d professions,* Lawyers of Calcutta 
visualised it as a threat to their legal profession. They 
threw their "wealth and weight, into the fight against 
75 
the scheme, * ttie flaharaja Manlndra Chander Nandi 
expressed his grief and sorrow when he said that in East 
70, '^ ushirul Hasan, op,cit«, p, 52, 
7 1 , Resolution Reyiewinof the Reports of the working of 
the i^funieipalities in Eastern Bengal end ASS€CT, 
106-7 (Shi l long, 1909) p , l , quoted by Hushlrul Hasan, 
opaCi t , , p , 52 , 
72, Tribune^ 24 Narch 1909, 
73 , aengalee (Calcut ta , 7th Ju ly 1905), 
74, ^ushirul Hasan, o p , c i t . , p , 52, 
75, r , B , Krishnai the Problem of l i i n o r i t l e s (london, 
1939), p ,14a . 
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Bengal "the Muslim population will preponderate (and) 
the Benaali Hindus will be In a minority, we shall be 
76 
stran <*rs In our own land.* So the real irlevance of the 
Hindus was that their dominence was threatened in the 
new province* whereas they were not ready to allow it. 
For this purpose they launched a violent campaign against 
partition. Revolutionary bodies were formed and th«iy carried 
out under-ground terrorists activities. "The revolutionary 
77 
terrorists swore by the Oita and K^li" struck at Muslims 
and Britishers. As a matter of fact "all the revolutionary 
78 
groups were then actively anti-muslia." 
All this resulted into serious Hindu-Muslim riots 
79 
in East Bengal. The anti-partition agitation seriously 
effected the relation of the Hindus and the vtuslims. 
Ihe congress* support to anti-partition agitation 
added fuel to the fire. Rot a single year passed* from 
1905-11 when the Congress did not demand the annulment of 
76. Proceedings of the Town Hall Protest Meeting* 
7 August 1905. 
77. Sipln Chandra* Communaliam and National Movement* in 
Communalism and Pan Islamic trends in colonial I«dia. 
Edited b'/ Mushirul Hasan (Manohar 1981) p. 188, 
78. Maulana Abul Kalam Aaad t India wins Freedom^ 
(orient Longmans* 1959). ?••• 
79. M. Noman* op.cit.* p. 92. 
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Bengal in its aessicms. In its Benaras session in 1905 
it passed the resolution "that this Congress records Its 
e<TH>h8tic protests against the partition of 3engal 
this Congress appeals to the government of India and the 
Seer* tary of State to reverse or modify the arrangements 
made, in such a manner as to conciliate public opinion «»d 
allay the excitement and unrest present among all classes 
80 
of the people^" At the Calcutta session in 1^06 Congress 
passed a resolution demanding ••to reverse or modify the 
partition in such a manner as to keep the entire 3ent|ali-
speaking community under one undivided administration and 
thus restore contentment to so important province as Bengal.' 
'The same <temand was repeated in Kagpur session when 
Coniress appealed "to the Government of India* and the 
Secretary of state for India to reverse the partition of 
Bengal or to modify it in such a manner as to keep the 
entire ^ngali-speaking coanKinity under one and the same 
82 
administratis)*'* This resolution was «»ce again reiterated 
in the Madras session of 1908. Honourable Mr. Krishnan 
Umlc in t is aeaaion declared that "if the partition is 
a settled fact* the unrest in India is also a settled 
83 
fact » 
30* 21st Congress '^ lanaras* 1905* Resolution No.xii# 
aacYclcg>aedia of Indian W'tional Congress, o p . c i t . . 
Vol. foiir, pp. 719»20, ' ~~" 
81 . 22nd Ccmgreas Calcutta, 1906. Resolution no .v i . Full 
Text of a l l presidential address. Reprint of a l l 
Congress Resolutions e t c . Cffatesan «d Company,Madras, 
n.d.) p.164. 
Contd. . . . 
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So Congress opposed the partiticMi vebeneatly and 
pressed for its annulment. It also "adopted 'Boycott' 
84 
and 'Swadeshi' as Its o%m cult*" Muslins on the other 
hand, supported the partition and massive ralles 
85 
In its support and ccMidemned anti-par tit Ion agitation. 
Although Swadeshi movement was benefeciol to all* Muslims 
opposed It because of its association with anti-partition 
agitation. Prominent t^uslim leaders were of the view that 
unless Swadeshi movement wa^ dissociated from anti-parti-
tion agitation, there was no question of cooperation of 
86 
Nuslitrts for this movement. They also appealed to the 
'4uslims to remain aloof from Swadeshi movement as it was 
87 
for the annulment of the partition of Bengal. 
^Continued from the previous page) 
92. Proceeding of the 23rd Indian Hati<mal Congress 
• Resolution No.v, Encyclopaedia of ClTlTr»Vlilri 
Indian National Congress, op.cit.. Vol.Five, p.279. 
83. Proceeding of the Indian National Congress (Madras 
P 
84. V.K. Saxena# op.cit.« p.126. 
35. The Eastern Bengal and Assam Era, 23rd Jan. 1907* 
quoted in "The History of the Freedom Hoyement" 
Pakistan Historical Society, o p . c i t . , p .25. 
86. yr**?*"^  (Kanpur, April, Hay 1906), quoted by V.K. 
Saxena, o p . c i t . , pp. 127-23. 
87. ^ f Roh|,Al^ifia <laiftt» (are i l l y , 24th August 1906), 
a lso Ihe Mufid-i-Am, Agra, 24th Sept. 1906. 
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The Muslim League fully supported the partition 
of Bengal* In its first meeting in Dacca on Dc^ cember 30« 
1906* "luslitn League resolved "that this tieeting in view of 
the clear interest of the ^ussalmans of Eastern Bengal 
considers thnt the partition is sure to prove beneficial 
to the Hohanmedan comnunlty «^leh constitutes the vast 
majority of thatpr<wince, and th»t all such methods of 
agitation as boycotting* should be strongly condemned -nd 
83 
discouraged." Zn its 2nd sessiont Muslim Leairue at 
^mritsar reaffirmed its earlier stand on the question of 
partition of Bengal. It observed "the partition has given 
a new life to the people in the Eastern province. They 
are feeling m refreshing sense and ^ relief from the 
89 
thraldom of Calcutta." 
thus it becomes quite clear in the light of the 
facts th^t regarding partition there were absolutely 
opposit stands on the part of the bOt^ oomunitl** •• 
well as the Congress and the Muslim League. In fact "on 
the issue of the partition of Bengal the Hindu and the 
Muslim* the Congress and the Muslim Leacrue were clearly 
90 
divided." However the attitude of Indian National 
88. Pirsada* o^.cit., p. 12. 
39. Ibid., p. 85. 
90. V.K. Saxena, op.cit.* p. 120. 
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Congress was responsible for the disenchantnent of the 
Husllm Youth vfho at one stage had thou:^t of Joining the 
Congress and agitation against the govemroent* the 
C<mgress sponsored *S«radk»8hi* and * boycott* myvements 
could not get support from the Muslim masses as these 
were linKed with the annulment of the partition of Bengal* 
However* the pressure politics exerted by the Congress 
yielded results when on December 12, 1911, the annulment 
of partition was announced* 
This decision came as a great surprise and shock 
to the Muslims and caused general discontent among the 
91 
Muslims and the leaders of the eominunity* who were 
repreatedly assured by the government that partition was 
a settled fact* Nawab Viqar*ul-(4ul1(« the Secretary of 
Aligarh College said on the partition, "The policy of 
the 3ovemment is like a eanncm which passed over the 
dead bodies of 'Muslims witViout any feeling «Aiether anKmgst 
them there was anyone alive and whether he would receive 
92 
any painful sensatitxri trom this action of theirs*** Sir 
Samiullah the Nawab of Dacca expressing the grief and 
anguish in his speech on March 1912 said, "that tln» '^ ••* 
91* A History of the Freedom Movement, op.cit., p*29, 
92* C*Khallquszaman t Pathway to Pakistan (Longmans 
Pakistan Branch) 1961, p.17* 
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reason for the undoing of partitlMi lay in the fact that 
the Hindus fought against the government through a 
revolutionary movanent# and Muslims were raerely content 
93 
with the British promises,- Mussalman in its column obser-
ved, "Agitate and you will get what you wantt remoin 
calm and you will have your heads ch<vped* This is the 
94 
moral we are given.** Hence the ?1uslim Community all over 
India resented the action of government and looked upon it 
95 
as the great betrayal* But the Congress welcomed the 
annulment and in its Calcutta session of 1911 expressed 
its gratitude to the King Emperor, the Secretary of 
96 
State and the government of India for the annulmwit. 
The Indian Newspapers controlled'by Hindu Bourgeois and 
other organisations thanked the government and expressed 
their faith in the 'wisdom*, •methods* and the sense of 
'justice' of the Britishers. 
Muslims were disappointed, with the government. 
However, the setback, "served indiriKttly to quicken the 
growth of Muslim political consciousness and underline 
97 
the need of self reliance.** Muslims rightly began to 
93. KhaliquBZaman, op.cit., p. 18. 
94. Muaaalman. 12 January 1912. 
95. A History of Freedoffl Movement, op.cit., p. 28. 
96. 26th conairesa, C-lcutta 1911, Resolution Wo>Il> 
A Hoin Z^idi and Shaheda Zaidi, op.cit., voi.vl, 
p. 234. 
97. A Historv of the Freedom Hoveawnt, op.cit., p.54. 
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realla* that only "peoples organised strength and their 
98 
willingness to aake sacrifice* and not the passive 
attitude and the false sense of loyalty could serve any 
cause. Su<rf» feelings were expressed In leagues sessions 
of 1910-12, ihls brought about a fundamental change 
In the Nuslltn attitude towards the governaient and the 
Congress. Muslim League in Its session of 1913, resolved 
to adopt as its goal# "the attainment under the aegis 
of the British Crovm of a system of self govenwaent 
suitable to Indl® through Constitutional n^ans by bring* 
ini about* aoiong others* a steady reform of the existing 
system of administration* by pr<Miioting natle»ial unity* 
by fastening public spirit among the people of India and 
by cooperating with other comfnunltles for the said 
99 
purpose. •* 
Incidently* "The beginning of the Muslim League's 
transformation into a quasi-political body coincided with 
some uneasy developments in Mtuslim countries of the Middle 
100 
Ea9t* casting no small amount of concern to lndl-?n ^slims.* 
I1»e feeling of Muslims were embittered end the British 
hostility to Islrmic countries* further alienated the 
98. Ibid. 
99. Sa lwid* M.H.Huhammad Mi J innah - A P o l i t i c a l 
Study ( L ^ o r e 1953) p . 2 9 . 
100. Rati Q(^al* o p . c l t . * p . 121. 
- 38 • 
101 
l^usllms from 3ritlsh 3ov«mnicnt« tfi« Kanpur mosque 
Incident In which a number of Innocent Muslims* tryin9 
to rebuild a portion of the demolished mosque were ruthlessly 
fired upon and killed toy the police* further inflaised 
antio3ritish feelings among f^uslims. Aroused by these 
ev«nts« the London Branch of Muslim Le^ g^ue "appealed to 
the^iusUms of India to cast in their lot with the Hindus 
and to identify themselves with the political objectives 
102 
of the Indian Rational Congress.** Itie league session of 
1914 appointed a committee cm the motion of Mr. M.A.Jinnah 
"to formulate and frame a scheme of reforms in consul-
103 
tation with other political organisation•** The Congress 
also directed the All India Congress committee to negotiate 
with the All India riuslim League for the purpose of 
framing a scheme of reforms. Hence the groui^ for coopers* 
tion between both communities in general and between 
Conjress and the liuslim League in particular began to 
prepare. People started expressing view on the same line 
for the cooperation. In the colunm of *Mu8salman* Hr.viujibur 
Rahman's comnient that 'there is no room for the old time 
honoured arguments against the congress* -is there is no 
difference between the aims ->nd objects of the Congress and 
101. V.K. Saxena, op.cit.« p. 154. 
102. Ram a<^ >el* op.clt.« p. 123. 
103. Mohd. Noman* op.cit.* p. 148. 
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104 
those of the *iallm Lea^e*« reflected the real laood of 
the <^slims whose outlook had greatly changed. 
the Congress responded well to the good will and 
the offer expressed by the League. Some of Its leaders 
started attending =4uslim Lesiue^s sessions. Mow the 
Congress, «nd the Muslim League were holding th<Plr 
sessions sisnultaneously* ?«nd at the same place. Delegates 
of both organls tion began to att^md one another^s 
sessions. Thus the political atmosphere was changed 
with enthusiasfOf friendship and fraternity. All those 
developments culminated into Lucknow pact of 1916. 9oth 
organisations h?»d earlier agreed at Calcutta in October 
1916 on the questions of u^sliio representations in 
Legislative Councils and the form of representative 
govemmt'nt to be demanded, rhls schetie was placed before 
the two organisations for ratification in their Lucknow 
session of 1916 and ratified by the same, ttie scheme 
provided that **adequate** provision should be ?!i<ide for 
the representation of important ninorities by elections 
and the Hohammedons should be represented through special 
electorate on the provincial legislative councils in the 
following proportions! 
104. Hluaaalm^n, 4 January 191S. 
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Punjab t On«<-half of the elected Indian {aciabers. 
United t 30 per cent o£ the elected Indian merabers. 
Provinces 
Bihar I 25 per cent of the elected Indian members. 
Madras i 15 per cent of the elected Indian meoibers* 
Bombay i One»thlrd of the elcKrted Indian members* 
Provided that no lohanBnedans sh^ll participate in 
any of the other elections, to the Imperial or provincial 
legislr^tive councils* save and except those by electo-
rate representing special interests. 
Provided further that no bill nor any clause 
thereof nor a resolution introduced by non-official 
inembers affecting one or the other comiminity, which 
question is to be determined by the members of the comimi-
nlty In the legislative council concerned shall be pro-
ceeded with« if three-fourths of the members of that 
community in the particular council* inqperial or provin-
cial* oppose the bill or any clause thereof or the 
105 
resolution.** 
the seccmd part of the scheme demanded that "in 
the reconstruction of the Empire* India should be raised 
105, Report of 31st Indian national Congress 1916* p.77 
cited by 8,N. Bandey* The Indian Nationalist Hove^ 
ment 1885-1947. Sel^etgd Documents (Mj»eMlllan 
1979)* p.20. 
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itom the status of a dependency to that of an equnl partner 
in the Bnplre as a self governing dominion. The provincial 
legislative councils should consist of four-fifths of 
elected and one-fifth of nonsinated members. Members of 
the councils should be elected directly by the people on ^s 
106 
broad franchise as possible.** 
Regarding the imperial legislative council* "the 
Lucknow Pact provided, that one-third of the Indian elected 
members should be Muslims, elected by separate electorates 
In the provinces in the same proportion in which they were 
107 
represented in the provincial legislative councils.** 
in return for these concessions the fluslim League 
agreed to reduce ^slim representations in Bengal from 
52.69(# to which they were entitled b/ their population, 
to 40% and in Punjab from 55X to 50%. The ^^*^^^repre-
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106. Ram Qopal, op.cit., p. 130. 
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the arcJiitect of this pact was Mr. M.A.Jinnah. The 
pact was undoubtedly his personal triuiaph In his campaign for 
Hindu-^fuslin unity ~nd Congress-League cooperation. His 
contribution to the cause of Hindu Muslim unity was of such 
a high order that aokhale used to call him the best i^«b«ssi»dor 
108 
of Hindu-Muslim unity. Hence the Uicknow Pect prepared the 
ground for political collaboration firaong Hindus and Muslims 
in general* and between Congress and Muslim League in parti-
cular. '*fh9 basic aim, undoubtedly, was the fusion of Hindu 
and Muslim into one political community, united in the comm<»t 
purpose, aim and <tojective of confronting the British Qov0m-' 
ment with a united demand for constitutional changes and 
109 
reforms." 
As such the recognition by the Congress of the 
principle of separate electorate in 1916 was an inqportant 
step towards removing the obstacles for rappro4ch««»lit with 
the Muslim leaders and so forming a united front for demanding 
constitutional reforms from the Oovemment. Had congress 
108. V.K.Saxena, op.cit., p. 168. 
109. Mohammad Raza Khan t What Price Freedom (Madras 1969) 
p. 7. 
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opposed the Muslim dwaands, the process of rapprocheweat 
would have got setback and the negotiations would have 
certainly resulted into fiasco, -meir failure to get Muslin 
support would have jeopardised their plan to present their 
demands as the national demands of All India character. 
However many eminent historians have questioned the wisdom 
of accepting the comnwinal electorate by the Congress. Hheit 
point of contention is th«t "Muslims gained all the points 
which they have been demanding - communal representation, 
the principle of weightage, and olao coiwminal vote In legisla-
110 
tion." To quote R.C.Majumdar, " .the Congress action 
In 1916, well and truly laid the foundation of Pakistan thirty 
111 
years later* «id thus "this was too heavy a price that the 
112 
Congress paid for unity." 
Hot#ever« this observation is incomprehensible. Although 
"the acceptance of these principles particularly of separate 
electorates had very great Importance for the future, but che 
pact wa? by no means a one sided '-affair. Itie Muslims had 
indeed paid a big price to obtain these concessions. This 
price was in the shape converting the two Muslim majority 
provinces, the Punjab and Bengal, into provinces whose legis-
lature would not reflect their majority. If it were merely a 
110. V.K.vSaxena, op.clt., p. 169. 
111. R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India. 
Vol. 11 (Cal, 1963) p. 353. P 
112. V.K. Saxena, op.cit., p. 169. 
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question of giving welghtag* to the Hindus in provlnc* wh«r« 
they were in minority there would be Justification for it in 
viev of the fact that the Muslims had been accorded weightage 
where they were in minority, aut the essential point to be 
considered was that whereas the Hindus even aftet conceding 
the weight age to the Muslims, still reinalned an overwhelming 
majority In the legisl-^turea the Muslims in the process of 
granting weightage to the minorities in the Punjab andBwigal 
113 
lost their naajorities.* under the regulations of Oovemraent 
of India Act of 1919, under which the seats in the various 
provinci?'l councils were filled further reduced the !4usliais 
representation* 4^u8lials representation in Punjab was reduced 
114 
to 40 per cent and in Bengal to 30 per cent« 
Thus in the light of the above facts no one cf^ n deny 
that the weightage given to the "luslims In Hindu majority 
provinces was of no avail as it did not disturb the power 
equilibrium, in which Congress was at the receiving end. But 
the weightage glvwi to Hindus where they were in minority 
namely Bengal and Punjab, the power structure was totally 
disturbed. In both provinces '^SIITIS'were reduced to minority 
from majority whereas Hindus were elevated from minority to 
majority. Hence a minority captured power in the legislatures 
of Bengal -nd Punjab. In view of this one can eafely come to 
this conclusion that the Lucknow pact was a substantial gain 
113. A History of the Freedom .Move7>ent. op.clt., p.l37. 
114. Ram Clopal, op.cit., pp. 171*2 • 
- 45 -
for nationalist forces. But "for the Congress It meant much 
more because the Muslim support gave It added strength 
115 
vls-a-vls the British iSovemment." The Lucknow Pact "not 
only hastened the la^ortant policy announced by the irltlsh 
Sovernment cm August 20» 1917, but In certain Important 
aspects it also influenced the course of events during the 
116 
next fow years." 
Thus by giving mutual concessions to each other the 
nationalisin gained. It should not be viewed as the loss of 
some seats in the legislature by one party and the gain of 
certain seats by the other comnunity in another legislature. 
The whole questicwi should be looked upon as the change of 
attitude of the Indian National Congress towards the Indian 
Muslims. The same party which had oppos«?d the separate 
electorate in 1909, itself conceded it in 1916, This change 
of attitude of the Congress brought the Indian Muslims into 
the main stream of the national liberation struggle. The 
Muslim Joined the Congress In large numbers as the new 
attitude created a trust of the party in the minds of educated 
Muslims as a secular force. The Home Rule Movement of Ats, 
Annie Besant and later movements became real mass movements. 
In the sense, that every Important section of the population 
115. 11story of the Freedom Movement, op.cit., p. 139. 
116. Ibid. 
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p a r t i d p e t f d In these moveftients. Jlnnah ??t one stage 
actually became the aytatool of Hindu*'4u8lim unity ^nd gave 
h is f u l l e s t cooperation and support to Home Rule Movement. 
Hie la ter movetnents l i k e non-cooperation and Khilafat became 
s t i l l nnore broad-based due to the emergence of leadership 
of '4ah8tni3 ^i^n^iknd All Brothers* This we shall discuss 
in the following pages. 
CHAPTER I I 
PROM COOPERATION TO CONf'ROMTATION 
FROM COOPERATION TO CONFRONTATION 
Jlnnah, the a r c h i t e c t of Lucknow Pact and the 
"Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity" was imbued with the 
s p i r i t of forging Hindu-Muslim Unity . Speaking - t the 
Muslim Leaqfue s e s s i o n of 1915 in 8ombay# he observedi 
"To rds the Hindus our a t t i t u d e should be of good w i l l 
and brother ly f e e l i n g s . Cooperation in the cause of our 
motherl nd should be our guiding p r i n c i p l e . I n d i a ' s rea l 
progress can only be chieved by a t rue understanding and 
harmonious r e l a t i o n s between the two great s i s t e r Conorminities.' 
So, he worked i n d e f a t i g a b l y t o - c c e l e r a t e the Hindu-iuslim 
understanding and u n i t y , which r e s u l t e d Into the faiious 
Lucknow Pact of 1916. In h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l Address to the 
League's s e s s i o n of 1919, Jinnah ha i l ed the League-Congress 
rapproch^ent and re jarded i t as "the f i r s t ureat s ign of 
the b i r t h of United Ind ia ." No doubt, i t was a s i g n i f i c a n t 
event . The Lucknow p«ct proved that an amicable se t t lement 
of the Hindu-Muslim c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l problems 
ccHild be achieved. I t s importance can a l s o b^ traced t o 
t h i s f e e t that I t l a i d emphasis on the dpmi=»nd for s e l f -
governrnf-nt. I t demanded t h a t "in the recons truct ion of 
1 . Mf'tlubul Hasan Sa iy id i Mohamnad Al l Jinnah - A P o l i t i c a l 
Study (Lahore, Muhamnad Ashraf 1953) , p . 131. 
2 . I b i d . , pp. 375-76 . 
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the B^pir** India ^ o u l d b« l i f t e d froa the posit ion of 
a de-pfffidentici to that of an equal partnar in tha Siif>ira 
alongwith tha aalf-goveming dcminions." 
tha yaar 1916 isarkad tha baginning and rapid growth 
of p o l i t i c a l ag i tat ion . "Tha movaaent for tha achiavaownt 
of aelf-govanvaant racaivad a graat f i l l i p by tha organiaation 
of a body cal lad Haaa Rula Lmagvut undar tha laadar^ip of 
4 
!>frs. Annia test^t •••••'* tha Congrass waa or ig inal ly he-aitant 
to support i t but latar on threw i t s weight in i t s favour. 
vfhen the H<MMI Rule covenant gained mamentuai* Mrs. Annie 
Beaant along with her associates was interned in June 1917. 
This provt^ed stronj reacti<Mi8 and great demcmst rat ions 
throughout the country, the Nuslias* therefore also 
participated in the deoKMi s t r a t i on in large nufldders including 
5 
the ^ftisliia League. Mr. it.A.Jinnah waa moved so taue^ that 
he departed from h i s usual disdain for ajitaticm t a c t i c s 
and joined the Hone Rule League and was e lected the President 
6 
of i t a 9onbay br«ic^. Addressing a nesting in Bonbay on 
3. Rajandra Praaadi India Divided. (Hind Kitaba, 9o«ibay* 
1947), p. 119. 
4 . Ja«il-ud>din Ahisad i t^mg n^tf ftJ^§Uf PoU^l9t l 
Moiraswnt. (Publiahera 0nited Ltd. 1969? p . l . 
5 . Gail Hinault« op .c i t . # p. 57. 
6. Sarojini Maidu s Portrait of Jinn^« p . 17 quoted by 
Oail Minault* Ibid. 
- 49 -
30 July 1917 h« declared t "we protest against the intemnwnt 
of 4rs. Sesant nnd her co-workera not only on principle but 
also because It Is an attempt to intern the Home Hule or aelf-
goveriwaent schene cf reforms franaed end adopted conjointly 
by the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim 
7 
Lrague.* In course of th» same speech he appealed to the 
British (Sovernraent **not to 108«ti;ne in naaking a declaration 
of policy for snaking Indin a self-governing member of the 
3 
British Empire at an e rly date,,#,," 
4any pKjminent Muslims aligned themselves with this 
movement and made common cause with Mrs, -^ -nnie Besant and 
other Congress leaders. Jinnah and Omar Sobhani in Bonbay* 
Abdul Majid Khwaja in Aligarhi Zahur Ahmad and Manzar Ali 
Sokhta in Allahabad; Syed Ali i^ abi in Agra* and Raja of 
M>hmudabad in Lucknov^ ' were the leading Mhislims who played 
9 
vital role in H<xiie Rule Moveioent, Among "young Jo'irnalists* 
lawyers* nd University students ••.«• Raja Ohulam Hus in, 
editor of New era, 3yed Abdul Jalib editor of th« Urdu daily, 
10 
Hamdam, Shuaib Oureshi, and Abdur Rehman Siddiqi" were 
7, M,H, Saiyid, op.cit., pp. 109-.10. 
3. Ibid., pp. 110-11. 
9. "Sushirul Hasan, o p . c i t . , pp. 99 -99 . 
10 . I b i d . , p . 99 . 
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prominent. M^ eaton observed that in the Home Kule aiitation 
"the greatest marvel of all* is that the Muhaimiadans had 
11 
also came into the fold,* the "marvel" which he pointed out 
was in fact the culmination of change in the political 
atmosphere and the change of heart, on both sides - Hindus 
and the 4^usli-I»• TS^ e change in Congress attitude towards 
Muslims brought unprecedent cooperatiat between th<Ni, A 
foundation stone was, thus laid in the shape of Lucknow 
Pact, on which the edifice of mutual cooperation, unity and 
fraternity began to get shape. In this process. Home Rule 
lavement was a mile stone, in which both Hindus and Muslims 
participated side by side. For the first time Muslim 
politics entered into the era of agitational politics. Home 
Rule Movement provided the first testing ground for the 
Hindu-Muslim unity in general and Congress-League cooperation 
in particular. This brought them more close to each other 
and further strengthened their alliance. Now they were 
sharing similar views, their inter«»sts were identical, their 
grievances and their destination - a self-government. 
Tn July 1918 Montague-Chelmsford Report was published. 
They w<r-re disapr>ointed md disillusioned as it Wes short 
of their expectatic«i, and had failed to adopt the whole 
scheme of Lucknow Pact. In a special session held in August 
11. Home (Political). Deposit, May 1917, 3 N/I, 
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1918 congress characterised th« reform prqpoaals as Inadequate^ 
12 
unsatisfactory and diaftppolntlng. ?fuslltn League In Its 
special session held sluulteneously, expresise^ a the s^me 
13 
views. Ag??ln, Congress and Muslim league held their annual 
session at Delhi in December 1913. By now the extremists 
h^d got control of the Congress. It rejected the Reform 
proposals and dem nded full reaponslbX© government In the 
Provinces imsaediately and the application of the principle 
14 
of self detertaination to India. Muslim League also passed 
resolution urging British Government to grant self-rule in 
15 
India. soon after this Report followed another Report of 
Rowlatt cowtiittee. It recotmended that for the suppression 
of anarchies 1 and revolutionary movements, the government 
should have arbitrary powers to arrest and try a person. 
For this purpose it recommended for special trial of offences 
by a special court from the decislcMi of which there was 
no appeal. Its recommendations were incorporated in a 3111 
and was Introduced in the Legislative Council on February 6, 
12. c»P» Andrews and CJirlJa Hlukerji* "Ihe Rise and growth 
9f %mi,^om^,^m,i^ U^iU (l^ ondon. 1938) p. 261. 
13. Pakistan Historical Society* op.cit.« p. 185. 
14. C.P. Andrews »nd 3. lukerjl, op.clt.* pp. 268-70. 
15. Evolution of Muslim Political Iticmght In India - Volume 
two t A.?4. 5'aidl (India Institute of 'Applied Political 
Research. New Delhi, 1975) p.165. 
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1919, 'mis evoked strong protest and agitation throughout 
the Country, voicing the popular feelintj, ^r, M.A.Jinnah, 
in the Imperial Legislative Council, stronjly condrnmed the 
recommendations ^nd rem.-?rXed,"No civilized government will 
ever dr'=am of putting these recommendations in the form 
16 
of laws,* In spite of widespread protest It b€c me an 
Act on 18 ^arch 1«?19. Jlnnah felt so deeply hurt that long 
with Mazharul H^ jq ?»nd Pandit Madan "^ ohan Halvln promptly 
17 
rcsignf <i Council seats in protest. In his letter of 
reslgn.iti-.n to Viceroy, Mr, Jlnnah strongly condenned the 
Act end said th^t by this Act 'the fundamental principle 
ot Justice h ve been ucroot d nd the ronstltutionol rights 
18 
of the people hav. 'ot^en viol-^ ted ** He further ass rtod 
th t "'"i government that passes or sanctions such a lav in 
tlTies of peace forfeits its cl Im to he c lied a civilized 
19 
government." 
3andhlji was also shocked by this Act, "his faith 
in the British v^a shaken. The unconditional support to 
the aritlsh cause in the war w«s now to be rewarded with 
16, M.-f. Sayld, opwclt,, p. 152, 
17, Independent, April 2 r-nd 7, 1919. 
18. Evolution of Muslim Political Thought, Volume two, 
op.cit., pp. 697-^8, 
19. Ibid,, p. 688. 
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r e p r e s s ! n . " f^e 1 unch d Satyagrah-? a g a i n s t t h e ^oul r ' t t Act . 
h a r t a l was announced on r p r i l 6 and was o b s e r v e ! a l l over 
I n J i . n l f« ;or tant f e a t u r e of t h i s v;as thr*t " I t u n i t e d both 
*Undjs nd ^lussalmans in e way which h^a never been vj l t -
?1 
n e s s e d , " A l l s h d e a of Muslim opin ion threv; t h e i r w c i i h t b th lnd 
; a t y « g r a h a . Maulane Abdul S a r i , i n Lucknowi Maulvi Mazharul 
4aq and Has^n Iiiam, i n 9 i h a r ; F a z l - i - H u s t i n , Sa i fuddin K i t c h l e v , 
P i r Ta juddin , Mohsin Shah nd Mohammad Tribal in Punjab; Dr. 
^4. . S n s a r i , Asaf / l l and Ar i f Husain i n Delh i i were l e d l n i 
'4uslira r>a tyagrah is . ' ^ ' s ides Uleroa and Western educated 
lus l lms t h o u s a n i s of "^lalim a r t i s t s * joerchanta, m i l l - w o r k e r s 
and weavers a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e d i n Satyagrah<». The Hindu-
Muslim u n i t y and f r a t e r n i t y reached i t s z e n i t h when Swami 
Shardhan^nd was i n v i t e d to a d d r e s s t h e F r iday Congregat ion 
a t t h e Junaa ' i a s j i d i n D e l h i . A l a r ^ e number of Hindus f»lso 
23 
a t t ended a naeeting a t Nakhoda Mosque i n C a l c u t t a . Hence, t h e 
20 . Hajendr- Prasad i Autobiography (3ombay,1957), p . 1 0 7 . 
2 1 . M.L.3hose t o ioh«(tied A l l , 14 A p r i l 1919, Mohammad Ali 
P a p e r s . 
22 . Ravinder Kumar (ed . )» fcasavs on aandhian P o l i t i c s - The 
Rowlatt S j t v a a r a h of 1919 (Oxford 1971) » J t t d i t h M. 
Browns 3andhi*s Rise t o power - I n d i a n P o l i t i c s I '^IS-
1922 (Cambridge, 1972) , pp . 163, 173, 136. 
2 3 . Home P o l l . 13 , May 1919, 514-15 , NAI. 
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unprecedent scen« of Hlndu-'iuslim unity during this agita-
tion was remarkable. The Oovemment reacted sharply and 
adopted repressive cneasures. Thousands of people were 
arrested. In Punjab Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew and Satyapal were 
arrested on 10 April nnd on the same day crowds of people 
who were protesting against the arrest of their leaders 
were fired et Lahore resulting in several casualties. On 
13 April in Mjritsar at Jalianwala 3agh a crowd was brutally 
fired upon by the i^ritlsh troops resulting in hundreds 
dead and thous-^ nds injured. The Jalianwala Bagh incident 
was followed by disturbances in several places. Consequently 
24 
nnartial law was enforced in the Provinces. All these 
crested an unparalleled indignation aoiong all Sections of 
the Indian population. 
Meanwhile hapt^nings in Europe caused further 
estrangement onong Muslims. Turkey was threatened with 
dismembernnent at the time of the war. f^uslim8 were greatly 
despondent and agitated over these developments* because 
of its religious importance. Earlier* a definite promise 
was given to the "Muslims by the government that the sanctity 
of the Holy places of Islwa would be respected ''nd no harm 
would he done to then. But after war Britain broks its 
25 
pledges and declarations. 'Muslims had great regard to 
24. History of Freedom Movement. P-^ kistan Historical Society, 
p. 214. 
25. Rajendra Prasad* qp.clt.* p. 111. 
. ss • 
Ottoman Eniplre as being th© symbol of temporal greatness 
of Islam's acdilevcflfientsS and the Sultan of turkey as Aalr-
26 
al-*^mlnln« and the custodian of the Holy places of Islam. 
Finally/ Muslims decided to launch a movement to press 
their dcupnd for the preservation oc the temporal power of 
the Caliph and the integrity of Turkey, A Khilafat con-
fer^ n^c© vsas formed in the tilddle of 1919 and an All India 
Khilafat Committee was set up with its headquarters in 
3ombay »nd branches in all the provinces. It was also 
decided to observe October 17, 1919 as Khilafat day. It 
included prayers, fasting, hartal, public meetings and 
27 
appeals to Hindus for support. the observance and success 
of Khilafat day was remarkable, dandhiji (i^ ddressed a public 
meeting organised by aombay iChilaf at Committee. He 
aupported the tx>ycott and mm-cooperation movement and 
©s ured the <4u8lims th?t Hindus would cooperate with the 
Khilafat Conference. Following Khilafat day, an All India 
Khilafat Conference wss called on »3ovember 23-24, 1919 in 
Delhi, Where vital resolutions were passed to exert more 
pressure on the Government, Thiise Include boycott of 
peace celeberation, boycott of European goods and to with-
draw cooperation from the (lovemment^ if the Turkish question 
26. Shlbli to Editor, Aliaerh .M«qczine» 17 November 1912, 
Makatib*i-Shibli, Volume I, pp. 342-43. 
27. Tfjbunef 27 Septemoer 1919. 
• 36 . 
28 
was not sa t l i i f «c turx ly s e t t l e d . I t a l s o appointed a 
d e l e g a t i o n t o go t o England t o represent the ^ s l i m cause* 
Now the Khl la fa t Hovetaent had gathered tnonienttuQ. On 
November 25« 1919« Ulema organised themselves i n t o the Al l 
India Jeritiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind ^nd decided t o hold i t s 
s e s s i o n at Amritsar* The Indian Naticmal Congress^ the 
Al l India Muslim Leogiie, the Khi latat ConEertncf and the 
newly forttied Janiiet^ul*oUle<'na»i->Hinci held the i r s e s s i o n 
sinniltanc-ouflly a t AKirltsftr in D€<?e'aiber 1919, Thus, "the 
Khi la fo t and Punjab gr ievances 5:»eceme linkc?d ^s two compe-
l l i n g reasons for r^usliras and Hindus t o j o i n in opposing 
29 
the government," 
The Congress :neeting was pres ided over by Moti la l 
N^ru* which r e i t e r a t e d i t s support and s o l i d a r i t y with 
30 
the '^usliins on the Khl la fa t i s sue* "The Khi la fa t conri^ittee 
w h l ^ was presided avex by Sh.'^ukat All and attended by 
prO'Hinent f^sl im and Hindu p e r s o n a l i t i e s ^ such as Al l 
3rothc rs« Dr« Ansarl« Hakim Ajmal Kh-?;n, Maulana Abdul 
3ari« Zafar Al l Khan* Oanchiji« Mot i la l Nehru* Swsmi 
Shardhanand and Pandit ^alviyay passed a r e s o l u t i o n and 
2 8 . I b i d . , November 29, 1919. 
2 9 . Minault# o p . c i t . , p . 66 . 
30 . I b i d . , p . 32 . 
- 57 -
warned th« government against any unjust peace ter.-ns imposed 
on Turkey, A Khllafat deputation led by Or.Ansarl met 
Viceroy Lord Chelmsford ©n January 19, 1920 gave him a petition 
signed b/ eminent Hindu «id Muslim leaders* Among those 
All Brothers, Dr. Ansarl, Hakim Ajmsl Khan, Maulana Acad, 
Maulana Abdul Barl, M.A.Jlnnah, Raja of Mahmudabad, Qandhiji, 
Motilal Nehru, Swaml Shardhanand and Pandit Halavia were pro-
minent signatories. They requested that Caliph*s temporal 
authority should not be affected In any way, since it was a 
matter of faith. They also asked the government to honour 
its earlier pledges regarding Turkey and the Holy places of 
Islam. They emphasised that Jasirat-ul-Arab rmjst remain 
under Caliph and not under non-Muslim mandatories or even a 
puppet such as Sharif Husaln. they also warned the government 
of its evil consequences if such a peace settlement was not 
31 
concluded. 
In February 1920, Muhammad All led a delegation to 
Fngland and Europe to plead the Muslim cause. But he soon 
realised the futility of his mission because of the hostility 
of christian powers towards 1\irkey in particular and Islam 
in general. In a letter to Shaukat All, he wrote from London, 
that Muslims must rely on themselves and should not wait for 
31. Text of the address presented by the Khllafat Deputation 
to the Viceroy, Independent, 21-22 January, 1920. 
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results from Europe and mist ler>d the non-cooperation 
struggle as a religious obligstlon* because "the real vork 
lies in Indl^.* It would also prove th« Muslim's dedication 
32 
to the cause of India's freedOB. True to Muslim's appre-
hension* the Turkish peace tenns* published In India on 15 
May 1920# was what they feared. Contrary to earlier announce-
ments and pledges in which British government had declared 
th t it had no ambition of territorial expansion ^^ depriving 
Turkey of its capital and its fertile lands of Asia minor 
end Thrace; Thrace nd Symrna were given to Greece, the 
territories of Jazlrat-ul-Arab were taken by Britain and 
France as Mandatories* and Constantinople was given under 
the control o!! a high cominisslon* thus* reducing the Sultan 
33 
to a position of puppet. Muslims vere greatly despondent 
and agitated over these developments* because of its religious 
importance. It created a storm of protest and condenmatlon 
from MusliiTis of India. On 28 M.-^y 1920* the Central Khllafat 
Committee* in its (oeeting at 3ombay passed a resolution in 
favour of launching a non-cooperation movement. It was to be 
implemented in four stagesi (a) renunciation of titles* 
honorary posts and membership of councils* (b) resigning 
from government posts* (c) giving up of police and military 
34 
forces* and (d) the non-payment of taxes. Gandhiji* in s 
32. Muharwnad All to Shaukat Mi* May 6* 1920* Mohd.All Papers. 
33. A History of Freedom Movement* op.cit.* V* III 1906-36* 
Part I* p.215. 
34. Indian Annual Register* 1921* Part I* p.103. 
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press statenent on Turkish peace terns* described It sa 
the "stagrjering blov" to the Indi-n "iusllrns -»nd declared 
non-cooperation as the "only effective reneay for healing 
35 
the vound inflicted on Mbhantneddn opinion.** llie All India 
Khilafat Conmittee, in its itretlng held in Allahabad cm 
1-2 June 1920# resolved and reaffirrtjed its non-cooperation 
programne In four stages* already adopted by Central Khilafat 
Cottmlttee. It also appointed a 8Ub-c<^nmlttee under Mahetma 
Qandhi consisting of Maulana Abul Kalrni Azad« All brothers, 
Mr. Ahmed H^ .jl Slddlq Khatrl, Or. Kitchlew and Maulana 
36 
Hasrat 'i^anl, to give practical effect to the programme. 
^ahatma Gandhi, in a letter to Viceroy, supported 
Muslim's stand end wrote* "I consider that, as a staunch 
Hindu wishing to live on terms of the closest friendship 
with my Mussalnuin Countrymen, I should be ^^n unworthy son 
37 
of India if I did not stand by then in their hour of trial." 
Howrver, It is noteworthy that his programme of 
non-cooperation was opposed by many Congress leaders, 
including Pandit M'^ lvlya, t^otllal Mehn.?, Lajpat Ral, Tej 
Bahadur Sapru and Jamnadas Dwarkadas. itielr opposition came 
35. Collected works of 3andhl, Volume 17, pp, 426-27. 
36. The Indian Annual Register, 1921, p. 195. 
37. Qandhl to Viceroy, 52 June 1920, cwo. Vol, 17, p.503. 
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In ll^t during the Central Khllafat Committee rneetlng held 
38 
in Allahabad on 1»2 June 1920, Ihe Congress leaders 
who hsd corne from Banaras meeting of nil India Congress 
Com Ittee, disappointed the Muslltns by merely repeating 
their decision to wait until the September special session 
39 
for "^ ny final verdict on non-cooperation." Abdul 9r>rl# 
Hasrat Htohanl and Shaukat All strongly condemned their 
attitude and expressed their anger over delay of launching 
40 
non-cooperation. Realising Muslim*s uneasiness Gandhijl 
got ahead with the decision to observe hartal on 1 August 
1920* However^ it was a small consolation to Muslims who 
had to content with it# Instead of a final decision on 
launching n<MJ-cooperatlon. Itiey knew that without Hindus* 
cooperation their n<m-cooperatlon would prove ineffective* 
So* they agreed* though reluctantly* to wait until SeptetidMrr 
special session of Congress, Yet* In view of the opposition 
shown by some Congress leaders to «dopt non-cooperation* 
the prospect of hartal on 1 August seemed in danger* As 
the time began approaching* the de-nand of postponing the 
41 
non-cooperation also began to gain strength* To add to 
Muslim's woe "Pandit M.'ilviya constantly pressured Sandhljl 
to postpone non-cooperation and urged Hindus not to join 
38. Home Poll* a, 1920, 109* NAI. 
39* 3ail Mlnault* op.cit.* p. 101* 
40. Ibid* 
41. Bombay Chronicle* 31 July 1920* 
- 61 • 
42 
the schedule hartal on August !• Sandhljl* however• putt-
ing aside all exposition and pressure* decided to continue 
his can^ aigrn alon~r with Khilafat leaders for non-
cooperation. He advised the Hindus to make comnon cause 
with the Muslims in a united mass ncns-cooperation. He had 
noticed the potential political power of the !<1uslims so 
he souq^t their support to put pressure on "British govem-
nent for the grant of Swaraj and to redress the Punjab 
grievances* Since* Muslinas had already comtdtted themselves 
to the attainment o£ self government and non-cooperation 
with the govem?t)ent« they readily accepted Mahatma 3andhi*s 
lee^dership. Khilafat leaders under the leadership of 
Mahatma cSandhi worked tirelessly to mobilize qpinion in 
favour of non-cooperation and to enlist support fot the 
August 1 hartal. On that day con^ slete hartal was observed 
throughout the Country, Qandhiji returned all his war 
medals awarded to him by the government, in recognition of 
his war se vices. He wrote to Viceroy, "I venture to 
return these medals, in pursuance of the schene of non-
cooperation inaugurated today in connection with Khilafat 
Movement." He further wrote, I cannot wear them with r-n 
easy conscience as long as my MUssalman Countrymen have to 
43 
l<;3bour under wrong done to their religious sentiments." 
42. Mlnault, op.cit., p. 108. 
43. The Indian Annual Register, 1921, Part 1, p.106. 
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In the special aesslcm of Calcutta In Scrptcntber 
1920* Oandhljl moved the resolution for non-cooperation. 
The non-cooperation progracwne consisted of surrender of 
titles and honorary offices* Boycott of Council elections, 
foreign goods, British courts by lawyers and liti|ants« 
withdrawal of students from government schools and colleges, 
non-p«irtlcipatlon in durbar and govern nent functions and 
resignation from governinent services, Inspite of strong 
opposition from other Congress leaders like Pandit Madan 
iohan Malvlya, C.R. Das and Sipin Chandra Pal, it was 
44 
approved by a vote of 148 to 135 in the subject Committee, 
45 
and by 1,855 to 873 at the open session. This progra?wne of 
non-cooperation was finally adopted in the Nagpur session 
of Ccmgress in December 1920. All the dissident Congress 
leaders, by thet time were won over. Now, they were among 
its ?'ctive supporters. Moreover, Qandhijl's leadership 
symbolising Hindu-iusllm unity had become unchallengeable. 
In view of the popular supp >rt to the non-cooperation, these 
leaders found It difficult to continue their opposition. 
oreover, Qandhijl's leadership symbclislng Hindu 'lusllm 
unity had become unchallengeable. The Congress h d to 
accept the non-cooperation programme as Gandhijl was the 
undisputed leader of the party. M ul na Mohammad All, who 
44. Mesne (Pol.) D, 70, September 1920, HAI. 
45. 3anbay Chronicle 9 and 11 September 1920. 
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returned to Indl' with Khllafat delegation on 4 October 1920 
threw hltjself In the non-cooperation Movement. He 
e:iiphasi2ed that unless self 3ovemtnent was achieved 
Khllafat worona could not be corrected and for that purpose 
46 
non-.co<3peration was the only oieans to that end. 
on 12 October 1921, the 11 Brothers -ccompanied 
by Qandhiji, Dr. M.A.Ansari nnd Hakim Ajmal Khan visited 
i.A.O.college, Aligarh and addressed ?» neetini of students 
and their synpathiaers among trustees nd staff on the 
47 
necessity of non-cooperation. On 24 October GandhiJi. In 
a letter to trustees c lied upon them to reject the grant 
nd affiliation of Aligarh to Allahabad anlversity. But 
they failed in their attettqjt to persuade majority of the 
trustees. lence they called upon the students to leave the 
College. "Over seven hundred students responded to their 
49 
rsppeal.* Oandhiji tried to bring Benaras Hindu University 
In this nnovcnent but faced strong opposition of Pandit 
50 
^adan Mohm ^alviya, its founder. The ^slims also 
46 . Independent, October ^, 1920. 
47 . Tribune. Qctoooc 15, 1920. 
48 . Let ter of "S.K.Gandhi, October 24, 1920, "teulana Aasad 
Library a^rchlves, Mhjslim U n i v e r s i t y , Al igarh. 
4 9 . s .^.Abdullahi Mushahidat va Ta*asurat. Al igarh, 1969, 
p .295 . 
5 0 . Minault, o p . c i t . , pp. 118*19. 
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responded well to the call for realgn tion from the Oovem-
ment services. Out of 46 Indians who had resigned froa 
Honorary Magistracy by rald«Nfovember 1920, 22 were Muslims 
51 
and 24 were Hindus. By November 1921, the boycott of Law 
courts was also very successful, A large number of Muslim 
lawyers suspended their practice. Twenty-two out ofthe 
forty-four lawyers who g?»ve up their legal practice in 
November 1920 were Muslims and twenty-two were non-Muslims. 
The movement continued to grew stronger. The attitude of 
its leaders also became stiffer. An important resolution 
v-as passed in the All India Khilafat Conference session 
held in Karachi on S July 1921 which was presided over by 
Maulana Mohammad M i . It reads .....••this nneeting further 
emphatically declares that in the present circumstances 
the Holy shariat forbids every Mussalman to serve or enlist 
himself in the British army or to raise recruits for it, 
that it is incumbent on all '4uslim8 in general and all 
Ulemn in particular to carry this religious commandment 
53 
to every Muslim soldier in the British Indian Army." It 
also threatened that if British government "resumes 
hostilities against the government of Angora the Indian 
Muslims will be compelled in cooperation with the Congress 
51. AlCC P-^ pera (5), 1920. 
52. Ibid. 
53. 3oraford, P.C, t Histories of the Non-Cooperation and 
Khilafat Movement (Deep Publication, Reprint, Delhi, 
1974), p.171. 
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to resort to civil disobedience and at the next session 
of the Congress at Ahraedabad to declare India's independence 
54 
and the establishment of an Indian Republic," The tone of 
the resolution v^ as a clear indication of a different mood, 
so the Qovernment was bound to take note of it. Now it 
decided to crush the Movement by arresting its leaders. 
In September the Governtnent ordered the prosecution of 
Ali Brothers along with other Muslim leaders including 
Dr. Kitchlew, Maulana Husain Ahmad, Pir CBiulam Mujaddid 
and Maulana Nisar Ahmad, They were tried on various charges 
of sedition, conspiracy and inciting troops for disloyalty 
and were senteneced to two year's rigorous imprisonment. 
Throughout the Country, the arrest and sentence of the 
leaders v;ere strongly condemned. Oandhiji vehemently 
criticised the government action and wrote that it was 
"contrary to the national dignity for any Indian to serve 
55 
as a civilian, and more specially as a doldler * The 
Country was convulsed with excitement and indignation from 
one end to the other. Between December 1921 and January 
56 
1922 about 30,000 arrests were made. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Pattabhi Sitaramayya t The History of the Indian 
Natttoal Congress (Bombay, Reprint, 1946), p.222. 
56. W.C.Sraitht Modern Islam in India ~ a social Analysis 
(Rlppon Printing Press, Lahore, 1947), p.236. 
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However* by that tina« cracks had began to appear 
in the edifice of Hlndu-r^usXlm unity. It was largely due 
to the misunderstanding between both the eomrnunitles on the 
Moplah rebellion. Hindus alleged thrit Moplahs h£4d coiwni-
tted barbarious acts on Hindu inhabitants of Malabar and 
forcibly convert«?d thein to Island. However, Musli^ na i!«in~ 
tained that the Hindu charges were grossly exaggerated. The 
police atrocities on Mqplahs and their religious leaders' 
arrest end humiliation, agitated them so much so thet they 
57 
broke into violence against government. The government 
retaliated with more repression and clanqped Martial Law. 
"Thousands of Moplahs were butchered, thoir houses and 
58 
crops were burnt to ashes .••.•** The Moplidts started 
Guerilla warfare. The local landlords, who were mostly 
Hindus, and supporters of the British Oovernment helped 
59 
it to get control over the rebellion. The Moplahs had no 
alternative except to fi^t the alliance. The Moplahs in 
their struggle against the Qovemment had to take to 
60 
violence against these landlords also. The Rightist Hindu 
57. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.220. 
58. Ibid., p. 247. 
59. CO.Tottenham, ^The Mapilla Rebellion and Malabar 
operation** Indian Police Collection, M.S.S.Eurf. 
161-4, lOL. quoted in flushirul Hasani Nationalism 
and Communal Politics in India* op.cit., p. 246. 
60. Pakistan Historical Society, op.cit,, p. 232. 
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leaders and press exaggerated the whole incident. Malavlya# 
Lajpat Ral# Moonje and shardhanand were the main propagan-
dists against Muslins and they were successful in creating 
bad blood bet*«reen Hindus and Muslims* C*RaJa Oopalachari 
61 
admitted the false reporting in the Press, the responsibi-
lity "for distorting the truth must rest with the press and 
62 
on Its coloured and subjective reporting." Commenting on 
the controversy arising out of the ^K^l h rebellion, Abdul 
3ari warned the people against evil design of the Oovernment 
63 
to create division among Hindus and <^slims. Inapite of the 
unfortunate cntroversy, the Khilafat and Non-cooperation 
movement was unaffected. In fact it further grew in stmegth 
by the complete boycott of the Prince of Wales* visit to 
India. The 3overnn»ent« out of its anxieties over the 
success of the movement finally decided to crackdown on its 
leaders. All ir^ portant leaders except Gandhiji and /^ Jttal Khan 
64 
were put behind the bars. 
The next session of Indian Nati<mel c<»ngress was 
held in Ahmedabad. It was marked by certain ii^ portant events 
which were to cast its lasting imprint on national politics. 
61. Home (Pol) F.No.241« 1922. 
62. Abdul Hamidi Muslim S<tt>arati8m in indijg - A arief Survey 
1858-1947 (Oxford University Press 1967) «p.l61. 
63. Independent, October 27« 1931. 
64. Pakistan Historical Society, op.cit., p. 234. 
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Itiis session passed a resolution for civil disobedience 
which was to be started with a campaign of non-peyraent of 
taxes from Bardoli. It also gave 3andhljl vast power to 
act on behalf of the Congress. As such, he assumed the 
dictatorship of the movement. But Malavlya and his suppor-
ters opposed the civil disobedience and "pressed e resolution 
favouring a round Table Conference, with temporary suspcn-
65 
slon of civil disobedience .,•..•• It was not surprising, 
because an Important section of these Congress leaders h^ d^ 
always been sceptical of the Khllafat and non-cooperation 
movement. They always tried their best to exert pressure 
on Congress to drop the whole movement. If such was the 
morale of the Congress leaders, their demand for Swaraj 
seemed to be a mere farce. When Maulana Hasrat Mohani put 
forward a resolution for Imnedl te declaration of complete 
independence, he was vehemently opposed b^ Oandhljl himself 
and finally the resolution was rejected by the Congress, 
Oandhiji saldt "'ffne levity with which the proposition has 
been taken by some of you has grieved me. It grieves me 
66 
because it shows l^ck of responsibility,* Answering a 
question, A bdul 3arl said that the Ahmedabad session of 
Congress "had made him realize that it would not be possible 
65, Mlnault, op,clt,* p, 181, 
66, Sltaramayya, op,cit,, I, p,?28. 
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for India to :3«t fre«dofltt In the near future, because the 
Hindus were not interested In a total break with Britain 
67 
* However* against all odds the movement was gathering 
taomentum. On February 1# Q^ndhljl sent an ultimatum to 
Viceroy either to redress the Khllafat and Punjab wrongis 
or to face a no tax campaign. Vilhen the 3overm.ent rejected 
the demand Gandhijl called for civil disobedience to start 
68 
in Bardoll on February 6, wlien every thing was set for the 
February 6 event, on February 4 took pl^ sce the Chauri Chaur^ 
incident in which twenty-two policement were f^iurnt »llve 
69 
by a furious mob on which the police had fired, 3andhijl, 
after this event called off the civil disobedience movement. 
Qandhiji even did not consult Hakln Ajnal Khan, the 
President and Dr. Ansarl, the Secretary of the Congress, 
Instead he went to Bonbay to consult Malvla and other people 
whose opfXJsition to the movement was well known, 3andhlji 
convened n neetlng of Congress working Committee in 3ardoli 
on February 11, wher** on February 12 it confirmed his 
decision to suspend the non-cooperation and civil dlsobeldence 
movennent. The dtcislon caused resentment and disillusionment 
67, Abdul Barl Papers, quoted In Mlnault, op.cit., p,l82, 
63. f-loitie Pol. 489, 1922 NAI. 
61, Riots In Chauri Chaura nnd Sarellly, Home Pol,563, 
1922, MAI, 
- 70 -
among people, AJnal Khan was unhappy over Qandhljl's 
70 
decision to call off the moveoient, Abdul Bar! took ntron^ r 
exception to this decision c>nd sAldi "To m© dandhiji is 
liXe a paralytic whose limbs are not in his control, but 
71 
whose mind is still active,,,..* Subhas Ch.^ ndra Bose 
72 
called it rj national calanilty. /ccording to hi-.!, Deshbandhu 
(C.ft.Das) "was bfside hirasrlf with anier and sorrow at the 
way the Mehatma was repeatedly bundling ,,,.• the Bardoli 
73 
retreat came as a staggering blow,* It was also a blow to 
the spirit of the Lucknov, Pact and Hindu-Muslim unity. It 
was a complete change in the Congress attitude tovards 
Muslims and radical leadership of Subhash Chandra 3ose and 
4aulena Miohaninnd Ali, Tt was the most unfortunate about 
turn in th-- process of tJetional stru^le for independence, 
fcven, '^ otllal and Jawaharlal Nehru who were in Jail were 
highly critical of his decision. "Pandit Motilal was 
furious ..,.. and expressed his deep resent nent ^^ nd an^er 
at whpt had happened. He shouted, "Look here wh-3t 
has happened .•••, This ends the movernent b«=cause some people 
70, Oaai Abdul 3haffar : Hayat~e~^.j nal (Anjumr^ n Tacsqqi-e-
Urdu, Allgarh 1950) pp, 26S-67, 
71, Statement by Abdul Bari in reply to s question about 
the ^rdoli decision, Anp, 
72, Subhas Ch??ndra aosei The Indian Stru-jile 1920«'1942, 
(Asia Publishing House, 1964), p,74, 
73, Ibid, 
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In a big country like India have lost their mind and 
cotinltted violence." Javaharlal did not s<^ y anything at that 
time. However, I could see by his face that he also did 
74 
not like it and shared his fathers* views.* Justifying 
his decision Qandhiji wrote to Jawaharlal Nehrut "I see 
that you are terribly cut up over the resolutions of the 
working coiTriiltt«»e. I sympathiae with you, and my heart loes 
out to father (^ o^tllal). I can picture to myself the agony 
through which he must have passed, but I assure you 
that if the thing had not been suspended we would have been 
leading not a non-violent struggle but essentially a vio-
lent struggle you are In as disadvantageous a position 
r'S I am ^advantageously placed for judging events in their 
75 
true proportion. The leaders of the movement who were in 
J-^ 11 wrote letters to 3«indhiji to continue the mcvement. 
He "had but one word to ay, namely, th t those who went 
to J"ll were civilly dead and could not cli^ lm or be expected 
76 
to advioe those outside," The i^usllms were e-^lso rUsappoln-
ted. Those who, inspite of th.ir poor econoalc c<^dltlon 
had sacrificed their wealth, Qovemment services and titles 
for th« success of non-cooperation movement found all their 
sacrifices gone in vain. 
74. Khaliquzzamani pathway to P^istan (Longmans, Lahore, 
1961) p.63. 
75. 3andhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, Bardoll, February 19, 
1922, Nehru Papers, JN>«,. 
76. Sitaramayya, op.cit., I, p.237, 
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with the end of political entente between the two 
co-nmunities« the whole structure of communal unity collapsed* 
The antl-Brltlsh feelings had brought the two coinmunltles 
together* but since the Con ire; s deserted the "lusllnns the 
relations between Hindus nnd ^sllnis reached Its worst pulnt* 
The rnutual distrust, suspicion and bitterness gave rise to 
unprecedented chain of cottununal riots throughout the country, 
"Ttie first grave outbreak of new series occured at Multan.... 
in 5epteint>er 1922 on the occasion of the Muharra-n festival* 
nnd the celeberatlon in 192 3 were marked by serious colli-
sions* of which the ,nost formidable occured at Saharanpur.,., 
where the casultie^ exceeded 300, The year 1924 had a 
still blacker record with 18 serious riots* In which 36 
persons were killed o^td 776 wounded. Ttie worst storm centre 
was Kohat ••••• where terrible disturbances arose out of 
the publication of an anti-Islamic poem of Hindu authorship. 
The roll of two days casulties amounted to 36 killei and 
145 wounded ••••. all previous records were surpassed in 
1926 with 36 serious riots and a casualty roll of 2*000 ••••. 
Cortmjnal disorder had became the dominant factor of Indian 
political life ..... the year 1927 was as black as its 
predecessor. Thirty-one serious riots occured with a 
casualty roll exceeding 1*600 In the year 1923 there 
occurred serious disturbances In Bombay city ..... there h^ d^ 
been over 1,300 casualties* including nearly 200 deaths..,.. 
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In larch X931 the Cawnpore tragedy shocked the whole 
of India. In the course of enforced closing of shops, in 
honour of. a Hindu assassin* the Hindus f^ nd Muslims of 
Cawnpore catie to blows. This developed into a riot of 
unprecedented violence and peculiar ferocity ••••. 'Murders, 
arson and looting were widespread for three days..... The 
de th roll ••••• was prcrfbably between four and five hundred 
- a large number of temples and mosques were desecrate or 
destroyed, and a very large number of houses were burnt 
77 
and Pillaged ....•*• the forces and the personalities 
which were responsible for such an affair were dcMiiinatlng 
the national politics, within few tnonths of the suspension 
of civil disobedience movement two canmunal movements -
Shuddhl n^d Sangathsn started to convert J^ uslinns to Hinduism 
and to train and arm the Hindus against J^ usliras, It 
caused the extreme damage to com-nunal harmony. Consequently 
riots occured with increasing ferocity and frequency. Prom 
1923 to 1927 eighty-eight communal riots occured, "in the 
course of which over four hundr«K3 were killed and five 
78 
thousand injured", ^nd from 1927 to 1928 there were nineteen 
79 
riots causing hundreds of c«sttltl««« , The men behind 
shuddhl and Sangathan were Swami shardhanand and "leading 
77, Cunning t Political India, pp. 114-17, quoted in 
Abdul Hamid, op.cifc., p. 162, 
78, W.R, Smithi Mationalism and Reform in India, (london, 
1938) p,353, quoted in «ushlrul Hasan, op,clt,,p,240, 
79, .*4ushirul Hasan,Indian Statutory C<ynmission,VQl.I,p.27. 
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all India politicians such as Malavlya* Lajpat Rai and 
80 
Moonje," Halaviya played a very important role in passing 
the shuddhl resolutlcn in the Hindu .lahasabha session of 
81 
Auqrust 1923 and its inclusion in Mahasabha prograswne, rt 
is Interesting to note the association of Malaviya with 
Hindu revivalist movements Inspite of his long standing 
association with Indian National Congress. It was unfortu-
nate that such a movement was supported evtm by s well known 
8? 
Congress leader - Rajendra Prasad. Anothf^ r Congress leader, 
Lala Lajpat Rai who had strong links with Arya Sam-j, and 
whose Inclination, according to Jawaharlal Mehru was 
83 
"towards more communal orientation,** worked hard for the 
success of Hindu revivalist movements. So, the leading 
lights of Indian National Congress w<^ re also the leaders of 
Hindu Communal Movements -nd organisations. Madan Mohan 
Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai belonged both to the Congress 
and the Kindu Mahasabha, inspite of their comnunal role 
84 
in provoking communal violence. Malaviya went to the 
30. Mushirul Hasan, op.cit., p. 252. 
81, Ibid., p. 255. 
82, Rajendra Prasad j Indij* Divided (Bombay 1946), p.123, 
83. Nehru t An Autobiography, p. 158. 
84. *bdul Bari to r^ ohawnad Ali, 11 September 1923, 
Mohanmad Ali Papers. 
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extent of inciting the Hindus "to arm thernselves for the 
85 
riots in future* Maulane Moha«wnnd Ali lamented that 
Gandhijl was under much influence of talaviya and Lajpat 
Rai, and was not interested in the cause of Hindu*Muslim 
36 
unity. The prevailing com-nunal atmosphere was so vicious 
that even the sober and rational nnindled people were in-
fluenced, aut Ali Brothers retiained Imtiun© from it. 
When Dr. Saifuddln Kitchlew proposed, in the Khllafat 
Conference in 19?4 to start Tanzlti to counter the Sangathan, 
toe was vehejuwitly opposed by the All Brothers en the ground 
87 
that It would militate . inst Hindu-Muslim unity." So, 
evidently. All -brothers were still connitted to Hlndu-
:^ usllai Unity, ''^ •preas Congress did not condenm '^ huddhl 
nd Sangathan auovementw and neither considered it as 
against the Hindu-lualirn unity. Msulana ioha'wrjad 11, 
while presiding over the Cocanada session of Congress In 
OecetTtoer 1923, called for Hindu-Muslim unity and advised 
the vernaculir press not to poison tte atmosp ere by th^  ir 
partisan attitude. He expressed his sorrow over division 
between the comnunities md the spread of cotivnunal 
antagonlsiDS and also condeianed Shuddhi, Sangathan, Tanalm 
95. lome (Pol.) P. No.l5/lV/l92 3. 
96, Hamdard, 3 "iay, 1923. 
37, Jamiluddln Ahmadi middle Phase of >1uslim Political 
Movement (Publishers United Ltd. 1969), p.44. 
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and Tabllgh movements for their role In vitletlnj the 
88 
com/nunal harmony. Notwithstanding the broadmlnded and 
soul searching speech* ?4aulana Mohananad Ali« as President 
of the Congress, came under criticism from members of the 
Congress Workinj Comsnlttee* who resented his stateoents 
about Shuddhi and Sangathan and "attempted to censure 
89 
him, but without success," Jawaharlal Kehru vrotei " fter 
his yeisr of Presidentship (1923-24), Hohammad M i gradually 
drifted away fram the Congress the process was slow 
.,,,. But uhe rift widened, estrangement grew, Perhps 
no particular individual or individuals were to btlaae for 
this, it was an inevitable result of cc^ r^tain conditions 
90 
in the Country. However one cannot ?3gree with him ths^ t 
"no particular individual or individuals were to bl-me for 
this", because the 'certain conditions'"of which Nf^ hru 
speaks did not create themselves. :^ ischief sprang from 
91 
the politics of individuals as well as organizations," 
The differences between All Brothers ->nd 3«ndhiji over 
Kohat riot of September 1924 proved lasting as the relations 
3B, t^uhammaa Mi, "Presidential Address to the Annual 
congress Session. Cocanda. December 1923" In Reznul 
Karlm led.) s Musllrtis ^nd the Congress, pp. 115-20. 
89. iinault. op.cit., p. 199. 
90. Nehru « An Autobiography, o p . c i t . , p . 119. 
9 1 . Abdul Hamid, o p . c i t . , p . 163 . 
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betv.'een them never recovered from this setb'^ck, while 
lusllns maintained that first shot w.-^s flrecS by the Hindus* 
3ondhijl "accused iuslins of irav^  acts of violence. 
92 
This resulted in more violence in the Country," Such 
attitude was hound to aggravate the already tense situa-
tion ltd also widened the existing 3ulf between the two 
cownunities. During t! is period of comnunal strife various 
-attempts were made to bridge this iCJulf but each effort 
drove them further apart, bee use of uncomDromlsing attitude 
of some Congress le ders. Dr, ftnsari and Lajpat Ral 
jrepared a draft for a National Pact. However, it renained 
^nly on paper, bcc use it failed to -jf^t support of both 
comnunltles. Even Dr. Ansarl and Lajpat Rai had differences. 
Dr. nsari wanted to extend the principle of separate 
electorate to municipalities and local boar^ls, but Lajpat 
93 
Hal dii not a'jree to that. 
In Decemocr 1923, C.R. Das Corcluded a pact known 
as 3«fngal Pact with aengali luslim politician, which 
provided representation on the population basis with 
separate electorate to the provincif>l council. Its another 
inportant feature was 60 per cent r**pre8entation to the 
.najority comminity and 40 pet cent to the Tiinority comroxnity 
52. Shan ^ i Freedom Movement in India - The Role 
of Ali Brothers^ (Associat<?d Publishing House,New Delhi), 
p.196. ..^ a^ g^ -xVrL?* 
93. Indian Cuarter ly Re-jister 1923, jotfffjitfS^ltJeV 
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for the local bodies In every district. It further pro-
94 
posed 55 per cent aovemment appointments for the ^ lusllms. 
Other Congress leaders raised a storn of protest and 
conde-nnatlon. They launched an ajltatlon and called It 
a 'surrender'. But C.R. Des maintained that the Bengal 
Pact did not concede to Muslims "more than they were 
95 
entitled to jet in fairness and justice " le was 
absolutely correct. Although l^usllms were In majority 
their representation in the local bodies =»nd aovernment 
service were negligible. For example* they constituted 
60 per cent of the population in Decca, but their share 
of seats In the district boards and local boards was only 
27,2 and 29,8 per cent respectively. Slnallarly, they 
numbered over 54 per cent of the population In aengal, 
but "they held hardly 30 per cent of the posts under the 
96 
Government." Being a realist C.R.Das had realised that 
the real problem was economic and unless due share were 
}iv<n to Muslims there could not be a u-iity of purpose. 
Hence he came forward with such a bold scheme, lut unfor-
tunately, the Congress at its annual session in Cocand^ 
"rejected the Bengal Pact under pressure from Malavlya and 
97 
Lajp t !*al ....." In January 1925, Qandhijl took an 
94. Ibid. 
95. Mushirul H^san, op.clt.# p. 216. 
96. '^ b^ul Kal-m Aaad, op.clt.# p. 18. 
97. lushirul Hasan,op.clt.« p. 216. 
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initiative and convmed an all parties conference to 
resolve the comiunal problem. But due to ladlifmrmtt 
attitude of Lajpat Ral and other Congress le^ »ders to 
arrive at a scheme of comrnunal representation, it failed. 
Sensinj the mood of Congress to reach at sone understanding 
with Muslins, they adopted such an ttltude. For the 
sacne reason Madan ^ohan ?1alviya and Lajpat Rai "forued 
the Nationalist Party with the object of apo sing the 
99 
Congress candidates and defeating the Congress programEne" 
in the 1926 general Elections to the liiegislative Assf ably 
•nd the Provincial Councils. Due to malevalent propa-
ganda launched by 'Undu ?1ahas'bha ?* gainst Cortgress, Congress 
fared badly in the Bombay and Central Province, vheress, 
it met with huiiiliating defeat in United Provinces and 
Punjab, Though it won only one seat in United Provinces, 
the ho:ne Province of Malaviya, it lost all the seats it 
fought in ^nj b, the strong hold of J*»JP«t Rgi, so, "the 
elections of 1926 were fought on national versus coovmn^l 
100 
lines** in which Mindu conwwnslism defeated the forces of 
nationalism represented by the Congress, Reallsinj the 
98. Indian Quarterly Rejlster, 1925, Vol.I, p.77, 
99. Una Kaur t Muslims and Indian !^ationaliam (Manohar 
1977 Delhi), p.27. 
100. C.S,R;?nga lyeri India-Peace or v?ar« (Harrap, London, 
1928), p. 116. 
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danger of coiwoufial trend and Iso to retain the lost ground. 
Congress in its Oauhatl session directed its workinqj 
Comnittee to "take irenediate steps in consultation vith 
Hindu and -^lussalrnan leaders to devise measures for the 
removal of the present deplorable differences between Hindus 
and ^^sealmans and submit their report to the All Indie 
101 
Congress Counittee not late than the 31 ?4erch 19?7." Another 
i-nportant effort was made b/ prominent •^ luslim leaders of 
different groups who net in g conference in Delhi on 20 
-larch under the Presidentship of He, Jinnah. "mey agreed 
to give up the separate electorate, the much criticised 
measure by the Hindu leaders and the pplicatlon of Joint 
electorate as demanded by the Hindus, but on the following 
conditions - (1) separation of slnd as province from 
3ombay, (2) introducti -n of reforms in North-West Frontier 
Provinces and Baluchistan, (3) representation in the Punjab 
and Bengal should be in sccordfince with the populfction, 
(4) Miuslim representation in the Central Legislature not to 
102 
be less then one third of the total strength. 
The Congress Working Cownittee, appreciating the 
iuslim gesture to ccept joint electorate, 'accepted all the 
101, Report of Indian National Congress forty-first 
8es!^ ion, Qauhati, 1926, p.l04» 
102. Jamiluddln Ahmad t Historical pocuments of the Muslim 
Freedom !4ovoment (Lahore, 1970) p.86. 
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Muslim proposals. The All India Congress Comaiittee in its 
session on ^ay 15 in Booibay, unanlcnously adopted the same 
103 
resolution with minor Alter»tion». the Congress in its 
?4adra3 session of 1927 resolved in favour of Delhi pro-
posals and assured the Muslim that "their legitimate 
interests should be secured ••••• by the reservation of 
sest3 in joint electorate on the basis of population in every 
104 
province and in the Central Legislature •••••.•** The 
Calcutta session of riuslin League in December 1<527 also 
accepted the Delhi proposals nd resolved to boycott the 
Simon ConKiiission and to frame sn a^ S*^ *®^  constitution* in 
105 
cooperation with all the cotnrminities and parties. In 
accordance with a resolution adopted at Madras session of 
the Congress, an All Parties Conference was convened "to 
frame a constitution for India as a reply to the British 
Challenge about the ability of the Indians to produce any 
106 
alternative scheme of reform." ?4eanwhile in Sind vith the 
active support of Hindu Mahasabha and its provincial branchrs 
103. Indian Quarterly Register 1927, Vol.1, p. 15, 
104. Report of Indian National congress. Forty-second 
gcasion, Madras, 1927, p. 61. 
105. A.M.Zaidlt Kvolution of Muslim Political Thought in 
Indiffi^  Volume Ttiree (S.Chend and Con^any, Mew Delhi, 
1977), p.89. 
106. vShan >^ fuh«i^ ea, op.cit., p. 209. 
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an agitation was launched against the Delhi proposals md 
Congress was strongly criticised for the acceptance of Delhi 
proposals. The first meeting of All Parties Conference, 
held in Delhi on 12 February 1=J28, was nnrred by the same 
controversy, Lajpat Rai, Moonja and Jairamdas Daulatrait, 
the representatives of Hindu Mahasat^a opposed the separa-
tion of Sind and the Introduction of Reforms in the N.W.F. 
Province and Saluchistan, and they outrightly rejected the 
Congress resolution for the creation of a separate Sind 
107 
province. Even iMotilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru and other 
Congressmen came under the pressure cf the Mahasebhi on the 
reservation of seats for the Muslinos in aengal n^d Punajb. 
The -luslim delegates, surpris d by such volteface of 
Congress le ders emphatically stated that they would not 
accept any deviation frosa Congress resoluti;;n -^f Madras 
session. Sandhiji, in a letter to Motilal Nohru, also dis-
approved this volts-face and wrote that since Congress leaders 
had ooramltted to reservation of seats, they roust renain true 
to their words until a new formula war devised f^ nd accepted 
103 
by the .Muslims* aut unfortunately, to insist on congress 
resolution of Madras was a cry in wilderness, '^sllns, 
therefore, boycotted the Conference. lt»e intransigence of 
Hindu Mahasabha thus, brought an abrupt adjournment of the 
107. Leader 13 February 1938. 
108, 3andhi to Mot i la l Nehru t 27 Pebruarv 1^128, the 
c o l l e c t e d worTcs of aandhi. Vo l .30 , Pebruary-june 
1928, p . 6 7 . 
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Conference on 10 March, It was unfortunate that the Hindu 
Mahasat^a leaders lllce ^ a^lavlya and Lajpat Ral were also 
occupying a dominant position in the Conqrres . Inspite of 
their fascist ideology they were caananding ^reat respect 
and Influence in the Congress, Often, they worked gainst 
Congress and refused to obey its orders. For example, they 
fii«lded thrir candidates against the Congress and 
inflict d a humiliating defe^ t^ upon Congress in the 1926 
elections, but Lajpat Rai was soon included in the Congress 
working Com:nlttee in 1920. Hierefore, one can not agree 
with Jawaharlal when he said that Congress leadership remained 
steadfast against coimninalism and did not take side with 
109 
any cotmnunity. Only because of this lick of firmness, they 
wc»e allowed to use the Congress platform for the Mahasat^a's 
purposes. In fact these leaders played duel role - a cotwnu-
nallst on Hindu MahasaW»o platform, and performing the same 
functions from Congress platform - in the garta of a 
'Nationalist*. Jaw'^harlal rlgh.ly observed that it vaa the 
easiest thing for Hindu comraunalists to speak in the name 
of nationalism and that many a Congressman "-as e cotnmunalist 
110 
under his nationalist cloak. 
109, Nehru I An Autobiography. op,cit,, p. 136, 
110, iDid., p, 136 and 138, 
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Again, the all parties conference met on May 19 at 
Bombay to resolve the deadlock. The old controversy once 
more cropped up. However, the Conference succeedf^d to 
appoint a Cofntnittee to deal with the comcnunal problem and 
to draft a constitution for the Country* under the chainiian> 
ship of r^otilal Nehru with Jawaharlal Nehru as secretary, 
and Tej 3ahadur Sapru, All imam, Shuaib Qureshi, M.U.Jsykar, 
M.S. Aney, Q.R.Pradhan, M.M.Joshl, S.C. 3ose and Sardar 
Hangal Singh, as representatives of various organisations 
and different point of views. After much deliberations, 
the Nehru Committee Report was published on 15 August 1928. 
Its main recommendations weret 
(1) There shall be Joint electorates throughout India; 
(2) There shall be no reservation of seats for the House 
of Representatives (Central Legislature) except for 
the '^slitjs in Provinces whpre they were in a minority, 
pnd non-MusiIns in the North-west Frontier Province, 
Such reservation will be in strict proportion tc the 
Muslim population in every province where they i?re in 
a minority and in proportion to the non-Muslim 
population in North-w©st Frontier Province, The Muslims 
or non-Muslims, where reservation Is . llowed to them, 
shall hflve the right to contest additional seatst 
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(3) In the Province (a) there shall be non reservation of 
seats for any cowmanlty in the Punjab and aenjal (b) 
in provinces other than the Punjab and iengal there 
will be reserv'tion of seats for Muslim minorities on 
population basis with the right to contest t^dditional 
seats, (c) in the Morth-west Frontier ProtTl^ nce, there 
sh<»ll be similar reservation for non-Huslims with the 
right to contest other seats; (4) Reservation of seats 
shall be for a fixed period of ten years; (S) Sind 
should be separated from 3ombay and constituted into 
a separate province after such inquiry about the 
financial position as may be considered necessaryf 
(6) Ihe NWPr and other newly formed provinces shall 
have the same form of Government as other provinces in 
India. India shall have a form of Oovemment in which 
the executive should be respcmsible to the popularly 
el<»cted legislature, i«e,« its status should not be 
lower than that of any self-governing Dominion in the 
111 
British E^ire* 
Thus* under the provision of Nfehru Report separate 
electorate nd weightage system were abolished altogether. 
Reservation of seats in Punjab and Bengal on peculation 
basis was turned down, Inste-d, joint electorate with adult 
111, Shan Muhammad, op.cit,, pp. 209-10, 
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cranchls* «««"« proviaed. Even the one-third HusUm repre-
sentation in central Legislature war, rejected. One ^llht 
be at loss to understand the indifference of Cotnmlttee to 
the Jladraa Resolution of the Congress, which had accepted 
the Delhi proposals. Jto«lla» had scrlflced separate elec-
torate for the sake of unity and opted for Joint electorate, 
with reservation ofseats in Punjab and Bengal on the popula-
tion basis, aut realising the fadt that their already poor 
representation would be ruined they demanded for reserva-
tions in Punjab /*nd Bengal on the population basis and one-
third in Central Legislature. It is an irony th t it was 
the same person - Motil^l Nehru, who played an important 
role in persuading the Conjress to accept the Delhi propo-
sals. The Hindu Mahasabha was Jubilant because "it had 
succeeded in its strategy of dissuading the Congress from 
112 
sticking to its Madras resolution." Lajpat Ral had warned 
M» -m -^ 
Motilal not to make any coa?>romise with Jinnah. similarly, 
?loonJ« convened a stern warning to Oandhiji and "^tilal 
through H-^laviya. He wcote to Malviyat "you should tell 
lahatmaji th t if he were to yield on these points; you 
would be painfully obliged to lead the opposition on behalf 
of the Hindus even against fcim, Jinnah and Motilal combined.** 
112. Una Kaur, op.cit., p. 41. 112. uma Kaur, op.cxc, p. «A. 
113. Lajpat Rai to Motilal Wehru, AlCC Papeta (109/ 
Supplementary Files). 
114. Moonje to Malaviya, 31 July 1928, Jaykar Papers (437). 
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So, it was natural that Jaykar welconaed the Nehru Report 
for It was "nore beneficial to the Hindus than any scheme 
115 
so far suggested on the Congress side." All Brothers 
accused that Congress leadership had succumbed to the 
pressure of the Hindu Mahasabha and reversed their earlier 
decision taken in Madras Congress. 
All Parties Convention niet in Calcutta to settle the 
issue and also to accept the Nehru Report presented as a 
3111. Mr. -l.A.Jlnnah, proposed three major amendments to 
the Nehru Report, to bring it in harmony with the Delhi 
proposals and the Congress resolution of Madras; firstly, 
th^t the Muslims should be 9lv«n cme-third representation 
in the Central Legislature; secondly, that the Punjab nnd 
Bengal should. In the event of the adult suffrage not being 
established, h-^ ve Muslim representation on the population 
basis. Thirdly, that residuary powers should be vested in 
116 
the provincial legislatures and not in the Centre, the 
representatives of Hindu Mahasabha adopted an unyielding 
attitude. Jc-»ykar warned that not a slight change in the 
Report would be tolerated otherwise the Report would be torn 
117 
into pieces. In contrast, Mr. Jlnnah pleaded for acceptance 
of amendments. He saidt "Every country stru^jling for 
115. Jaykar to Kelkar, 28 August 1928, Javkar Papers 
(442) NAI. 
116. The Proceedinaa of the All Parties National Convention 
(Allahabad 1929) p.13. 
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freedom and serious of establishing a democratic system of 
aovernment has had to face the problem of minorities wherever 
they existed and no Constitution, however idealistic it m^y 
be, and however perfect from the theoretical point of view 
It may seem, will ever receive the support of the minorities 
unless they e n feel that they are secure under the proposed 
constitution and Oovernment, and whether a Constitution 
will succeed or not must necessarily depend as J" matter 
119 
of acid test on whether the minorities are in fact secure. 
He added "Hindus and Mussalmans ••••• these two comnwnities 
have r|ot to be reconciled united and made to feel that their 
interests are coiwnon and they are marching along together 
Nothing will make me more happy than to see Hindus 
and ^ssalmans united, 1 believe there is no progress for 
India, untill Mtussalnaans and Hindus are united nd for that 
purpose let not logic, philosophy and squabbles stand in 
119 
the way of your bringing that about." ^t all in vain. 
The convention rejected the amendments moved by Muslim 
League. Consequently, It withdrew from the Convention. "Tlie 
failure of the convention can only be attributed to the 
inability of the Congress lenders to stand up firmly against 
the pressures of the Hindu Mahasabha and override its 
117. Ibid., p.91. 
118. The Times of India, December 29, 1928. 




Opinions,• whereaa th« Muslim League got rid of Shafi 
group to coine to an und#r8tanding with the Congress* in the 
national insterest and also for the Hindu-f<4uslim unity; 
Congress failed to deal firmly with Hindu Mahasabha and 
other Hindu conniunal leaders. The uncompromising attitude 
of the Hindu ?^ a^ «8»bha at the convention also disappointed 
niany -Muslim Congressmen. Dr, Ans^ri, the President of the 
Convention wrote to GandhiJii "We wanted to be Just and fair 
and in our effort to do Justice snd bring greater h^ r^rnony 
and unity in the shape of the Nehiru Constitution, I am 
afraid we lost at Luetnow and Calcutta wh^t we had gained 
at Madras at the Calcutta Convention, it w;^ a the 
Hindu Mahasabha which completely did the work of destruc-
tion, I can not help expressing that the speech made 
by Mr, Jayaker and the subsequent attitude in the Conmittee 
taken by Pt, Malaviya# Dr, Moonja and Hindu Mahasabha 
121 
friends destroyed all chances of unityt* 'm 
The Hindu Mahasa]::^ a even questioned the represents-
tine capacity of Jinnah« as the spokesm?»n of the Muslims, 
Hounded and shattered by the treatment meted out to himself 
and to the amendments, he left the Convention 3nd called it 
120, lima Kaur, op ,c i t ,« p, 46, 
121, Ansarl t o C3andhi, 13 February 1930, Ansarl Papers, 
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"Parting of the Ways," Similarly, Haulana "tolianvnad All, 
who opposed the t^ ehru recommendation of Dotnlnlon status 
for India, on the cr«>w^ d that It "ran counter to the 
previous year's Congress resolution which deTiandfd ctxnplete 
123 
Independence", war treated so roughly that out of Indigna-
tion, he left the Convention and the Congress - on whose 
behrilf he was attending the Conv*»ntlon, never to return. 
Muslin delegates of the Convention were so tnuch disappointed 
and distressed by the outcotie that they decided to convene 
an 11 Parties !*iusllm Conference. It held Its first session 
t Delhi on 31 Decentiber 1928. The objects of the Conference 
'A'ere declared to be "to s'-feguard and pranote the rights 
and Interests of Indian Mussalmans at all stages of Consti-
tutional advance towards full responsible govemrnent In 
Indls and to organize the Indian Mussaltnans for the purpose 
of glvlnj expression to Muslim opinion on questIns affectln< 
124 
the "lussalmans of India." Its m.aln resolutions reflected 
the s me often repeated old demands being put forward since 
1927. '^ut sooie of them bore the frustration >nd disillu-
sionment caused by the All Parties National Convention, 
v-hlch had rejected th^  ir concill-itory gesture of sacrificing 
1?2. 3olitho F^ ectorj Jinnah - The Creator of Pakistan 
(Murray, London 1954), p.95, 
123, ^^ am Gopal t Indian Muslims op,cit,, p, ?05, 
124. K.K.zlz, ed. All Parties Muslim Conference 19?9~ 
1935^ A Documentary Record (Karachi l973i p.34. 
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separate electorate and opting for Joint electorate for the 
unity. So while retaliating* they called for the separate 
electorate In legislatures and loc?»l bodies with weightage, 
Horeov< c 5ts leaders issued a itk^ nifesto asking (Muslims 
not to obey the Congress and to abstain from its fueetinga 
end proceedings. Such war the extent of 'iuslim estrangement 
from Congress that "the Muslims in the Congress dvfindled 
125 
from a few hundred to less than s score of numbers " 
Thus Nehru Report instead of spanning the ever widening 
gulf between the Hindus and Muslims, widened it further. 
After the failure of the National Conventi<-m, 
attea^ts were made to bring the two factions of the Muslim 
League together to present united demands. Efforts succ'-
eeded and Mr, Jinnah acccxamodating various view-points of 
Muslim opinicm formulated his ••Fourteen points'* - or counter 
proposals of Mehru Report for the future constitutional 
reforms scheme, TSiey were as follows* 
(1) Ttie form of the future constitution should be 
federal with the residuary powers vested in the provinces, 
(2) A uniform measure of autonomy should tse granted to 
11 provinces, 
125, Iyer, op,cit,, p, 138, 
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(3) All Legislatures In th« Country n^d other elected 
bodies should b« constituted on the definite principle of 
adequate and effective r^resentation of minorities in every 
province without reducing the »«Jority in any province to 
» minority or even equality. 
(4) In the Central Legislature, Muslim representaticm 
should not be less than one-third of the total. 
(5) Representation of communal groups should continue 
to be by means of separate electorate as at present, 
provided that It should be open to any community, at any 
time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour for 
joint electorate. 
(6) Any territorial redistribution that might at any 
time bo necessary should not in any way affect the Muslim 
m jorlty in the Punjab, Bengal and N.W.P, Prwince. 
(7) Pull rellgrious liberty, i.e. liberty of belief, 
worship and observance, propaganda, association and educa-
tion, should be guaranteed to all communities. 
(8) No bill or resolution or any part thereof should 
be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if 
three-fourths of the members of any community in that parti-
cular body could oppose such a bill, resolution or part 
thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the 
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Irtcrests of that ctMnsunity or in th« alternative such 
other method would be devised as might be found feasible 
and practicable to deal with such cases* 
(9) Sind should be separated frcm the aombay 
Presidency. 
(10) Reforms should be introduced in the H.w.F.Province 
ind aaluchistan on the s'^ me footing as In other provinces, 
(11) Provision should be made in the Constitution 
giving Mlualims an adequate share along with the other 
Indians* in all the services of the state and in local 
self-gov«»rning bodies having due regard to the requirements 
of efficiency, 
(12) The Constitution should embody adequate safequardtf 
for the protection of Husllm culture* for the protection and 
prcKBOtion of Muslim education* language* religion* personal 
laws and 'iusllm charitable institutions* for th ir due 
share in the grants*in-aid given by the state and by local 
self-governing bodies* 
(13) No cabinet* either Central or Provincial* should 
be formed without there being or proportion of at least 
onBofthird Muslim ministers. 
(14) No change should be made in the constitution by 
the central legislature except with the concurrence of the 
- 94 • 
126 
states constituting th« Indian Federation. 
In July 1929 Sarojlnl Naidu made an «ffort to arrange 
a meeting of Gandhiji* Mr. Jinnah -^ nd Ml Brothers to 
resolve the st8l^ :i^ >^ t^  Alarm aounded in l^ahasabha Camp. 
It started ceapaign of villification and accusation 
against the Congress leaders. In a letter to Qandhiji* 
Jaykar stressed th t he must not listen to Muslim demands. 
He also made it clear that if any arrnagement was made 
127 
wit^out consulting the Hindus it would be rejected. Moonje, 
also in B letter to 3andhiji insisted that the N hru Report 
128 
must not be altered even by <»ne 'Jot* or 'title*. Finally* 
it was decided "to ignore Jinnah and the Ali Brothers 
completely, as Motilal felt that all the three of them 
were "totally discredited" and had no following worth the 
129 
n me." Interestingly, Motilal*s claim that they had no 
following waa contradicted by none other than TeJ Bahadur 
Sapru, who in a letter to C.P. Ramaswami* expressed the 
126. Maurice cswyer and A, Appadorait Speeches and Documents 
on the Indian Constitution 1921»j7, Vol.1 (OitfOfa • 
University Press, London) pp. 245-47. 
127. Jaykar to Gandhi, 25 July 1929, JavXar Papers. 
128. Moonje to Gandhi, 5 August 1939, Jaykar Papers. 
129. Motllal to Gandhi, 11 August 1929, Motilal Papers. 
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necessity of reconciling 11 Brothers, biceuse they "were 
130 
the key figures of the Muslim Politics of the tiae." 
expressed 
Evidently, Motil-^ l «as echoing the saine viewsvi@%fs as / 
by Jaykar, Lajpat Ral and loonje. Xn place of Ignoring 
^oonje -nnd Jaykar the Congress chose to ignore M.A.Jinnah -
a staunch nationalist and liberal devoted to the Cf^ use of 
Hindu-Muslim unity, -mus, accepting the views expressed 
by Moonje ^nd Jaykar, Conjress proved that it worked under 
heavy pressure from the Hindu Hahasabha and ignored the 
influence of All Brothers, who had mass following of the 
Huallms of India, Their role in the non-cooperaticm was 
nlso totally ignored. The Congress, simply by saying that 
these leaders should be ignored ^iB they had no following 
was ridculing itself. 
130. Sapru Manuscripts, National Archives, Calcutta, Vol.1, 
Quoted in Padaashai Indian National Congress >ind 
the Muslims - 1928*1947 (Ralesh Publications* Delhi, 
1980) p,58. 
CHAPTER IZX 
PARTIN3 OF THE WAYS 
PARTIWQ OF THE WAYS 
The Nehru Report became a discredited docatient 
because it w.-?s rejected by the Muisll-ns, Sikhs* Depressed 
classes and the left wing of the Congress itself. Inspite 
of this the Congress Session of Calcutta In December 1928 
gave an ultimatlum to the British Oovemment to accept the 
Nehru Report by Decentoer 31, 1929, otherwise it "would 
Insist on independence and organize n<m-violent non-
cooperation to achieve It." Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, 
issued a statement on October 31, 1929 promising Dominion 
status for India and also indicated that after the con^le-
tlon of SitTJon Report, a Round T ble Conference of Indian 
Representatives end Britain would asstable to deal with 
2 
the constitutional reforms. However, Lord Irwin's announce-
ment that the natural issue of India's constitution'*^  1 
progress •.••••••••••••. was the attainment of Dominion 
3 
status, could not satisfy the Congress which wanted an 
assurance from the Qovemment that the proposed Round 
Table Conference would be convened with the purpose of 
drafting a scheme for Dominion Status for India which 
1. v.p.Menon t The Transfer of Power In India (Orient 
Longman (1957) p.37. 
2. R.J.Moore i The making of India's paper Federation 
1927-35 in C.H.Philips (ed.) The partition of India -
Policies and perspective 1935-1947 (London 1970) p.57. 
3. Subhash Chandra Bose i op.clt., p. 170. 
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4 
would be binding upon His Majesty's 3ovemment. aat, since 
the viceroy did not accept th*Ir demand and the deadline 
fixed by the Congress for the Srltlsh Government to rccept 
the Mehru Report was to expire soon, the Congress in its 
Lahore Session in December 1929 declared independence as 
its goal. It also decided to launch a prograime of civil 
disobeidence. However, the civil disobedience resolution 
was "assailed by the leaders of all the other parties," 
f^ aulana iohammad All • ven "vent to the extent of apoeeling 
D 
to the Muslims not to participate in the Congress movement,* 
He expressed his apprehension that 3andhijl would not stick 
to his progranoine. He contmndedt 
"Doubtless (the) tiian who could suddenly call off 
the Non-cooperation canqpaign at Bardoli in 1922, with the 
same astonishing about-face can inaugurate a civil dis-
obedience movement in 1930, 3ut what surety Is there that 
he would not again order suspension, just as he ciid eight 
years ago, only a few days after serving an ultimatum to 
7 
the Viceroy." Significantly, the civil disobeidience movement 
4* Una Kaur : op.cit., p. 63« 
5. V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 42. 
6. Ibid. 
7. R.A.arafri (ed.) Hljarishat-1-Mohanwad All (Hyderabad, 
1944) pp. 237-238 cited in Mushirul Hasan i Mohammad 
All - Ideology and Politics (Manoh?«r 1981) p. 102. 
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waa opposed ev«n bv Muslin colle.^gues of GandhiJl« who w«r« 
of the view th=!t the situation in the country was not appro-
priate for the civil di80bedi<nnee« Dr. Ansari wrote to 
Oandhiji not to start civil disobedience movenent because 
Hindu-Muslim unity had reeled tiie * lowest water-mark*. 
In such a situation civil disobedience wmild *do an un-
8 
calculable ditfsage* to the unity. This view was also shared 
by Khaliquss«B«n« T.A.K. SherKanl and Syed Mahmood. 
However* Gan<fi)iji was adament. On March 12« 1930 Oandhiji 
started Dandi Marc^ and on April 6, 1930 he launched civil 
disobedience aoveoient with a cMq;>ai9n for the manufacture 
of salt in violation of salt law. At a later stage* boycott 
of British 900ds and non-payment of taxes were also included 
in the programme which were effectively carried out. 
thousands of people courted arrest. 
On the other hand Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind« while 
burying its differences with the Congress decided to 
support thm civil disobedience* only because the Congress 
had declared independence as its goal. Similarly* Ahrar 
Party in Punjab and xhudai Khidmatgars of the North-west 
Pr<mtier Province* under the leadership of Khand Abdul 
8. Ansari to ^andhiji* 13 February 1930* cited in Hasan 
(«Kl.) Muslims end the Congress pp. 99-100. 
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9 
Ohaffar Khan actively participated In the movenient. Insplte 
of their participation in the civil disobedience the Muslims 
by nnd largre re-nained dissatisfied with the Con'jress 
apathy towards the cotiraunal problem. 
The report of the Simon Conmission was published 
in June 1930 and was outrightly rejected by the majority 
of the Indian leaders who ternaed it as a political hunibug. 
Meanwhile a Labour Government came into power in Britain. 
It decided to shelve the report and convened a Round Table 
Conference in London. Efforts failed to persuade the 
Congress to participate in the Conference. The first 
Session of the Round Table Conference b<»gan on November 12, 
1930 without Congress. Out of 89 membrrs representing 
various intere>stsy 57 were fran British India* 16 from the 
10 
Indian States* and 16 from the British parties. The first 
session was marked by the old controversy over "lusllm 
representation in Punjab and Bengal and welghtage in other 
Hindu majority provinces. The question of Joint versus 
separate electorate was also a much debated issue. These 
issues* however* rem^ tined unresolved as no agreement could 
be achieved in the Conference. Ihe Hindu Mahasabha was not 
ready to move a bit from the stand which it had taken in 
9 . Ram 3opal* o p . c i t . * p . 224. 
10. Sul^ash Chandra Bose* o p . c i t . * p . 195 . 
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the All parties convention In 1928, though Muslim delegates 
were ready for a settlement. In the words of Sir Chlman Lai 
Setalvad, a delegate to the Conference! 
"After we reached London well in advance for the 
Round T^ble Conference, it was arranged that some represen-
cativ a of Hindus and of Muslims should m et to consider 
the question of a coiwiunal settlement. Sapru, Sa«3tri# 
myself, Jaykar, Moonje and Ambedkar were deputed for this 
meeting and the Agha Khan, Jinnah and one other gentleman 
represented the 'luslims ••••• when we first met, I put the 
question to the Agha Rhan, whether. If we arrived at a 
satisfactory settlement on other points he would agree on 
Joint electorates. He said, "If you satisfy our demands 
on 11 other matters we would agree to joint electorates, 
with reservations of 'seats for Muslims." I put a further 
question, "If we came to a settlement on all nwstters includ-
ing Joint electorates, will the Muslim delegates support 
the national demand at the Conference?" His answer w«s 
characteristic. He said, "In that event you lead and we 
11 
follow." Further he stated that Sapru, Sastri and himself 
would liave agreed to those demands tout they were very much 
11. Sir. Chiman Lai Sctalvadt Recollections and Reflections 
(Bombay 1946) p. 358. 
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12 dlssppointed by the attitude of Jaykar and Moonje and 
13 
"a great opportunity was thus lost.** Th« only mccean 
achieved in the Conference was unaninous agreement of all 
14 
parties* including the rulers* on the issue of federation. 
The Round Table Conference adjourned an January 19, 1931. 
soon afterwards seme Important develocuients took 
place in India. Oandhiji arrested during the civil dls-> 
obedience raovement was released and a rapprocheaent was 
on the Card between hin and the Viceroy. As a result 
*<3andhi>Xrwin* Pact was signed on March 5, 1931. The 
Coagress agreed to suspend civil disobedience and to parti-
cipate in the next Round Table CfMiference in excdiange of a 
few minor eoneessicns including release of all civil dis-
obedience prisoners. The Karachi Congress of Hareh 1931 
ra<''.ified the 3andhi-Zrwin Pact and appointed Gandhiji as the 
sole Congress representative to the Second Round Table 
Conference. 
The Second Round Table Conference started in the 
second week of Septeaber 1931. Zt concentrated its work 
primarily cm the solution of coonunal problem in India. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
14. V.P.Menon* op.cit.# p. 44. 
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GandhiJl# the sole representative of the Congress questioned 
the credential of those delegates who represented various 
Interests in India, and claimed that only Congress represen-
ts 
ted the whole of India and all the Interests. He also 
opposed separate representation and special safeguards 
-jiven to any minority and untouch-^bles. He contended that 
untouchables were Hindus and could not be separated from 
16 
the naln body of Hinduism. This contention was not accepted 
by other delegates including 3.R. Ambedkar - the leader of 
the untouchables, who wanted reservation and special safe-
17 
guards for them. He then turned to the representatives 
of minorities and concluded • Minority Pact* vjhich contained 
a Joint statement of their clalnns. It provided the desired 
safeguards and reservation to the untouchables. Oandhiji 
strongly objected to this pact and assertedi "I would like 
to repeat what I have said b- fore-that vhile it will always, 
accept any solution thf't may be accept'^ble to the Hindus, 
Mussulman and Sikhs, the Congress will be no party to special 
18 
reservation of special <=^ lectorat#s for any other minorities.• 
15. C.RaJagopalacharl and J.C. Kumarapa, (ed.)i Matlons 
Voice (Ahmedabad, 1932) p.104. 
16. .'bdul Hamid, op.cit., p. 212. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Subhash Chandra ^se, op.cit., p. ?22. 
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Dlfferenc<'8 grew atconqec among the delegates. Here, It 
will be interesting to note that 3andhijl always stressed 
that for the attainment of Swaraj Hindu-Muslim agreement 
was essential. But speaking at the Conference he s Id 
"The solution of the communal tangle can be the crown of 
Swaraj constitution and not Its foundation. Our differences 
here hardened If they have not arisen by reason of the 
foreign domination. I have not B shadow of do ^ot that 
the Icebera of comitunal differences will nelt under the 
19 
warmth of the sun of freedom,* The Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald, known as the Congress sympathiser was provoked 
by this argument and saldi "Be honest and face the facts. 
Ihe communal problem la a problem of fact. Does the pro-
blem exist in India or does it not exist. I do not answer. 
I leave you honestly to answer it for yourselves and to 
20 
yourselves." Ostensibly, Oandhijl ignoring the real 
problem, was trying to achieve a swaraj constitution without 
reaching to a Hindu-Muslim settlement,which certainly, did 
not have any anount of feasibility. So, it was do<»ned to 
failure and was responsible for creating bitterness ??nd 
heat in the iiscuaslon ultimately leading to a position 
where no agreement could be achieved. Kenjl Dwark;* Das, e 
prominent Hindu leader l'?.ld the responsibility for the 
19. Janil-ud-dln Ahmadi Speeches <?nd writings of -Ir.Jinnah. 
vol.1 (LJ'hore, 1943) pp. 462-63. 
20. Ibid., p. 463. 
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failure of the Round Table Conference, on the Con^ jre s and 
the Hindu Mahasabha leaders, !e wrote. The contitiunal and 
Depressed classes problem would h"5Ve been -.ettl*>d In London 
at the a.T.C. but landhijl was under the Influence of Hindu 
21 
co.nnunalists - Pandit "1 lavlya, JayXar and 3,;:^  Birla," 
rhus the congress missed the opportunity at this 
Conference to solve the communal tangle. At that occasion 
the Prime minister addressing the deleqiates announced that 
in the bsence of an agreement etnonj thfn^ 5P'lv«*s, the British 
Qovernment would have to settle not only the problems of 
representation but would also be compelled to devise cons-
titutional checks to protect the (TJinoritles from unrestric-
ted and tyrannical use of the democratic principle expressin-j 
22 
itself solely through the majority power. Even in face of 
this threat, the Congress failed to p«itcli up differences on 
the is^ sue. Consequently, the British Government came forward 
with its own scheme of the cotifinuial Award on Aujust 16, 
1932, It granted separate electorate to the Muslims, 
Europeans, Sikhs, Indian Christians and "nglo-Indians, It 
accorded reservation of seats for the "lusll-ns in every 
Province, and v;elghtage in the Province where they wore 
in a ninority. It also gave wel^htsge to the Hindus in the 
21, Kanji Dwarkadas; In^B*t^ Fiaht for Fge^dpm (Bombay 
1«»66) p, 404, 
22, biul Hamid, op,clt,, p. 212. 
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23 
North-West Frontier Province and Slnd. But neither i^sllms 
nor Hindus were satisfl<^ d with their representation given 
In Punjab and Bengal. Against their 55 per cent population 
In Punjab, Muslims were given 49 per cent of the se-^ ts In 
the legislature. Similarly* 47,5 per cent at seats In 
B«igal against their population of 55 per cent was short 
of tielr expectation who wanted statutory majority in 
24 
Punjab and Bengal. Another Important feature of the Award 
was that the seats were reserved for the untouchables which 
were to be filled by election from special constituencies 
in which they alone could vote, though they were entitled 
25 
to vote also In the general constituencies, ilie Congress 
was worried, because. In the words of Rajendra "rasad, the 
Hindu community was further weakened by giving separate 
26 
representation to the untouchables, GandhiJI undertook 
-fast unto death on Septenriber 20, 1932 to pressurise the 
Government to change the Award concerning untouchables. 
Certain prominent Congress leaders Including CRaJago^ala-
27 
charl In consultation with Qandhljl started neiotlatlon 
with 8,R. Ambedkar - the leader of untouchables .ind conclu-
ded a pact with him known as 'Poona Pact' which ggve more 
23. Ram 3opal, op.clt,, p, 237, 
24. Ibid., pp. 237-33. 
25. V.P. Menon, op.clt., p. 49. 
26. Rajendra Prasad, op.clt., p. 136. 
27. C.Khallquzzaman, op.clt., p. 115. 
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representation to the untoochablea than the Award. While 
the Award had given them 71 seats in various state legis-
latures* the 'Poona Pact* gave them 148 sents in the state 
legislatures and 18 per atnt of the general seats in the 
28 
central legislature. The Oovemment accepted it as it was 
keen to have a consensus and had earlier declared that it 
would welcome any alternative scheme, aandhiji broke his 
fast. Had Gandhiji and Congress shown the same attitude 
towards Muslims, perhaps the never nding cofoaunal problem 
between Hindus and Muslims would have been solved for ev* r. 
On December 24, 1932 the Secretary of State for 
India announced the British 3ovemment»s decision to accord 
33.3 per cent seats to the Muslims in the Central Legisla-
29 
ture and the formation of Sind as a separate Province. 
Muslim League welcomed thl«decision because it was in 
accordance with the long standing demand, similarly on 
July 7, 1934 the share of Muslims in Public Services was 
also fixed at 25 per cent. Meanwhile Mr, Jinnah came back 
to India and once again assumed the leadership of the 
Muslim League. The Council of Muslim League, under his 
presidentship resolv<»d in April 1934i "that the council 
23, S.3hattach<3ryai A Dictionary of Indian History 
(New York 1967) p. 243. 
29, Ram Oopal, op,cit,, p, 238, 
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accepts th« coinnunal ^w©rd so far as it goes, until a 
substitute is agreed upon by the various comimnities and 
parties to secure such a future constit'Jtion for India as 
30 
vjould be acceptable to the country." enviously, '*jslim 
leaders were still hopeful of arriving at any Hindu-Muslim 
settle lent vith the Congress. 
The Congress* significantly, decided to remain 
neutral to the Award. It resolved in October 1934i "The 
Congress ..... in view of the division of opinion, c-=!n 
neither accept nor reject the Comriun-: 1 Award as long as 
31 
the livision of opinion lasts." Howev<=r it v;as ^^n strange 
decision which was certainly taken ojt of political exigency. 
The Central Assembly elections was to be held in November 
1934. Dr. Ansari and Khaliquzzaman eminent Muslim Congress-
men were totally against the rejection of the Award and had 
conveyed their stand to Qandhijl th t if the eonKnunal Award 
was rejected by the Congress they would resign from the 
32 
membership of the parli?(n>ent3ry Board. Whereas, Aney and 
M-laviya were dead opposed to ita acceptance and were pre-
33 
ssurizing the Congress to reject it. As there was division 
30. syed Sharifuddin Piraada t Foundation of Pq)^ iiytant -
luslim League Documents 1906-1947 (Karachi 1970) p.XVII, 
31. S'diq Ali (ed.)» Congress ;^ nd the '-linoritles Resolutioni 
(Allahabad, 1947) p. 125. 
32. C.Khliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 124, 
33. Ibid. 
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of opinion, th<r Congress decided to remain neutral. 
Evidently, In view of the forthcoming election Congress was 
not ready to antogonlze either Hindu Mahasabha or the 
Muslim League. However, Hindu Mahaaabha leaders strongly 
conde^ Tined the Award, and the neutral position taken by the 
Congress in its resolution. Bven a section of congressfnen 
led by Hindu Mahasabha leader M.M.Malavlya broke away and 
started the •Congress Nationalist Party', with a policy to 
34 
reject the Coronunal Award. Apparently the Congress and 
the Mluslim League, both were now, realising the need for 
reconciliation. It also reflecteki in the Congress-League 
cooperation in the Central Legislature during the period of 
35 
1934-1936. 
The Government of India Act, passed by Parliament 
received the Royal Assent on Aujust 4, 1935. Important 
Principles enshrined in the Act were - All India Federa-
tion, Provincial 'utonomy and responsibilities with safe-
guards. The residuary powers were vested in the 3ovemor-
36 
General to be exercised at his discretion. Ihe Act received 
condemnation from congress as well as the Muslim League.The 
34. V.P.Menon, op.cit., p. 51. 
35. R.Couplandt Indian Politics - 1936-42, (London 1943), 
pp. 9-10. 
36, Syed Sharlfuddin Pirzada, op.cit., p. XVI, 
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Congress In Its Falzpur Session In Decesnber 1936 rejected 
the Act and resolved "not to submit to It both inside and 
37 
outside the legislature so as to end it,* But ultimately, 
the Congress rrsolved to fiqht the Provincial elections 
33 
under the A<it,*to coTib t the -ct and seek to f-na it." The 
All Indl- lusllm Le -jue at its Oo-.nbay Session on "prll 17, 
1935 stron-jly conde^ tmed the federal scheme of the ct as 
"most reaetlonr^ry, rf^ t^rograde, Injurlovis md fatal" "nd 
39 
"totally unacceptable", but resolved to utilise the pro-
vincial schestie of the constitution "for what it is v;orth, 
40 
inspite ttt the most objectlon'^ble feature contained therein, * 
Thus, both the parties decided to contest the elections but 
as H.V, Hodson retnarked, "The Congress contested the elec-
tions explicitly to combat and destroy it. The* M'jslim 
League, vshile equally opposed to the federal provisic»is, 
fought in order to use the provincial part of the 'ct for 
41 
what it was worth," 
the provincial elections were held in 1937, in eleven 
provinces. The Conjress ministries were formed in six 
37, Indian nnual He lister 1936, Vol.11, pi), 27-23, 
38, J waharlal Wehrui An Aut^ oblootrapf^ y (London 1^42) 
pp, 422-23, 
39, Indl n Annual ^eqilster, 1936, Vol.1, p, 2<i5, 
40, Ibid. 
41, H.V.Hodson t The 3reat Dlvie (NcwYork 1971), p.6?, 
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provinces i.e. Bihar, Orissa, the United Provinces, the 
Central Provinces* Bombay and Assam. In the same year, 
the Congress formed coalition ministry in N.W.F. province 
and in March, also in Assam a coalition ministry was 
formed after the fall of non Congress ministry. The 
Unionist party of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan came to power in 
Punjab and the Krishak ProJ a Party of Fazlul Haq formed 
ministry in Bengal, Whereas, nfter the fall of non-
Congress ministry in Sind, Allah Bakhsh formed ministry 
v/ith the Congress support. 
At the time of election "in the U.P. the Congress 
and the League pronouncedly arrived at an understanding of 
mutual help in the election can^aign." Obviously "The 
Congress, when it entered the contest was not sure of a 
dedisivie victory, and one of the reason why its provincial 
leaders m de an alliance with the League was the prospect 
43 
of a coalition with it in ministry formation. But with 
its victory the whole situation altered, 'iost of the seats 
vi^ e^re won by the Congress ;^ nd so it w-^ s in a position to 
form a Government by itself. The Congress now turned down 
the coalition offered by Muslim League. Subhssh Chandra 
Bose, the party president declared that party dictatorship 
42. Ram lop^ il, op.cit., p. 243. 
43. Ibid., p. 247. 
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should be he slogan of the Congress nnd the lde~ of 
cooperation '•nd coalition with other parties must be given 
44 
up, Jawakiflrlal Nehru also expressed the same views. 
ddressing convention of newly elected Congress rnembers 
of Provincial Assemblies on March 19, 1937 he termed such 
settlement with the *4u8lim League as "nonsense" and said, 
"This mode of thinking might have existed in the medieval 
45t 
-'gea but today nooody cares for it.* The Congress countered 
the coalition offer by insisting that only one ?;eat would 
be given to the Muslim League in the ministry on the condi-
tion that "Muslim League group in the United Provinces 
Legislature should cease to function as a separate group 
and Join tVe Congress as full members" and that "the Muslim 
League Parli ?tmentary Board in the United Provinces will be 
dissolved, and no candidate will thereafter be set up by 
46 
the said Board at any by-election." It is worth mention-
ing that the same conditions were l-^ id before the Muslim 
47 
Leegue in ^mbay. Naturally* such conditions aimed at 
liquidating them, were unacceptable to the League and were 
44. A History of the Freedom Movement (Pakistan Historical 
Society 1970) Vol.IV 1936-1947 Part I, p.9. 
45. Ashiq Husain Batalvit Iqbal ke Akhri Do Sal, (Karachi 
1961), p. 381. 
46. The Leader (Allahabad), 4 August, 1937. 
47. Kanji Dwarkadas, op.cit., pp. 466-67, 
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rejected. Some writers, have defended the Congress attitude 
as being in accordance with the principles of pBrlla!nent<»ry 
43 
deitiocracy, 9ut 3eni Prasad has rightly remarked that "The 
majority principle is a rule of «xp«<Si«ncy and always 
to be so interpreted as to conwnand minority aff Irmatlon, 
Orthodox parliamentarism, however, carried the day and 
4^ 
excluded the ^sllm League from a share in power." R.C. 
M^ JuiTidar criticising the Congress attitude cotimentedi "To 
sacrifice collaboration with the Muslim League in the name 
of ideals which did not at all correspond with existing 
facts -was an extremely unwise-elmost fatal-step for which 
50 
India had to pay very dear.. w 
ddressing the Lucknov Session of the Muslim Leajue 
in October 1937, Jinnah aai^ i, "Mo settlement vith the 
majority community Is possible, as no Hindu Ir ^der speaking 
with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire for 
It. Honourable settlement can only )c achieved betv^ een 
equals and unless the tv^ parties learn tv^  respect and fear 
e»ch other, ther*^ - is no solid ground for ^ny settlenent. 
Offers of peace by the weaker party always means confessions 
48. TI.R.Manda in -rdllips, d, op.cit., p. 155 and also 
P^ d^mashai Indian Nc'tional Congress -nd the Indian 
Muslim, op.cit., p. 113. 
49. 3enl Parsadi Hindu-Muslim Question, (''llahab?'d,l94l) pp. 59-62. -------—-—---—-—--—— 
50. H.c.HaJumdari History of the Freedom Movement 
(Calcutta, 1962) Vol.1, p.337. 
of weakness and an Initltation to aggression. Appeal to 
patriotism* Justice and fair play and for qfoodwill fall 
flat politics means power and not relylnr on cries 
59 
of Justice or fairplay or goodvill." At the Lucknow 
Session* Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Premier of Punjab 
Mr. Fazlul Hug* r^twaler of Benjal* and Sir Mohantrnad Sadullah* 
Premier of Assam announced th-^ ir decision of joinlni the 
^slim League. Many Muslim leaders from Sind* N.w.F.P,* 
Madras* Assam and the Central Provinces merged their parties 
52 
with the Muslim League. This development w«»kened the 
Congress and strengthened and consolidated the position 
of the Muslim League. 
The congress decided to meet the challenge of the 
growing strength of the Muslim League by launching Muslim 
Mass Contact programme. Muslim League also launched their 
Muslim Mass Contact Programme. The Congress programme and 
53 
was thus r'^ taliated and ultimately "crushed* by the League. 
The formation of Congress ministries in six provinces 
in U.P.* aihar* Orissa* Central Provincep* 9ombay and Madras, 
and coalitions in H.W.P.p, and Assam* created more contro-
versies and antagonist!. The Congress ministeries remained 
51, Jamil-ud-din Ahmad i Speeches and writings of Mr.Jinnah 
(1964), Vol.1* p.30. 
55. syed Sharifuddin Pirzada* op.cit., pp. XVIII-XIX. 
53. Ram 3opal* op.cit., p. 254. 
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in office from July 1937 to t^ ecember 1939, itiis period 
Was very crutlal for the Hindu-Muslim relations in India, 
It was also a watershed In Congress-League rift. The 
Con^res • was accused by the )^8lim League of o;.pression# 
injustice and ill-treatment to the "tuslims. It was alleged 
that the Congress had a set design to establish Hindu Raj 
and destroy the religion and culture of the "^slims nd 
54 
deprive them their political and econonrdc rights. In order 
to depopularlse Congress r-^ mong the Muslins the League appoin-
ted coTwaittees under the presidentship of Raja 'luhamtnad 
Mehdi of Pirpur and S,M, Sharif to Investigate the iusliin 
con laints .^ jainst the Congress GSovemments, As expected 
the Pirpur Report and Sharif Report unanimously declared 
that the ^slims were the worst suffeers and Congress 
54 
ministries purely resembled the Hindu Raj, The singing of 
"Bande -latram". Congress flag# wardha scheme of basic 
education, vldya Mandir schf'nne of education and Hlndu-Hrdu 
controversy were the tnoin points of criticism, Mr, Fazlul 
Haq# the Premier of Bengal, in a pamphlet, entitled "iuslin 
ufferings und'r Congress Uule", ch-rjcd the Congresa 
ministries with partial nd unjust treatment of the ?1u3lians 
56 
under their rule. 
54, Cadlq 'li, op,cit,, p, 16, 
5 5 , Shan Muhammadt Khaksar 4ovefaent i n I n d i a , (.'Meenakshi 
Prakashm), 1973^, p , 1 1 5 , 
56 , A ,K,Faz lu l Huq i "jluslito S u f f e r i n g s under Con^rress Rule 
( C a l c u t t a 1939) pp , 1-19, a l s o ^ n r i t !?azar P P t r i k a 
( C a l c u t t a , 18 r>ec, 1939) , 
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The Congress leaders and the press retaiHated and 
accused the "lusllm League of trying to discredit the 
Congress and the Congress administration and that the 
stories of atrocities and injustice were nothing jnore than 
a propaganda against the Congress. However, Maulana Aead's 
observation that "the charges levelled by Mr, Jlnnah and 
the •'ftjslim League with regard to injustice to Muslims ^ n^d 
57 
other minorities are absolutely false" is controverted by 
a letter of Sulayman Jinnah# the secretary of Jabalpur 
District Congress Musli.Ti Mass Contact, to Nehru, 'c wrote 
"The root of the disease I believe lies in the -nti-
National activities carried on from time to time by the 
various town and district Congress committees which have, 
I hold, frlghtemd the Muslim masses as to their religions 
integrity and their share in the future acJministration of 
t le country and thus kept them away from Joining hands with 
the m sses in the fl:jht for freedom, I Kiyself have experi-
enced th t Tiany of the office-bearers in the district and 
town Congress coiwoittees have no cl ar hf^ ad with regard to 
th ir lusllm brether«i, often I have been v.-itness to the 
most shocking treatment being meted to them by these v-orkerg 
59 
of our organisation," lesidea, a number of lettera available 
57, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad t India Wins Freedom. (Orient 
Longman, 1967), p, 19, 
58, Letter of Sulaymnin Jinnah tc Nehru, dated April 24, 
1938, AlCC Papers^ File Number 0-32/1938, 
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in the Congress Conenlttec Papers written to the Concjress 
President and the Secretary h-'ve complaints against the 
Congress ministries. For instance, Muhanimad '^ ftlkhar 
Husayn Faridi to Congress President dated January 10, 103<» 
from Moradabad; Ashfaq Aihmad vakil to Nehru, dat**d January 
14, 1939 from Rai darelir S.u. Faridi from Mt erut dated 
January 15, 1939 and Shaykh Waris 'li from Mahmiidabad to 
59 
»1aulana Azad dated August 20, 1940 are all cases in point. 
In view of the general discontent, Jamlat-ul-Ulamri-
i-Hlnd asked the Congress to appoint a cownlttee to inquire 
into the complaints made against the Congress ministries. 
It even raised objectl ms tc certain features of the wardha 
scheme of education and threatened with civil disobedience 
60 
if enforced, -'umayun Kabir has observed that the dis-
satisfaction which the Congress rule had aroused amons^st 
fiuslims could not have continued unless there had been 
61 
discontent and a real sense of injury behind It, 
Forced by the campaign launched by the Muslim League 
against the Congress, its leaders mad© efforts to open 
59. AICC Papers, Haas Contact Movement. Pile No. D-7/1933-
39; Pile No. 11/1940. 
60. The Times of India. March 7, 1939. 
61. Humayun Kabir i .Muslim Politics - 1906-42, 
2nd edition, (Calcutta^ 1944), p.l4. 
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ne|otietion with Jinnah* out It failed to nake any headway, 
"Having consolidated his sxjsition to a considerable extent, 
Jinnah now insisted that before nejotl tion could bejin the 
•^ uwlln Ijcajue should be recognised as the one and only 
org;»!nlsation th?!t represented the entire Muslim community 
in India nd that the Congress should speaH only on behalf 
62 
of the Hindus." The Congress could not nccept Jinnah's 
condition, so the efforts for the ciipprocft«fa«nt proved 
futile, tn Sept-raof r 1939 war oroke out In F^ urope. Lord 
Linlithgow announced that India was also on w^ sr with Jemany, 
The Congress stron jly prot^ sted and pleaded th"»t the issue 
of v,ar and peace was to be decided by the Indians, 
Subsequently the Congress ministries r« signed fronn the 
offices on the war issue in October 1939. The Muslim 
Lcsague observed, 'Deliverfince Day* on December 22, "to exp-
ress their deep sense of relief at the tcrmlnatl n of the 
Congress regime In various provinces, -^ind on their dellvf r-
63 
n^c< fro.a tyranny, oppression and injustic**," This .action 
evoked string re scntoient In the Congress. Jav-aharlal M*»hru 
t rote to Jinnah, "It thus seerns that >olltlc->lly ..e h?ive no 
62. :?,R,M«hrotra; op.cit., p. 196. 
63. s. Sh,-5rifud3in Pirzada, op.cit., p, xx. 
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64 
cojuaon ^romd and thi^it <xir objectives are different." 
Thus, after the elections of 1937 the Congress and 
Leajue steadily became two absolutes between whom no 
65 
compromise was possible. Tlie developments that accompanied 
those eventful years* Immensely widened the '3ulf between 
the Congress and the League. 
64. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada* (ed.)» Leaders correspondence 
with Mr. Jinnah {Bc»nbay# 1944) p. 147. 
65. S.R, Mehrotra, c^.clt., p. 201. 
CHAPER IV 
INDIA t DIVIDED 
INDIA I DIVIDED 
The forrnatlon of Congress ministries and Muslim 
League's grievances against thetn opened a new chapter to 
the Congress*League relations - rnarked by bitterness* 
suspicion and even hatred, A direct confroncatlon between 
was 
Congress and the League/''i^R^ssed during the years that 
followed the elections. The "Day of Deliverance" was the 
war cry vhlch culminated In the form of Lahore resolutions 
in 1940. Uptil now ^sllm League was in favour of a 
federation in which the residuary pov,ers were to be vested 
in the provinces and not in the centre as dem.->nded by the 
Congress. The controversy over ministry formaticm* how-
ever* changed the attitude of the League. Its leader, 
iuhanaraad Ali Jinnah had no longer any faith In such a 
system. So, he propounded the two-nation theory and deman-
ded parity with Hindus in the lovernment, "because nations 
1 
are equal irrespe»ctive of their size," Speaking at the 
Lahore session of Muslim League on March ?2, 1940« he 
dficlaredi "Musalmans are not a minority as it is connonly 
known and understood •••,, Musalmans are a nation according 
to any definition of a nation and they must have their 
2 
lUKae land, their territory and their state". Accordingly 
1. '.N.s, Mansergh - Some re flections on the Transfer of 
Power in Plural Society in C.H,Philips (ed.l oo.cit., 
p,53, 
2, Jamil-ud-din Ahmad op.cit,* p, 155, 
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on March 23, 1940, the All India 'Muslim Learjxie while 
rejecting the 3overnment of India Act of 1935 demanded 
that the whole constitutional plan should b^ reconsidered 
de novo nd that no revised plan would be acceptable to 
the Muslims unless it framcfd with their approval and 
3 
consent, resolved that "no constitutional plan vould be 
workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless 
it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., 
that Seojraphicf^lly contigiHious units are demarcated Into 
teqion& vhich should oe so constituted, with such terri-
torial re-adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas 
In which the Muslimsfere numerically in a majority as in 
the North-West and Ea tern zones of India should be jrouped 
to constitute "Indepenomt states" in v/hich the constituent 
4 
units shall be autonomous and sovereign." 
This resolution vhich came to be knovn as r>akiatan 
resolution aroused whirlwind of condenmation and criticism 
from different quarters. Jawaharlal Nehru, reacting 
sharply stated "all the old problems ••••. pale into 
insignificance before the latest stand taken by the Muslim 
League leaders at Lahore* The v.hole problem has taken a 
3. Matlubul Hasan S^iyid, op.cit., pp. 699-90. 
4, 3v,yer and Appadorsai, o:.cit., Vol.11, p.443. 
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new eomplL9xi€m and there is no question of settlement or 
5 
ne'jotlatlons now,** Gandhiji» In response to Lahore resolu-
tion vrote In April 1940 t "Unless the rest of India wishes 
to engage in internal fratricide the others will have to 
sutxnlt to the Jtoslem dictation* if the Moslems will resort 
to it, I know no non-violent method of compelling the 
obedience of eight cror« of Moslems to the will of the rest 
of India* however powerful a majority the rest may present. 
The Moslems must h ve the s me ri^ht of self determination 
that the rest of India has. w© are at present a Joint 
6 
family. Any member may claim division." 
The Congress did not Immediately expressed its 
formal attitude to the demand for Pakistan, ^t the 
statecnents of 3andhljl and !iehru reflect^ -d the thinking of 
the Congressmen. The Impression one could draw from their 
statements and writings was th^t the Congress leaders were 
not in favour of two-nation th*>ory but were not willing to 
force the Muslim League to abandon this path which was 
going to the partitlcm of India. N^ru» according to a 
press report* re^ n rked that he felt relieved because at 
last the Muslim Lea^ iue had discarded its demands about 
5. ^.R.Nandal Nehru* The Indian National Congress and the 
Partition of Indl * 1936-47* In C.H. Philips (ed.) 
op.cit.* p. 166. 
6. D.3,T«mdulkar t Mahatma - Life of Mohandas Karamchand 
3andhl. new edition* (Bombay 1962) Volume V* p. 269. 
- 122 -
proortlonate representation in Legislatures^ services* 
7 
cabinets etc. So Instead of taking any concrete step to 
meet the challenge exprii^ ssed his childish pleasure and 
proved that he was neither Interested nor serious for the 
settlement of Hindu-Muslim problem. He was not prepared 
to give any Importance to the demands of the J^sllms -
their representation in various fields. Instead he was 
prepared to accepr the idea of partition - to get rid of 
their demands of proportionte representation in Legisla-
tures* services, cabinets etc. He "asserted that If people 
wanted such things, as suggested by the i^sllm League 
at Lahore, then one thing was clear, they and people like 
him could not live together in India, He would be prepared 
to face all consequences of it but he v^uld not be prepared 
8 
to live with such people," 
So, wittingly or unwittingly he was s^ccepting the 
idea of partition. Another important feature of the atti-
tude of Congress leaders to the demand of partition was 
thct it lacked firm and clear cut stand. Dubious and con-
tradictory j^pproach to this problem was the feature of the 
Congress attitude. One could draw double meaning and double 
stand from the writings and the statements of its leaders. 
7. t£asisr# April is, 1940. 
3. laUi^iS£» April 15, 1940. 
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They gave the Impression that they were against the partl-
tidn and they v;ould not compromise on this Issue* but at 
the same time they Impressed that they would not oppose 
this demand If pressed, writing In the Herjljan# Onn«3hlJl 
argued« "vhat can be done under the threat of Pakistan? 
If It Is undesirable and Is meant only for the "Muslims to 
jet more under Its shadov*, any solution would be an unjust 
solution. It would be worse than no solution ••••. rhe 
partition proposal has altered the face of the Hindu-Muslim 
problem, I have colled it an untruth. There can be no 
compro^nise with it. At the same time I have that if, the 
•4ght crores of Muslims desire it, no power on earth can 
prevent it, notwithstanding opposition, violent or non-
9 
violent. It cannot come by honourable coraprcmlse," Contrary 
to Congress attitude the attitude of non-League Muslim 
organizations, asse-nbled in the Azad Muslim conference was 
clear. The conference \-ia~: convened by the Jamiat-ul-Ulema 
and other organiaations in April 1940 at Delhi, It 
ernphatically opposed the :iivislon of India and condemned 
10 
the league's defnand for the partition. But at the same 
time expressed its deep concern for the protection of the 
religious -^ nd cultural rights of the Muslims in any future 
9, Herljan, May 4, 1940. 
10, ziya-ul-Hasan Paruqi, op,cit., p, 96, 
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11 
constitutional set-up of the country. Hence, the other 
'Muslim organisation were more clear on their stand against 
partition than the Congress, Although, the Jamiat and 
other Muslim organisations were not less worried about 
religious, cultural, political and other interests of the 
Muslim community? but they did net prescribe partlticm 
as it was detrimental to the Interests of the country. The 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-l-Hlnd In 1942 came forward with Its own 
scheme known as Jwnly^ t^ Formula, It declared! 
1, "Our objective is complete independence, 
2, In a free India, Musalmana and their religion and 
culture will be free. They will not 'tccept a consti-
tution which does not approve of these freedoms, 
3, we stand for the fullest «nd unrestricted autonomy 
of the provinces, '^he centre will enjoy only those 
powers which the .rovinces, of their own accord, hand 
over to it and which concerns equally with all pro-
vinces, 
4, It is our considered opinion that a federation of 
autonomous provinces of India is essential. But a 
federation in which ninety million Bfuslims with a 
distinct culture of their own are left on the mercy of 
11, Ibid, 
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e nwoerical majority will in no case* b« acceptable 
12 
to then.••••••" 
The changed situation was influencing the course of 
political deliberation. Different organisations were 
responding differently to the new situation cremated by the 
Lease's demand of the partition of Indi-• Si;}nifidantly« 
Linlithgow* the Viceroy* did not take the P-ikistan resolu-
tion seriously and wrote to Zetland "I do not attach too 
nnsch iiiqportance to Jinni^'s deiaand for the carving out of 
13 
India into an indefinite number of religious areas ••••••" 
In an another letter to Amery he wrote th^t the Pakistan 
resolution v/as "laerely put forward ••••• for bargainini 
14 
purposes." 
The situation arising out of Ja^n*s victories in 
the south-east Asiat and the American and Chinese pressure 
on Britain to get support of Indian leaders to their w<:^r 
efforts* by achieving a tmp&xochmwmt with them drove the 
British Oovernment to adopt a reconciliatory attitude towards 
12. Sayyid Muhamcnad Hiyan i Uletaa^i-Haoa* Vol.II* 
(Al-Jamiyat Book Depftt* Delhi* 1948J" pp. 136-37. 
13. Linlithgow to Zetland* March 25* 1940* Zetland Collec-
tion cited in R.J.Moore - British Policy and the 
Indian Problem* 1936-40* in C.H. Philips (ed.) op.cit.* 
P.93. 
14. Linlithgow to Amery* June 30* 1940 (telejr^ ti Zetland 
Collection* Ib*d. 
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Indian defoands. Sir Stafford ^tippa arrived India in March 
1942 to negotiate with the Indian leaders on the proposals 
which were contained in the Draft Declaration of the British 
Oovemraent to resolve the political deadlocX, The object 
of the British Oovernment in these proposals were declared 
to be "the creation of a new Indian Union which shall 
constitute a Dcminion associated with the United Kingdom 
and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the crown 
but equal to them in eVf-ry respect and In no way subordinate 
15 
in ony aspect of its domestic or external affairs.** It 
proposed that after the end of war a constituent Assembly 
would be set up to frame a new constitution for India. It 
also laid down that any province would have an option not 
to join the proposed Indian Union, if it desired, the non 
acceding province would be entitled to frame a new consti-
tution of their own, giving them the same full status as 
16 
the Indian Union. 
the Congress working committee* in its resolution of 
April 2, 1942« strongly objected toilthe **novel principle of 
non-accession for a province" and regarded it "a severe 
blow to the conception of Indian Unity and an apple of 
discord likely to generate growing trouble in the 
15. C.H.Philipsi The Evolution of India; and Pakistan. 
1857-1947 - Select Documents (Oxford 1965), pp.371-73. 
16. Ibid. 
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provinces which may lead to further difficulties in 
the way of the Indian states awrging th^aselves into an 
17 
Indian Union." However* it resolved that "the Committee can 
not think in terms of compelling the people of any terri-
torial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their 
declared nd established wlll« wiiHe recognising the 
principle inevitably involves th-t no changes should be rnade 
which would result in fresh problems being created n^d ccMa-
pulsion being exercised on other substantial groups within 
that area. Each territorial on other subst ant it'll groups 
within that aren. Each territorial unit should have the 
fullest possible autonoay within the Union consistently 
18 
with a strong national state. 
Again it was a dubious ^^ nd ambiguous resolution. 
W^hile the Congress working Committee rejected the principle 
of non-accession for a province, owing to its apprehension 
of India's disintegratiuni it "implicitly conceded the 
^slim lieague*s demand for Pakistan* provided, first, that 
a coitmon centre was maintained, and second, that the non-
*^ uslim-s>aJorlty areas in Assam, Bengal and the Punjab were 
19 
not to be compelled to join Pakistan." It appe rs, that the 
17. juyer and Appadori, op.cit., Vol.11, p.525. 
18. 3uyer and App.^doral, op.cit., p. 526. 
19. s.R.Hehrotra. The Conoreaa and the Partition of India 
in C.H.Philips (ed.) op.cit., p. 214. 
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Congress was willingpo accept the proposals v;lth certain 
conditions. But since Stafford Cripps did not oblige* the 
Con jress decided to reject the proposals. The tiost impor-
tant issue on which there could not be any agreement between 
Congress and Cripps was the status of Executive? Council 
of the Viceroy • composed of Indian alone. Congress insis-
ted that it should function as cabinet. The po^ ver of the 
Commander-in-Chief and the Indian Membf^ r of the Executive 
Council in charge of Defence, was linked with this contro-
verfy. since the Ccmgress reg-^ rded the powers given to 
the Def4mce Minister as "totally insufficient*** and its 
demand for more power could not be accepted by Sir Stafford 
Cripps* the Congress Working Committee decided to reject 
21 
the British Government's proposals. 
The Muslim League appreciated the non-acceding 
clause* because it visualised in it the possibility of the 
creation of Pakistan. But since it was "purely illusory** 
and the creation of Pakistan was '•relegated only to the 
22 
realm of remote possibility*** it demanded to amend the 
proposals as to ensure the cessetion of the provinces 
20. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* op.cit.* p. 53. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Guyer and Appadoral* op.cit.* pp. 526-23. 
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claimed for Pakistan. It r©solv*^ d'tiMlt"th© only solution 
of India's constitutional probleni is th« partition of India 
into independent zones* and it will therefore be unfair 
to the Muslins to compel them to enter such a constituticMi-
nn king body whose main object is the creation of a ne^ 
23 
Indian Union." so, it decided to reject the proposals. 
ttie failure of the Cripps Mission disappointed 
Raje7opalach?tri, wfho wari of the view that* the Congress 
should accept the Iief»gue*s denand because the only obstacle 
to India's freedom was the differences between Congress and 
24 
the Leajue. He got two resolutions p ssed in the Madras 
Congr ss Legislature Party in this respect. The first 
resolution* inspired by the Implied but reluctant accep-
tance of the non»8Ccession clause* by the Congress saidt 
"It is absolutely nd urgently necessary in the best 
interests of the country at this hour of peril to do all the 
Congress cnn possibly do to remove every obstacle in the 
way of establishment of a National administration to face 
the present situation; and therefore* in as mxch ao the 
Moslem Le~jue has insisted on the recognition of the right of 
separation of certain areas from unit d India upon the 
23. V.p, Menon*op.cit.» p. 133, 
24. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* op.cit.* p. &0< 
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ascertaintnent of the wishes of the people of such areas 
as a condition precedent for a united national action at 
this moment of grave national dar ger, this party is of 
opinion* end recowaenda to A.I.C.C, that to sacrifice the 
chence of the fonnntion of a ?i4tional aovernnnent at this 
grave crisis for the doubtful advantage of -naintoining a 
controversy over the unity of India is a rnost unwise policy, 
<ind thr>t it has become necessary tc choose the lessor evil 
and acknowledg*^  th^ Mloslem Leajue's claim for separation 
should the same be persisted in when the time comes for 
framing a constituticm for India, and th< reby rwnove all 
ioubti r-nd fears in this regard, and to invite the ^ toslem 
Leaiue for a consultation for th« purpose of -arriving at 
an agreement and securing the Installation of a N^ t^lonal 
25 
jovemment to loeet the present emergency." 
The second resolution so 7^ t the permission of A H 
Indi.-: Congress Committer to foirm a coalition v,ith the Muslim 
League In order to "facilitate united nd effective ->ction.«.< 
26 
,,•,,'• The Congress leaders took strong exception to these 
resolution, Rajagopalachari u-^ s severely criticised cind 
•lis resolutions v;ere vehemently oppos^ d^, 3leck flags were 
25, rhe statesman, April 25, 1942. 
26. Ibid. 
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shown to him when he r^ rrlved at Allahabad! to attend the 
A.I.CC, neetlng. On April 29, 1942, he moved the two 
resolutions at the meeting but both were lost. Instead, 
a counter resolution moved by Jaiat Harain was passed which 
stilted that "any prop -sal to disint^ f^ ^^ rate India by giving 
liberty to any coinponent state of territorial unit to secede 
frorrj the Indian Union of federation will be detrl:nental to 
the b<^ at interests of the people of the different states 
and province* and the country as a whole and the Congress, 
27 
therefore, cannot a^ree to any such proposals." 
In fact there w?3a hardly any difference between the 
resoluticm passed by the Congress working Committee on 
April 2, 194:» and the Madras resolution. The only difference 
b*?twe#n the-n was that "whereas the working conBwittec had 
seemingly conceded the principle of self-determination to 
any terrlr.orial unit which wished to enforce it, the Madras 
resolution made a specific, reference to the Muslim Leaguers 
28 
demand for separation." Its aii^ eal to negotiate vith the 
•Muslim r^ -^ gue "for the purpose of arriving at an agreement 
and securing the Installation of a National C3ovem?t»ent", 
27. Civil and lllitary Qazette (Lahore) May 3, 1942. 
23. i^ .H.Zaidl - Aspects of the development of Muslim League 
Policy 1937-47 in C.H.Philips (ed.) op.cit., p.266. 
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during a transitional p«riod« vtith the common objective of 
obtaining complete independence found no positive response 
from the Congress. Instead Rajagopalachari was forced to 
resign from Congress working Committee as well as the provin-
cial legislature. So there was division of opinion among 
the Congress leaders on the issue of provincial autonomy 
and the consequent refusal of the top leaders to give a 
chance to Sri Rajagaopalachari's efforts to work out a 
possible solution of the Congress-League differences. The 
top leadership's adwmuit attitude towards non-cooperation 
with the Muslim League in forming coalition ministry hardened 
Muslim League's efforts to further take away the Muslims 
of India from the Congress. 
Meanwhile war situation worsened. Allied powers 
received set back in the far east. Japanese attack on India 
was now anticipated. At this stage Qandhiji decided to 
start Quit India Movement believing th'^ t "since the war 
was cm the Indian frontier* the British would come to terms 
29 
with the Congress as soon as the movement was launched." 
Maulana Azad opposed this view as he believed that it would 
encourage the Japanese to attack India. He was of the 
view that the Oovernment would not tolerate any mass movement 
while the enemy was knocking at the door* consequently the 
29. MauL^na Abul Kalva Azad* op.cit.* p. 67. 
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(3ov«cnnient v«ould certainly resort to repression. In e 
situation* while the Congress leaders would be imprisoned* 
36 
the movement would not rmnain non-'Vicrient* However* the 
Congress working Committee passed the *Oult India* resolu-
tion on July 14* 1942. It demanded the withdrawal of 
British rule from India. In the event of the non-acceptance 
of the Congress demand* it was made clear that Congress 
would reluctantly be coc^ ielled to utilize all Its accumul-^ -
ted non-violent strength in a wide-spread struggle* under 
the leadership of Gandhiji. It wast further resolved to 
refer this resolution to the All India Congress Committee 
31 
for the final decision. 
The All India Congress Committee met in Bombay on 
August 7-8 to give the final approval to the resolution of 
Congress working Committee. At the meeting* Jawaharlal 
Nehru moved the 'Quit India* resolution and Sardar Patel 
seconded it. The A.I.C.C. finally approved «nd endorsed 
the resolution by passing it. Next morning* GandhiJi and 
all the members of the working Ccsmmittee were arrested. The 
32 
Congress was declared unlawful and its offices were raided. 
Following the arrest of the Congress leaders* violence broke 
33 
out in many places. It soon took the shape of a revolt. 
30. Ibid.* pp. 66-68. 
31. C.Khaliquzzaman* op.cit.* p. 282. 
32. The Hindustan Times* August 10* 1942, 
33. lEhe Pioneer* August 11* 1942. 
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^aulana Aza6*a apprehension, thus, proved true. The 3overn-
ment reported to stem action and came down heavily on the 
agitators. DenK>nstratlons, vlolene* «n^ police firing 
were the order of the day. rhousand of people were killed 
34 
tay the police and military firing. The Movement was 
crushed and the 'Quit India* Movement failed miserably. 
Mr. Jinnah '^ hii© condetiming the 'Quit India' 
resolution said that it was an attempt "of blackmailing 
the aritish and coercing them to concede a system of govern-
ment and transfer power to that government vhich would 
establish a Hindu Raj immediately uiid«r the aegis of the 
British bayonet, thereby throving the .Muslims and other 
35 
minorities and interest at the mercy of the Congress Raj. 
The 'Muslim League refused to Join the Congress in the 
•Ouit India* Movement, inspite of t&« A.I.C.C. resolution 
of August 8, 1942 in which It promised for a federal 
constitution "with the largest autonomy for the federating 
36 
units and with the residuary powers vesting in these units." 
Muslim League saw this movement with suspicion. Soon after 
rejecting the cripps mission and the Rajagopalachari*s 
proposals, the Congress decided to launch 'Quit India* 
34. Freedom struggle (National Ftook Trust , India, Nevj Of ihi) 
p. 222. 
35. V.P.Menon, op.cit., p. 141. 
36. B.R.Nanda - Neurw* The Indian Nritional Conaresa and 
%n^ PflffUtf4on.Q^ In^atft m^-V in C . H . P h i l i p s (ed.) 
o p . c i t . , p . 171 . 
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Movctnent. !<toslim League held that after closing the door 
of negotlaticm on its face the Congress had decided to 
oust the British from India, without reaching to any 
settlennent of conmunal tangle - a move detrimental to the 
Interests of the Muslims. Before achieving independence, 
the ^uslim League wanted to make it sure thdt its demands 
were met. The view prevailed in the country and also in a 
section of the Muslim League that in view of the friendly 
gesture of the Congress in its rieeting of August 8 in which 
it sought the Muslim cooperation and their goodwill to 
achieve freedom, it vaa a good opportunity to extend the 
hands of cooperation to the Congress to achieve the freedom 
from the 3ritish Yoke. 3ut Jlnnah failed. 
Rajagopalacharl, once again took initiative in 
April 1^44 and offered his proposals to Jinnah, fully 
aporoved by Qandhiji, to achieve a settlement of the Hindu-
Muslim proble^ m• The Rajaji Formula provldedi 
" (t) Subject to the terms set out belov; as regards the 
constitution of free India, the Muslim LP'ague endorses 
Indl-^ n demand for Independence and will cooperate with 
the Congress in the formation of a provisional Interim 
3overnment for the transitional period. 
{7) After the termination of war a commission sh«ll be 
appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the 
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^^ orth->west and east of India wherein th« l^uslim popula* 
tlon is in an absolute majority. In the areas thus 
demarcated the plebiscite of all the inhabitants^held 
on the basis of adult franchise <>' other practicable 
franchise, shall ultimately decide the issue of 
separation frotj Hindustan, If the majority decide 
in favour of forming a sovereign state separate from 
Hindustan, such decisldn shall be given effect to, 
vlthout prejudice to the right of districts on the 
37 
border to join either state." 
Jlnnah, however, insisted that th®»* proposals must 
be send directly by Gandhiji, otherwise he viould not be 
39 
able to pi ce it before Muslim League Working Comnittee. 
Gandhljl, after his release from prison vrote a letter to 
Jlnnah expressing his desire to meet him. Consequently on 
September 3, 1944 they met in Bombay. Rajajl formula 
war the c^ais of their talks, Ttie talks last*, d till 
September 27, 1944 during vhlch, apart from holding talks 
they «J1SO exchanged correspondence. On September 24, 1944, 
3andhijl wrote to Jlnnahs 
"I proceed on the assumption that India is not to 
be regnrded as two or more nations, but as one family 
consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the 
37, C.Khallquszaman, op.cit., pp. 315*16. 
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north-west zones, !•©•# Baluchistan, Sindh* the North-west 
Frontier Province, and that part of the Punjab where they 
nre In absolute majority over all the other elennents, and 
in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are In absolute 
majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of 
India." 
"Differing from you on the gen ral basis, I can yet 
recooraend to the Congres and the country the acceptance of 
the claim for separation contained in the Musllii Lt ague 
Resolution of Lahore, I'^ IO, on ny basis and on the follow-
ing t rmsi 
"(e) The areas should be demarcc^ ted by a commission 
r pijroved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the 
inhabitants of the nreas demarcated should be ascertained 
through the votes of the adult population of the reas or 
trirough aome ec^ uivalent nethod. 
(b) If the votes is in favour of separation, it 
sholl be agred that these areas shall form a separate 
St te as 30on as p ssible after India is free fronn foreign 
dooninati-'n -nd can, therefore, be constituted into two 
sovereign independent states. 
(c) rher» sh.= ll be treaty of sepi^ ration which should 
also provide for the efficient and satisfactory adininistra-
tlon of Foreign Affairs. Defence, Intf rn^l Co'munlCTtians, 
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Customs* Conaerce and the like, which mist necessarily 
continue to be matters of counon Interest between the 
contracting parties, 
(d) Ihe Treaty 8h«H also contain t«i*rm8 for safe-
39 
ju rdlng the rlghs of rninoritlcs in the two states," 
Jlnnah rejected Sandhiji's proposf^ls as being "funda-
iK?ntally opposed to the Lahore "^esolution" and inslstt>d that 
the luslins of India should be recognized as a nation, vdth 
an inherent right of self deterrnination vhich they lone 
vere entitled to exercise; thet Pakistan should comprise 
six provinces, naitiely, r.lnd, aaluchistan, the North-west 
Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal -nd ^sr-am, subject 
only to minor territorial ^djustmenti and that vital 
tiatters like foreign affairs, defence, internal communica-
tions, customs and coaunerce, "which are the life blood of 
any State, cannot be delegated to any central authority or 
40 
^overnnnent, •• Consequently, the talks broke down on September 
27, 1944, Gandhiji was not in favour of sovereign Pakistan 
41 
as dem-nded by the Muslim League, 
39, Gv-yer and Apradoral, op,cit,, pp, 549-50, 
43^ Ibid. Vol, ii, pp, 550-51. 
41, Jinnah-3endhi talks - a publication of Central Office 
of All India Muslim Li^ ague (1944), p, 61, 
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Such an extreme position adopted by Jinnah continued 
also In the ai.nla Conference in June 1945. Lord wgvell's 
propos 1 provlltd a parity between the Congress and the 
League in the Vi:eroy*s executive Council, 3ut Muslim 
Le^gu- claimed to no^ -ninate all the Muslim members of the 
proposed government. Jinnah dertjfinded that the Congress 
42 
should have no right to nominate a Muslim, It could 
nominate only Hindu members of the Executive Council, This 
demand was unacceptable tc the Congress which was a national 
organisation. Consequently the Conference broke down in 
July 1945, Even Simla Conference failed to resolve the 
political deadlock and met the same fate of other Initiative 
to brrak the stalemate. 
After the surrender of Japan the war came to an end. 
In England an important development took place. The Labour 
Party came Into power. On September 13, 1945 Clement 
the Prime Minister announced the holding of Central -^nd 
provintial elections in India, After initial hesitation 
the Congress and the League finally decided to fight the 
elections, Pakistan was the issue on which the Muslim 
43 
League fought the elections, l^e elections of 1945 proved 
wfitershed 
to be a in the annals of Indian history. Though, 
42, Maulana Aaod, op.cit,, p, 97, 
4 3, Jamil-ud-din AhmadJ Speeches and v^ 'riting of •1r,Jinnah 
(1964) Vol, ii, p,202. 
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the Congress victory wa« overwhelming in all general seats* 
the Le^i^e's victory was equally impressive in reserved 
Muslim seats. Itie Muslim League won all 30 Muslim seats 
in the Central Legislative Assembly. In the provincial 
elections* held in Ferrary 1946, the Muslim League won 
439 out of 494 Muslim seats that was 99,9%. The polariza-
44 
tion of forces in India was thus, complete. On April 9, 
1946, the Muslim League members of Central and Provincial 
Legislatures met in a convention at Delhi. The convention 
in a resolution declared! '*that the Muslim Natton will 
never submit to any constitution for a tJnited India and 
will nevtr participate in any single constitution-making 
a»chin«>ry set up for the purpose, and that any formula 
devised by the British Oovemment for transferring power 
from the British to the people of India, which does not 
conform to the following. Just and equitable principles, 
calculated to maintain internal peace and transquility in 
the country, will not contribute to the solution of the 
Indian problem* 
"That the zones comprising Qengnl -md Assam tn the 
north-east and the Punjab, Morth-West Frontier Province, Sind 
and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely Pakistan 
zones, where the Muslims are In a dominant majority be 
44. Humayun Kabirf Muslim Politics 1942-47 in C.H.Philips 
(ed.), p. 397. 
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c o n s t i t u t e d i n t o ?• sovcrel j rs independent S t a t e nd t h a t 
an unequivoca l u i d r r t . : ' k l n i be given t o i?nple:t»ent t he 
^ s t a n l i g h m ? n t of P c k l s t a n > I t h o u t d e l - y , " 
This conven t ion f u r t h e r emphatic?^lly d e c l a r e d th«t 
any a t t e n p t t o inp >se a c o n s t i t u t i o n on a t ln i ted I n d i a 
b a s i s or to fo rce any i n t e r i m arranoffment a t t he c e n t r e , 
c o n t r a r y t o t h e 1>i::.lirn League deinan i, ' - ' i l l l e ave t h e lusHms 
no a l t « . r n a t i v e but to r e s i s t such i i i n o s l t i o n by a l l 
45 
p o s s i o l p m a n s fo r th i r s u r v i v a l and n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e , " 
The r e s o l u t i o n was t h e fnan i fcs ta t lon of t h e uncompro-
n i s l n g , f i r t i and s t i f f a t t i t u d e of t h e Muslim League vhich 
V as c e r t a i n l y hardened ?s a r e s u l t of i t s v i c t o r y in t h e 
r l e c t i ino. Ttie t lec t lonr> o r o v ' d t r u e the l ^ a ^ u e ' s c la i 'n 
t n a t i t r c p r s e n t d t h e v h o l e I U G I I fi I n d i a . Mov^  i t was in 
a nuch s t r a n g e r p o s i t i o n t o b a r g a i n on t h e q u e s t i o n of 
P a k i s t a n . On February 17, 1946» t h e B r i t i s h Sovernment 
annou iced t h e d e c i s i o n t o ''end a Cabine t l i s s l o n t o India 
t o di '-cu s the cmest ion of Ind ian f ree io t ) and t h e f u t u r e 
46 
c o n s t i t u t i o n with t h e Indian r e p r s t n t a t i v e s . Lord ?^ethik 
T,,awrenc<», ••-•••cret--iry of S t a t e for I n d i a , ? i r 8taf--0'-d Cr ip . i s , 
t h e '-r< s i ^ent of t h e Josrd of Trade and i r , A.V.Alexander , 
4 5 , C.'^haliquiiza^Tian, o p . c l t , , pp, 340 -41 , 
46 , ".auiana Aoul K"ala?n Azed, o , c i t . , o, l ? 3 . 
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the first Lord of the Admiralty* were the ftiembers of the 
'lisslon. It arrived in India on March ?3. Soon after, 
the Usslon started discussions with the Indl?^ n leaders 
of different shades of public opinion and the oartles. 
itie -Usslon held discussion with Maulan? zad and Jlnn^ 
to ascertain th-lr views on the Question of future set-up* 
Abul Kalam Aaad who represented the Congress as its 
President expressed the view that after independence the 
future constitution vould be determined b/ a constltutlon-
ra-^klng body. In the Interlrn peri'Jd there should be an 
interim governntnt at :he Centre, 'inulan-? Aaad or sented 
a scherne to the Cabinet llsslon vhlch provided full -nntonomy 
to the provincial units* v( sting all residuary powir in the 
provinces. It AISO provided a list of cnini.itjufn conipulsory 
subjects "snd an additional list of optional subjects and 
third list >f subjects regarding which the provincial 
legislature would h -ve the authority to retain th©:n as 
47 
provincial subjects or delegate then to the 'Centre. *ut 
Jlnnah v.as not prepared to budge from the position %hich 
he held on the question of Pakistan as contemplated in 
the resolution of Musli-n League Convention of April '),1946, 
Ho'Aever, the luslim Leajue, after long discussions '^vlth the 
Cnbinet -tissi n, agreed on the principle of a loose Centre 
nd e three tier constitution to be the basis of further 
47. Ibli., pp. 124-25. 
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discussion. Lord Pethlck Lawrence, on 'pril 27, l'?46 wrote 
letters to laulnna Abul Kalam Azad and Jinnah, Inviting 
them to nominate their repressntativr to discuss upon -
schcue of the followlnj principles. 
The futurf' ccmstitutional structure of India to be 
as. follovsi 
(a) ^ Union Government dealing vlth the follov.ln-j subjects, 
foreiin affnlrs, defence and com nunications, 
(b) rhcre will be tvfo jroups of Provinces, one of the 
predominantly Hindu Provinces and the other of the 
predominantly luslim Provinc*='R, dealing with 11 oth*»r 
subjects except those which the provinces in the 
respective jroups desire to be dealt with in coTsnon. 
The provincial Governments v^ lll deal with all otht r 
subjects and ill have all the r< siduary sovereign 
48 
rt jhts, ^oth. Congress ^nd the League, after express-
in;j| some doubts and mis;jivlngs a jreed to participate 
in the Conference, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, ^^ardar 
Vellabhbhal Patel, Khan bdul 3haffar Khan and M ulana 
ami Kal m Azad, the Pr aident of the Congress were 
the Conjress nominee. The Muslim League nominated 
ir, J inn ah, r:av-«i lohammad Ismail Khan, Ma^abzada 
48, V.P,1en:n, o ,cit,, pp, ?54-:>55, 
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Liaquat 11 Kdan and Sardar Abdur R^b Mlsht-^r. 
"he aeftlnt^ s t a r t e d on Any 2, 1946 a t Sinla ^ni 
1 ist€?d t i l l lay I ? . During the n e j o t i ^ t l o n , they could not 
rtT.->ch on ry niref^wnt find therefore , there i as n deadlock. 
The iusllm L e a ^ e sent an off' r t o Cabinet l l ss ion on lay 
12, 1)46, as follows* 
" ( I ) The s ix lus l l i i Provinces, "unjab, 'J.w.r.r*., Baluchistan, 
Sind, i t n^a l nd Asa»n sha l l be grouped torjrth r 
as v.ne cjroup and '113 deal with a l l o ther 53ubjects 
•end na t t e r s except f -rcijn a f f a i r s , def«-rce and 
corfinunicatlons ncccs-ery for «1efcnce, vfhlch nay be 
]t?alt vitrh by the ccnstitutlon-'naklnqf bo i l e s of the 
tv'O groups of provinces - lusliiti provinces (here-
Innfcer nened the Pakistan Iroup) and Hindu provlnccs-
Blttln.7 toge the r . 
(?) i'^ nere sha l l be a separa te const l tut lon-rnaklni bo<JY 
f j r the six Musll;i» provlnc««'s naned -'^cvr, th ich v l l l 
froiU'^ r c o n s t i t u t i o n s for the ^roup artd the provinces 
in the ^roap and wi l l deterTilne the l i s t of subjects 
t ha t s h a l l be p rov inc ia l and c e n t r a l (of the i^akl tan 
Federa t ion) , with res iduary powers ves t ing In the 
provinces . The nrjethod of e l ec t i on of the represe^nta-
t t v e s to the const i tut ion-making body wil l be tnjch as 
vould secure proper r epresen ta t ion to the various 
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coiniiiunities In proport ion t o t h e i r population in each 
provinces of the Pakistan group. 
(3) vfter the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Pakistan f'ederal 'tovern-
nent and the provinces arc? f ina l ly fr^^iied by the cons-
t l t u t Lon-Tif'klng body, i t v l l l bt open t o any province 
of the iroup t o decide t o opt out of i t s ;jroup# pro-
vided the ' ishes of the people of t h a t province are 
ascf r t a ined by e re Trnncmn tcj opt out or not , 
(4) i t w'ill be open t o discussion in the c o n s t l t u t i o n -
r\ kin J bixJy as t c whether the Unl m w i l l h^ve a 
Ic |1? Inture or no t , Hie nethtd of providing the Union 
Itfi t inanct should a lso be 1 f t for decision t o the 
j o i n t nt e t ing of the consti tut ion-rnsking bodieg, tnit 
in no cv tn t shwll i t be by neans of t axa t i on . 
(5) rhe e should Oc' pa r i t y of representa t ion b tween the 
tvo groups of provinces in the Union executive and the 
Leg i s la tu re , if any, 
(6) ^'a n Jor point in the I nlon c o n s t i t u t i o n which effected 
the coriiTJunal i ssue sha l l be deenied t o be passed in the 
j o i n t const i tu t ion-making body, unless the majority of 
the neTibera of the const i tut ion-making body of the 
Hindu-provinces ^nd the majority of the menabf^ rs of the 
c ns t i tu t lon-maklng body of the Pakistan group, present 
-ini v t i ng , are sep r a t e l y in i t s favour. 
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(7) No decision legislative* executive or administrative* 
shall be taken by the Union in regard to any (natter of 
a controversial nature except by a majority of three-* 
fmirths. 
(8) In grovtp and provincial constitutions* fundamental 
rights and safeguards concerning religion* culture 
and other matters affecting the different coiwminities 
will be provided for, 
(9) The constitution of the Union shall contain a proviso 
whereby any province can* by a majority vote of its 
leglsl tive assembly* call for reconsideration of the 
terms of the constitution* and will h <ve the liberty 
to secede from the Union at any time after an initial 
period of ten years. 
These are the principles of our offer for a peaceful 
and amicable settlement and this offer stands in its 
entirely and r»ll matters mentioned therein are inter-
49 
dependent.* 
Most of the Muslim Lej^gue's demands were strongly 
opposed by the Congress. It 8ubmittc»d its own propos^^ls 
different from League's proposals. It suggested the single 
transfer-»ble vote for the election* end a Lf gislature for 
the *^ederal Union. It expressed its opposition to the right 
49. C,Khaliquz7aman* op.cl .* pp. 352-53. 
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of opting out of ri province from Its groupf and etaphfltic?>lly 
declared its opposltloil to parity of representation isetween 
groups of provinces in the Unit>n r-xecutlvc or legislature. 
It farther proposedi "we suggest that the prober procedure 
is for one constitution-m^kin^j IXKJy or Constituent Asseflibly 
to fooet for the whole of India and later for groups to be 
for^ ned, if so desired, by the provinces concerned. The 
matter should be left to the provinces nnd If they wirti to 
function aa a group they are at liberty to do so «nd to 
franw th' ir constitution for the purpose. 
In any evf nt Assam has obviously no place in the 
g^roup mentioned and the Horth-West Frontier Province, as 
50 
the election show, is not in favour of this proposal." 
When, such a diametrically opposed views were held 
by both the parties the prospect of any settlement was 
certainly bleak. The conference came to an end without 
reaching to any agreement between the Congress and the 
Muslim i<eague. The Cabinet Mission, then fremed its own 
proposals. The Plan was published on May 16, 1946. The 
C?»binet Mission Plan rejected the League's demand for en 
51 
Independent sovereign Pakistan, on the ground that it would 
50. V,P,Menon, op.clt., p. 261. 
51. Iwyer and Appadorai, op.cit., Vol.ii, pp.578-579. 
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not solve the conrminal tnln^lty problem and also that those 
nre«>8 which ar« inhabited by pre'Somlnantly non-4usllai popula-
tion could not be included in a sovereign Pakistan, apsides, 
there vere weighty administrative, economic and -nilltery 
52 
consideration a<j»ln8t It. Instead, the plan provided an 
Indian Union dealing with the subjects of d^ ffrnc«*> foreign 
affairs and comlunications, while the resudery subjects 
vrxf vested in the provindes. The country was divided into 
three zones - (A) Madras, Sombey, United Provinces, Bihar, 
•Central Provlncen and Oriss^, (B) Punjab, North-vjest Frontier 
Province and Sind, (C) Bengal and Assam, to be represents<^  
in the Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution of 
the Union Centre, It furth; r provided three tier consti-
tution - Provinces, groups of provinces and a union Centre, 
wirre jlven their own constitutions. 
Ihe plan vas a conpromise oetween '•> sover<?i7n 
Pakistan and a united Indi n Union with stronq Centre, tie 
conpulsory grouping of six Muslim majority Provtnc' 3 in 
sections 8 and C was the alternative to p aovervign «'>=»<ir5tan, 
and was certainly to satisfy and all y the; f^ a^rs of the 
Muslim League about their position in an independent India, 
which would nt predominantly Hindu. Moreover to meet a 
Centre dominated by Hindus, the Centre wis given only 
62. Ibid., p. 579 
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defence, foreign affairs nnd coinnunloatlons as Central 
subjects. Thus the provinces v;ere given considerable 
antono^y v^ ithin Indian Union, 
llie ConqresB 'A'orkln-| Con.T»lttee In Its neetlng on 
iriy 24, afiopt' d a resolution obJ<>ctlng the cotapulsory 
irouping of the provinces. It resolved tha- ••in order to 
retain the recomroendatory character of the stat<prnent, and 
In order to make the clauses consistent with each other, 
the Committee read paragraph 15 to mean that. In the first 
instance, the respective provinces shall make their choice 
whether or not to b' long to the section in which they ire 
53 
placed,** Out the Cabinet Missi^ n^ issued an statement on 
?1ay 2b, 1946 "^ nd contradicted the Congress* own interpreta-
tion of paragraph 15 of the statement, emphasising that 
The rijht to opt out of the vgroup fram« d by that section 
arlsf^ s after the constitution has been framed and the first 
flection to the U-/islature has taken place. It does not 
54 
risps before that," 
rhe luslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission plan 
on June 6, 1946, «»ut reiterated that "the attainment of the 
joal, of a complete sovereign Pakistan still r»-mains the 
55 
unalteraolf objective of the 'Muslins of India,•• The r^ i^ son 
53, y.P,Menon, op,cit., p, 270, 
54, C.Kh liquzzaman, oo,clt,, r, 356, 
55, 3v^ * r and ftppaiorai, op.clt,, p, 600. 
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for thr acceptance of the t-l^ n •''='S that the "USHTI LPP iue 
visualised in the connulsor/ ^roupinar of sly Muslim pro-
vinces In nectl 'n B nd C as the baj^ ls an-S the foundation 
of •''pXlst'-'n, ^nci the rl'jht to s*"cr/ie fronn Tn«31?>n Union 
ft.er ten V^^'TS CTS '»n app:.-rtunlty t - achieve ultlrsately 
56 
- coa.jletely sov. reiin Pakistan, If the Union Centre func-
57 
ti ne:; to the detriment of the 'aslltti provinces, riut th^t 
vas fl remote poBslbillty. Jlnnah accepted that the plan 
vag > St possible solution of the minority problem. So 
"prcnptcfl by its earnest desire for » peaceful solution" 
of the Tnii n Constitutional problem, the •4uslifn Lea?|ue 
53 
decided to i^ ccept the Plan. 
rhe Congress Working Coajmittee nnet In Delhi on June 
25, 1946 and once again raised its serious objections on 
various issues contained in the May 16 statement, point«='d 
out earlier by the Congress working Committee on May 24. 
:ct reiterated its ovn interpretation of some clauses of the 
'liy 16 statement, especially, the compulsory grouping of 
the provinces. It -^ Iso rejected the propoasls of the interim 
Jovernment, vhlch provided parity between the Congress ^^ nd 
the -lusll.Ti Le Tue. It resolved th-^ t "In the formation of a 
provisional or Interim Government, Congressmen can never 
56, Ibid., p. 601, 
57, v[.H,ispahanlt Factors Leading to the Partition of 
aritish India, in C,H,Philips (ed.) op,cit,, p,350, 
58, '^ A'ycr and 'pp-'dorsi, op.clt:,, o, 60?, 
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glv« up th« national character of th« QMigrstfa of aeoapt 
an artificial and un#uat parity, or agrea to tha vato of a 
S9 
oooMMinal group." Tha Congraaa waa alao aora ovar lindtad 
Cantral authority. Znapita of all theaa reaarvationa and 
inaiatance on ita own intarpratation ot aome of tha ao eallad 
60 
"inconaistant clauaea** which in raality did not axiat, 
tha Congraaa raaolvad to accept tha plan and to join tha 
eonatituant Aaaaiably "with a view to framing tha conati-
61 
tution of a fraa united and danocratic India." However, it 
waa an anbiguoua atand. Tha Muslin Laague in its raaolution 
on Jttna 25 atrongly <^jactad to Congrass inaistanca on ita 
own intarpratation of tha Miaaion'a propoaala and ita claim 
62 
of accepting tha Cabinet Miasicm plan. 
The Cabinet Miasion waa so •athuaiaatlc to get the 
Congreaa* acceptance of ita plan that it scrapped the 
propoaala of June 16 and decided to oial^ e new afforta for 
the formation of an Interim Oovammant. The June 16 pro* 
poaals had provided that "In tha event of the two major 
partiea or either of them proving unwilling to Join in the 
aetting up of a coalition Oovamment on the above linea« it 
ia the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation 
59. V.P.Nanon, op.cit., p. 277. 
60. A.d.Hoorani, T^f 9afr4ntt ytttttffl Mia AU tfUffUlfft 
in C.H.Philipa (ad), qp.c i t .» p. 108. 
61. Owyer and Appadorai# op .c i t . * pp. 610-11. 
62. V,P,H*non, op .c i t .» p. 109. 
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of ma Znt«riai (lov«mflMBt which wi l l b« • • repr*««nt«tiv* 
as possible of thoss wi l l ing to seospt ths ststeawnt of 
63 
May 16th.** Zt had a l so announcad tha nsnas of tha Indian 
laadars to ba inoludad in tha Znteria Oov«rni«ant. Thay 
warat 
(I) Sardar Baldav Singh, (2) sir N.P. Inginaar, 
(3) Mr. Jagjivan R«i# (4) Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru* 
(5) Mr. M.A.Jinnah# (6) Nawabsada Liaquat M i Khan* 
(7) Mr. C,R«jagopal«ehari# (8) Dr. Rajandra Prasad, 
(9) Mr. H.K. Mahtab, (10) Dr. JcAin Mathai, 
(II) Nawab Mohamad Ismail Khan, (12) Khwaja Sir 
Masiauddin 
(13) Sardar Abdur Rab ifishtar, (14) Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patal.** 
Wh»^ n tha Congress rejected the Inter in Oovarnnent 
Plan, it was expected that in accordance with the June 16 
stateaant tha Muslin League would be invited to f o m the 
Inter in Oovemaent. But the Viceroy chose to abandon tha 
propoaala of June 16 itself. The Muslin League had already 
accepted the Jime 16th proposals. So it was natural on 
its part to qpposa this decision. Accordingly, Jinni^ 
6S 
tamed this decision as a brea^ of faith by tha Briti^. 
He atrongly condenned the C<mgress* adherence to its own 
63. M.Qwyar and A.Appadorai, op.cit., p. 603. 
64. C.KhaliqussMMn, op.cit., p. 361. 
65. A.O.Noorani, in C.H.Philips (ad.),op.cit., p. 109. 
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interpretation of tho grouping fomula and wamod that "if 
thay peraiatad and adopt aeaauraa to aat at naught What ia 
dasoribad by tha atatanant of Nay 25 to conatitut* tha 
aaaantial faatttra of tha achaiaa* tha whola plan will ba 
66 
wracked at ita vary inception.* Hia outburat wee ganuinaf 
beenuae the Coagrea^captance of tha Cabinet Miaaion 
Plan was aubjeoted to ao aany reaenrationa and qualifieationa 
that it meant aliaoat ita rejetion. The only thing on which 
the Congreas agreed was the joining of the Constituent 
Assembly. Even, in thla respect, its intention was not tha 
67 
implementation of the plan but to •aaiiave" their "objective. 
And that objective waa clear to 4ll->not to allow the group* 
ing syatem to be successful. Speaking at the All India 
Congreas Committee meeting in Bombay* Jawaharlal Nehru* 
the newly elected Preaident of the Congreas said "so far 
aa X can aee it la not a queation of our accepting any 
plan long or short. It is only a queation of our agree* 
ment to go into the Constituent Aaaambly. That ia all 
and nothing more than that we are not bound by a aingle 
thing esccept that we have decided for the moment to go to 
68 
the Conatituent Aaaambly." In a Preaa Conference, on Jnly 
10» he announced more clearly the objective of the C<Migreaa. 
66. I b i d . 
67 . N.Owyer and A.Appadorai, o p . c i t . # p . 603 . 
68. q^yjl fB<| 'f41Ui¥T fflHt^f* Jruly 9, 1946. 
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H« said that "th* C^mgrass had agraed only to partloipata in 
tha Ckmatituant Aaaanbly and regardad itaalf fraa to changa 
•9 
or aodify tha Cabinat Mission Plan as it thou^t bast*" 
Thasa daclarati«ms vara ragardad by tha Mnslia Laagua as 
tha gross batrayal* reflacting tha real wind of tha Congrass 
la^dars* Consaquantly* tha Muslin League decided to with-
draw its i^ceptanee o£ tha Cabinet Mission Plan. At tha 
oieetlng of M l India Muslioi League Council at Bon&bay on 
July 29« 1946« Jinnah saidi "We have learned a bitter lesson" 
70 
and "How there is no rooa left for eonpronise*" 
so* the League in ita session resolved to observe 
Direct Action days OTI Migust 16* Reacting to tiiin eall 
tha Congrass made efforts to clearify its position and save 
tha situation* but tha Congress was ^sessad so nnch with 
71 
the prestige of its President* that it did not have tha 
courage to r^mdiate the atateaMmt of the President becsusa* 
according to Maulana Asad it would have weaken the organitfa-
72 
ti<»i. So the All India Congreaa Comaittee paased a reaolu* 
tion OA Augtuit 10 overlooking its President's controvartial 
atateaMmt and yet claifldng that it had accepted tha Cabinet 
Mission Plan. It also appealed to the Muslia League to 
69. Naulans Abul Kalaa Asad* op.cit.* p. 138. 
^SSsil* aoabay* J^ly 29* I94e. 
71. Maulana Abul Kalan Asad* op.cit.* pp. 139-140. 
72. Ibid.* p. 146. 
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cooperate with it. But in fact once again tha Congraaa 
73 
reitaratad ita old stand on tha grouping of tha prorincaa. 
Tharafora* Jinnah rejected it. 
In thla way tha Congraaa aaeceaded not to allow tha 
waaXaning ofth ir Preaidant*8 position. But in thia procaaa 
It gave up «n ^f^portunlty to keep tha India united and tha 
nation waa thus* aacrificad at the coat of the preatiga 
of tha CtmgfBB* Praaidant. tha direct action day waa 
obaarved on Auguat 16. Unfortunately the day waa narrad by 
unprecedented mato violence in Calcutta^ and other parte 
of the country. Soon the whole country waa under the apall 
of cooMRtnal frensy. A civil war like aituation aroae. 
Hundrada loat their livaa and thousanda were Injured. The 
"Direct Action Day* tAiich ultiiaately proved to be« waa not 
the day which waa underatood. Thia unfortunate event waa 
the outcooM of Congreaa-Laagua differences. In fact tha 
Congraaa waa largely reaponaible for all thoae developmenta 
that took place after the announceoMnt of the Cabinet Miaaion 
Plan. The Congreaa* inaiatance on ita own interpretation of 
the grouping formula and tha Nehru*a atatement that tha 
"Congreaa h^d agreed to join the Cwiatituant Aaaaoibly but 
accepted nothing elae" and that **once the aaaambly mat* 
73. See Conareaa Working Cowcnittae'a reaolution in V,P, 
Manon, (^ .cit.* p. 292. 
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Congress would be free to ssk for sny changes in the 
74 
Cabinet Mission Plan what it considered necessary*" sealed 
the fate of the Cabinet mssion Plan. Nehru's statement 
was quite unfortunate. Itocause in the words of Naulana 
Aead it was "cme of those unfortunate events whic^ changed 
75 
the course of history*" Maulana Aaad further sayst "Z 
nust place on record that Jawaharlal Nehru's stateaent was 
wroni. It was not correct to say that the Coaigress was 
76 
free to laodify the plan as it pleased. ** So« one can safely 
come to this conclusion that it was a "direct act of 
77 
aabotage" by Nehru. 
Meanwhile* the Viceroy's decisicm to invite the 
Congress to form the Interim Oovemment further aggravated 
the situation. Jinnah took strong exception to it. He ssid 
that the "Viceroy had struck a severe blow to the Muslim 
78 
League and Muslim India." However* the Viceroy unmindful 
of the protest by the Muslim League went on to implement the 
announced scheme of forming an interm Government on September 
2* 1946. On that day a one party government was installed 
74. Humayun Kabirt Muslim Politics, 1942-7. in C.H.Phillips 
(ed.) op.cit., p. 398. 
75. Maulana Abul Kalam Asad* op.cit.* p. 138. 
76. Maulana Abul Kalam Asad* op.cit.* p. 138. 
77. Leonard Mosleyt Itif Last Davs of the British Ral 
(London 1961) p. 27. 
78. V.P.Menon, qp.cit.* p. 300. 
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and Pandit Nahru beewMi th« Prla* Minister. lh« day «a« 
obaarvad by tha Naslin Laagua aa day of nouming and blaek 
flaga vrm diaplayed. Mow, in viaw of tha degraa of dia* 
contant and troubla throughout tha country tha Vlearoy 
dacidad to parauada tha l»aa<7ua to join tha Zntam Qksvamaant. 
But tha stutfbling-blook in this way waa tha Congrraa atti* 
tude towards grouping formula. Sinea tha Vicaroy failad 
to parauada tha Congraaa to give up ita stand on grouping 
fonsulat ha tumad to Jinnah and invitad him for talka in 
Oalhi. Tha Viceroy held aaveral naetinga with Jinnah and 
ultiaataly by giving aasuranca, parauaded hia to join tha 
Qovamnant. The i^alin League joined tha Zntcrin Ckyvemiaent 
on October 24# 1945 with its five oMmbara - Hawabsada Liaquat 
All Khan, X.Z.Chundrigar* Abdur Rab Niahtar* OhasaAfar All 
Khan and J.S.Kandal. But it continued ita boycott of 
Conatituant Aas€»tobIy« apparently because of Congress 
iAtr«aalg«Be« on the lasua of grouping of tha provinces. To 
resolve the deadlock tha British Oovarnaent held talka with 
tha rapraaentativaa of both tha parties in London. But 
nothing caoa of it. The stalamfids* continued. 
The Conatituant Aaaeapbly met on Decesriser 11 and 
adopted certain rulaa which were wrongly criticiaed by tha 
League's Working Comnittee on January 31• 1947 in ita 
Karachi reaolution which tercMd theae rules as ultraviras. 
The League contended that it was deaigned to get control of 
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th« group*. 1h« aMnolrs of K.N.ffanahl the legal adviser 
of the Congress proved that It was so designed. He writes 
"if properly framed^ the Rules would ensble the Constituent 
Assenbly aa a whole to exerciae control over the Sections 
79 
and Provinoea •** So the Congreas was leaving no atone 
unturned to destroy the Cabinet Mission. 
Itie fate of the Interim Government also looked uncer-
tain because of the Congress-League differences and their 
respective stands on the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Congress 
demanded the resignation of the Musliia Le.'^ gue nennbers frcMi 
the Interim Government on the plea that the Muslim Xj«ague 
had not accepted the Cabinet Missicm Plan. The Viceroy 
a^ed the Muslim League to accept the Plan* but the League 
held that since the Congress itself had not accepted the 
Plan* it had no locus standi to call upon the League to do 
80 
so. The mutual distrust* suspicion and animosity hankered 
the smooth working of the Interim Government, the Finance 
Ministry held by Liaquat Ali Khan proved a headache to the 
Ccngreaa siinisters of the Government. The Finance Miniatry 
was given to the League by the Congress in its belief that 
League would not be ablf* to manage it ^nd would become a 
81 
laughing stock. 9ut Liaquat Ali exercised such a control 
79. K.M.?4unshi» Pilgrimage to Freedom (Bombay, 1967) p.Ill, 
80. A.O.Kfoorani* in C.H.Philips (ed.) op.cit.* p. 112. 
81. Maulaea Abul Kalam Azad* op.cit.* p. 149. 
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over th« vxpcnditur* of all other Mlnlstri** and enforeod 
such • Striot scrutiny of tho proposals sent by tho Minla-
trleai Moating tha fata of either raj action or oKXlification, 
that aoon tha Oongrass Ministers wara fada up with such an 
82 
state of affairs. Tha Budget of 1947<->48 prasanted by Liaquat 
Ali added fual to fire, Tha Congressmwn alleged that it 
83 
was alaad at harassing tha industrialists and businessaian. 
Howavar this observation is incoaq>rehensibla, Maulana Asad 
himself adaittad that Uia budget was based on tha declared 
84 
aocialist principles of the Congress itself. So it was 
natural that being in accordance with the socialist principlaa 
it would strike at tha existing capitalist systMi. tha 
Congress hsd promised in its election laanifesto to replace 
the capitalist system by a socialist pattern. As tha (pinion. 
held by the Congressaian like Nehru and Maulana Asad* that 
actiona should be taken against tax evaders* Lisquat Ali 
proposed to appoint an enquiry coomission to investigate 
into the matter and to recover taxaa from the buainassman 
85 
and industrialists. Thus* the proposals were in conformity 
with declared Congress principlaa '^ nd Objectives* but when 
time came to bring these principles and objectives into 
practice the Congress dubbed this effort as harmful to the 
82. Ibid.* p. ISO. 
81. Ibid.* p. 158. 
84. Zbid.* pp. 157-158 
85. Ibid., p. 157. 
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national •conomy and based on communal consideration. If 
the Con9res8 had adopted its declared objectives of removing 
the economic disparity by replacing the capitalist society 
with a socialist pattern then it would have certainly strife 
at the root of the systems •> the capitalist class. But 
it seems thlit the principles and objectives of the Congress 
were confined to the Congress manifesto and were not meant 
as it sounded. The Congress aiiiBtt>«*CL' c^f t!%ti Interim Govern-
ment strongly opposed the Budget and created an uproar in 
the Central Assembly. Ultimately the Budget was amended 
but the Congress had to lose face because it shifted its 
88 
position from its old stand and earlier socialist professions. 
Out of such an embarrasing position the Congress once again 
demanded the resignation o£ the League's members from the 
Oovemment and threatened to resign if the l^agoers were 
not asked by the Viceroy to resign. At this stage the 
British Prime Minister announced on February 20, 1947 the 
decision "to effect the transfer of power into responsible 
89 
Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948.** He also 
announced that Lord Wavell would be succeeded by Admiral 
viscount Mountbatten as Viceroy in March. Lord Mountbatten 
86. Ibid., p. 158. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Humayun Kabir in C.H.Philips (ed.) op.cit., p.401. 
89. V.P.Menon, op.cit.. Appendix IX, p.507, also Owyer 
and Appadorai, op.cit., Vol.ii, pp. 667-9. 
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arrived India on March 23« 1947 with vast powara to aacura 
90 
tha implamentatito of tha Cabinat Miaaion Plan, Aa a 
conaaquanea of tha Liaqust All*a pqpular and aoeiallatAc 
budget which was llkaly to affect tha Congreas flnancaa 
and flnaneiara* tha Congreaa Working Conmlttaa* in ita 
raaolution of Marc^ Q, 1947, welcomed tha Attlae'a announca-
aent but deiianded partition of Punjab and Bengal on rell-
91 
gloua llnea - a demand which became the prelude to vlvi-
aection of not only Punjab and Bengal but tha whole of 
India. Lord ?tountbatten« aoon after hia meetinga with 
the leaders of both the partiea realised the futility of 
endeavouring for an agreed aolution of the problem on the 
basis of Cabinet Miaaion Plan. Mehru» in a apeeeh on April 
20 declared that "the Mualim League can have Pakiatan if 
they wish to have it, but on the condition that they do not 
take away other parte of India which do not wiah to Join 
92 
Pakiatan." 
According to Maulana Acad Sardar Wallabhbhai Petal 
was the foremoat anthusiaatic aupporter of the partition 
suggested by Lord Mountbatten as a solution of the political 
93 
deadlock, who threw his waight behind the idea of partition. 
90. Ibid., p. 351 and 353. 
91. 3%#yer and Appadoral* op.cit.# Vol.ii« pp. 667-9. 
92. Michael Brecher i Wehru » A Political Biography (Lond<ni 1959) p. 345. .^.=^.^ -^...^^^.-^.....^-^..^...™_-
93. Maulana Abul Xalam Aaad# op.cit.# p. 164. 
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The experience* which Patel got In the Executive Council 
exercised it* influence to nK>uld his opinion in favour of 
partition. Only to get rid of the Muslim League he was 
prepared to go to the extent of giving Pnkist^n to the 
94 
League. Soon« Jawaharlal aft^ .^r initial reluctwice, fell in 
line with Patel «*nd pressed Maulana hznd not to oppose the 
95 
partition s it was inevitable. Hehru end Patel succeeded 
to win over even Oandhiji thus leaving Maulana Asad alone 
to preach the gospel of unity of India. In view of these 
circumstances Mountabatten fortmilated his proposals for 
the partition of India. Ttie scheme known as the Mountbatten 
Plan was announced on June 3, 1947 and was accepted by the 
Congress as well as the Muslim League. The Plan provided 
for the transfer of power to two states - India and Pakistan 
96 
on the basis of dominion status« with Punjab and Bengal 
partitioned on religious lines. The Plan embodied in the 
Indian Independence Act was passed in July 1947 and on 
August 14 India was partitioned at the will of the Sardar 
Patel and Nehru and at the cost of Muslim nationalist leader-
ship of Maulana Asad« Khan Abdul Ohaffar Khan« Jamiat-ul-
Ulema and other Muslim organisations. It is strange to note 
94. Ibid. 
95. Ibid., p. 166. 
96. S.R. Mehrotra# op.cit., p. 220. 
•• 163 « 
thnt th« Muslim leadership in the Congress and other Muslim 
organlsaticms that had been on the forefront against the 
vivisection of India and the idea of Pakistan* were 
completely ignored and were not even consulted. Noulana 
Asad till the very «nd fought for the united India but his 
voice was neither he'-red by the Muslim League nor by his 
own party '•- Ih* Indian National Congress. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
CONCLUSION 
Th« failure of the Revolt of 1857 brou^t untold 
misery and suffering and proved a catastrophe to the Musllits 
of India. Ttie tide of suppression which sprange from the 
consolidation of the British irule in India reached Its high 
water mark during and after the Revolt of 1857, To cfuote 
K.A.Nlsaml* the ar^tlsh "were determlnt^ d to cut them root 
and branch and reduce th^ to a position of complete 
1 
political and economic servility." so they pursued such 
policies which had their alms for the econc^ alc ruin of the 
Musllats and tht^ lr intellectual stognatlon and general dege-
2 
neratlon. Consequently, the economic and political position 
of Muslims was ruined and they were reduced to the level 
of peupers. 
When the Muslims began to work under the leadership 
of sir syed Ahmad Khan for their regeneration and salvation; 
born the Indian Natlcxnal Congress-an organisation of English 
educated Indian bourgeois, whose fortune was in ascendance 
whereas the Muslims were yet to recover fully from a century 
long reign of t«^ rror# oppression and systematic suppression. 
It was an irony that the Indian National Congress turned a 
blind eye to the posttlwj of such a large section of the 
1. Khallque Ahmad Nizami, op.cit., p. 131. 
2. Moh6.amad Nom^n, op.cit., p. 23. 
- 165 • 
population. Instead, it in its early sessions expressed its 
unconditional loyalty to the throne and expressed its 
gratitude to the so called benefits bestowed on India by 
Her Gracious Majesty's government. It never design to draw 
the attention of the government or to express its sympathy 
to the plight of the unfortuna'e gen^ r^al masses. The ^slia 
apathy to such «n orgenlsntlon v/r.s but natural* The first 
thing which the Congress demfcaded to 'jet was ICS and other 
governrnent jobs for a handful Fngllsh educated Indians throu^ 
competitive examinations and r#»presentatlon through limited 
election^ both of which did not ?^t all correspond with the 
then fxisting facts. The majority of people were illi-
terate an^ j poor and were disquitlified for the jobs and 
*'lectorate. Such was the attitude of the Congress towards 
poor «nd illiterate masses in general .~nd the oppressed 
and impoverished population of the Muslims in particular. 
By the beginning of 20th century the efforts of 
sir Syed Ahmad Khan had succeeded the Muslims* to some 
extent« to regain their identity. The spread of modem 
education and liberal ideology brought about a change in the 
political outlook of the Commuilty. They org'^ nised themselves 
politically under the banner of Muslim League to air th ir 
7rlev?»nces. The Congress realised that the national movement 
could not succeed v.lthout the actual cooperation of the 
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Muslims. So# with th« ehan9e in situation* the attitude of 
Congress also changed and it began to adjust itself in 
accordance with the deiaands of the new situation. The British 
accepttfice of the Muslim demand of separate electorate for 
guaranteed representation strengthened the Muslim League 
and made it a political force to be reckoned with, the 
Congress while accepting the Muslim League as the represen-
tative body of Muslims entered into the Lucknow pact with 
lt« primarily with the objective of pressenting a tinlted 
demand for the forthcoming constitutional reforms, l^ e 
striking feature of this pact was the acceptance of separate 
electorate by the Congress. 
Itie Lucknow Pact provided guaranteed Muslim represen-
tation in Legislative Councils through separate electorate 
and weightage. rhis pact opened a glorious chapter of 
cooperation* unity and fraternity between Congress and the 
Muslims in the history of India. Muslims joined the Congress 
in large numbers and carried out its policies and programme 
with vigour and enthusiasm. ^'^^ ^^^* R«l« Mov. ment further 
strengthened this unity, iao, the change of attitude on the 
part of the congress brought about such a revolutionary 
change. The Lucknow pact, thus, served as the foundation 
of the edific of Congress - Muslim unity and cooperaticm. 
The spirit of Lucknow pact further found its expression in 
. 167 -
th« Khllafat and iion-coop«ration menmMmtm In ti^ ieh th« 
unity and Cooparation between tha paopla raaohad Ita sanlth 
against tha oppfBaire foreign rula« Bat unfortunately* 
the moveflMnt waa wlthdra%m by the Congreaa without conault-
Ing the Muslim leadera of the moveoMmt. Muallaa felt 
betrayed, the Congreaa desldon arouaed lauch dlacontent 
and indignation and unleashed the foreea of dlaunlty and 
conmunal hatred. Sonw Congreas leaders like Madan Hohan 
Malavlya and Lajpat Ral actively aupported and aaatimed the 
leaderahlp of the Shuddhi and Sanghathan novenienta to convert 
the Mualina to Hindulam, even Rajendra Praaad aupported 
thia Movement. Particularly thia one was the laat atraw 
on the Canal*a back and thua brou^t the whole atrueture of 
the national unity to the ground. Coomuaal riota apread 
like the foreat fire. Soon the whole country waa burning 
in the flatttes of Coonanal hatred. 
Again# it was a change of attitude on the part 
of the Congreaa but in the negative aenae. It marred the 
whole efforta for the unity and comiminal harmony made since 
Lucknow pact and altered the entire process. Now it was 
replaced by mutual diatruat auapicion and bittemeaa. Every 
effort made to bridge the gulf between the Congreaa and the 
Mualima drove them further apart because of the unyielding 
attitude of the congreaa leadera. The Bengal Pact* Delhi 
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proposals* All parties conferences, Mehru Rtport end Round 
Table Conferences, are all cases In point* The Bengal Pact 
of C*R, Das which provided fair !<tuslim representations 
in the representative bodies and govemawnt services was 
rejected by the Congress In its Cocanada session of 1923 
"under the pressure from Malaviya and Lajpat Rai." The 
Delhi proposals of the Muslim Leaders which discarded 
asperate electorate and adopted Joint electorate on certain 
conditions was appreciated and accepted by the Madras 
session of the Congress in 1927. But in the All parties 
Conference the Congress coawltted volte face. 
The Muslin leaders strongly reacted and m^de it 
clear that any deviati<Mi from the Madras resolution of the 
Congress would not be accepted. Even Sandhiji, disapproved 
the Congress volte face and wrote to Motilal, to remain 
tirue to the Congress commitment. But all in vain. To 
insist on Madras resoluti<m was 6 cry in wilderness, in 
protest, the Muslim delegates boycottedjthe conference. In 
this background, the Nehru committee was appointed to solve 
the communal and consitutional probleots. The Report of 
the committee known as Nehru Report rejected most of the 
Delhi proposals accepted by the Congress In its Madras 
session. Ironically, it was Motilal himself who had persuaded 
3. Mushicul Hasan, op.clt., p. 216. 
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the Madras Congrcaa to accept the Delhi proposals* Mr. 
Jlnnah and Maulana Mohaaniad All tried to bring the Nehru 
Report In conforalty with Madras resolution but they were 
humiliated in the All parties Rational convention and their 
anMindaents were rejected. Mr. Jinnah left the convention 
and called it "parting of the ways'** whereas Maulana 
Mohaomad Ali left the convention and also the Congress of 
which he was a representative* never to return to its fold. 
The outcome of the convention and also the way In 
which the Muslim demands were rejected gave rise to bitter-
ness and indignation, it alienated the Muslims from the 
congress so much so that the number of Muslims was reduced 
to few in the Congress. The Nehru Report* thus* instead 
of spanning the gulf between Congress and the Muslims* 
widened it further. So the Muslim gesture of sacrificing 
the separate electorate and opting for the joint electorate 
for the sake of unity received casual response and failed 
to shake the Congress leaders from s state of apathy and 
indifference. 
It was the tragedy of national movement that from 
the very beginning it had b« en dominated by certain Hindu 
revivalist and communal elements. These elements were 
strongly opposed to any settlement with the Muslims. They 
always attempted to thwart any effort which tended to resolve 
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th« cofttmmal problem by reaching at any ••ttlea«at with th« 
Muslims. They disliked the Lucknow pact and were also 
opposed to Khila£at and Non->cooperatlon movements. They 
tried hard to get the movement called off and finally 
succeeded* This section was led by Madan Mohan Malaviya 
and liala Lajpat R«i • the two ve^ teren Congress leaders. 
These two men were also the leaders of Hindu Mahasabha 
and its Shuddhi and Sangathan movements, so, according 
to Jawaharlal Nehru It was easiest thing for Hindu comnu-
nalists to speak in the name of nationalism and that mwiy 
a Congressman wan a eommunalist under his nationalist 
4 
cloak. The ease with whi^ they jeopardised ev«»ry effort 
of coming to terms with the Muslims is a pointer to their 
influence they c^amanded tn the Congress on account of 
their close association with the Hindu religious and reviva-
list bodies all over the cowitry, on whose support the 
5 
Congress relied. In fact the Congress attitude towards 
Muslims kept on changing according to time and circumstan-
ces. It was certainly unfortunate that the Congress lacked 
any firm and clear cut policies over communal problem. 
Different groups exercised their influence on the 
decision making of the Congress at, different levels ami at 
different point of time. Whenever the secular leaders were 
4. Nehru i An Autobiography» op.cit., p. 136. 
5. Mushirul Hasan i Nationalism and communal Politics in 
India, op.cit., p. 305. 
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In control of the Congress they adopted a liberal attitude 
of reccmciliation towards f^alima nd attempted to come 
to a settlement of the communal problem. 3ut th'tir efforts 
were soon frustrated by the communal and reactionary ele-
ments within the party. Lucknow pact# Khilafat and Non-
cooperation movement and acceptance of Delhi proposals by 
the Congress are all cas s In point and their subsequent 
rejection toy the Congress bore the influence of the 
communal forces operating in th*^  garb of nationalism within 
Congress. Hotllal Nehru under the pressure from these 
elements f;!nally decided to reject the Congress acceptance 
of Delhi proposals, and came forward vith the Mehru Report 
which had the strong support of the Hindu Hahasebha. 
The election of 1937 proved ^  a watershed in the 
history of Congress-Muslim relations in general and the 
congrt sa~League relations in particular* The Congress* 
rcfus:^! to form a coalition government with the Muslim 
League except on the condition of liquidating the mislim 
Lea^ fue in the United provinces and also in Bombay was an 
exam^le of ^arrogance and lack of political foresight" which 
was "repented time and again during the next tsn years, 
culminating, at last in the division of the country into 
6 
India and Pakistan." 
6. Kanji Dwarkadas, op.clt., p. 473. 
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The ganc of power politics play«d by th« Congress 
arous«d much bitt«m*88 and indignation m^ong HuslisM 
and led its leaders to reassess the entire situation with 
a <3if^ ®Jf«nt^  approach bas«d on tha hard raalltias of the 
Indian politics. The Muslin League changed its tactics and 
laid emphasis on acquiring strength «)d po^er to deal with 
the congress on teriss of equality. From the League's 
offensive launched against the Congress ministries* started 
the partini of the ways and culminated in the "Deliverance 
Day* at the termination of the Congress rule in the pro-
vinces. The discontent aroused against the Congress minis-
tries had « r««l sense of injury behind it otherwise it 
could not have prevailed for a long time. The success of 
the "Deliverance Day* itself testified the strength of ttie 
'Muslim League. 
:»lnally came the Lahore resolution of 1940, Clandhiji 
and Javaharlal Nehru strongly condemned the resolution and 
rejected the ti^ o nation theory* but gave an in^ressicm that 
7 
they would not oppose the partition if pressed. The 
Congress v/orklng Comsiittee in its sessicm of 1942 resolved 
that It "can not think In terms of compelling the people 
of any territorial unit to remain in Indian union against 
121-X23. 
7, For d i i ta i l see chapter second, pp. 
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8 
their declared end •st^bllshed will." ThVLB, It iapllcitly 
conceded the League's detnand for Pakistan on the condition 
that the non-Musiim areas of the North Meat and Eastern 
9 
provinces would not be forced to join Pakistan. However^ 
the demand for Pakistan vas nothinqf more than a bargaining 
10 
counter of the Muslim Leaiue, Under the shadow of threat» 
Huslim League wanted to get maxinRim concessions from the 
Congress. If a sovereign Pakistan was the aim of the Muslim 
League then it would not have accepted the Cabinet mission 
plan which had not conceded Pakistan. As a matter of fact, 
Muslim Leegu© Itself proposed a federation with six Muslim 
provinces grouped together and dealing with all subjects 
except defence, foreign affairs and conemanications necessary 
11 
for defence, irtius the f^ttslim League proposed a union of 
two units and not two sovereign states. But the Congress 
rejection of cabinet mission proposals regarding compulsory 
grouping of provinces thwarted the settlement of the communal 
issue. The »tosllm League withdrew its acceptance of the 
Cabinet Mission plan. Thus, the Cabinet Mission plan was 
killed by the "wobblng and vacillating" attitude of the 
8. Qwyer and Appadorai, op.cit., p. 526. 
9. S.R.Mehrotra, op.cit., p. 214. 
10. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, op.cit., p. 164. 
11. dwyer and Appadorai, op.cit., pp. 573-4. 
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C<mgfmm» To czuot* Sir Oilnmnlal Setvlvad **1he cherished 
boon of a united India had fallen into their lap, ftwt 
they by their om% w.«nt of political wiadoa threw it out and 
12 
made it beyond their reach*" 
The Congress-i^eague differences grew stronger and 
their attitude hardened more towairds ^^  each other, the 
Interim aovernnent venture did not succeed because of 
their suspicion and distrust against each other. Bickering 
and 9<|uat»bllng «•«•« the features of the meetings of the 
Executive Council. Liaquat Ali»8 etrict scrutiny of the 
expenditure of other ministries aroused much indignation 
and discord among the members of the Interim Qovemment. 
The budget of 1946-47 presented by Liaquat Ali xhan was 
embarraslng to the Congress because of its strict measure 
against tax evaders and industrialists - the financiers 
of the Congress. Sardar Patel and other Congress leaders 
strcmgly opposed the budget on the ground that It was anti-
nationj»l and having the communal considerations. But Liaquat 
All maintained that the budget was in conformity of the 
declared objectives of the Congress, which was also admitted 
13 
by Naulana Aaad. Ihus when time came to tranaform thm aims 
and objective of the Ccmgress into practice the Congress 
12. Sir dhimanlal Setalvadi India Divided* Th<y Times of 
Jndi^. June IS, 1947. 
13. Maulana Abul Kalam Asad, op.cit., p. 158. 
- 175 -
hesitated to do so because it did not want to displease the 
industrialists who had great influence in the Congress, aut 
of frustration the Congress demanded the resignation of the 
League's aeinbers from the Interim Government* 
Sardar Vallabhbhal Patel* according to Maulana Asad 
now was prepared to get the country partitioned only to get 
14 
rid of the Muslim League. Patel held the view that the 
Congress and Muslim League could not work together. Maulana 
Azad strongly opposed the idea of partition and viewed that 
the Cabinet Mi8si<»i plan was the only best possible solution 
of the problem and not the partition. But Sardar Patel succ-
eeded to influence Nehru and Oandhiji and got their support 
15 
to the partition of India. Now the Congress held the view 
that cooperation with the Muslim League would jeopardise 
Indian unity and strength, aut the fact remained that the 
Congress* lust of powfr their desire of an undisputed 
uthority and th ir attitude of one party rule finally deter-
mined their attitude towards the partition of India. Itiey 
finally got the country partitioned. The nationalist Muslims 
looked all these developments with agony and despair as they 
were helpless against the strong lobby of Congressmen led by 
Patel. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema strongly condemned the partitior 
14. Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, op.cit.« p. 164. 
15. Ibid., p. 168. 
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proposal accepted by the Congress, Its leader >4aulana Hlfzur 
e^hm«fi« in the meeting where the Congress accepted the 3rd 
June plan, tried to desist the Congress to sign the deith 
16 
knell of united India but in vain. Khan Abdul caiaffar Khan 
ccMiiplalned th t the decision about partitiWJ was taken by 
the Congress Hijh ccxunand -^ ithcHit consulting him and his 
17 
Khudai Khidmatgars - who had cast their lot with the Congress. 
He In anguish told the C<Migresa Working Cowaittee that "We 
Pskhturjs stood by you and had undergone great sacrifice for 
attaining freedom but you have nov deserted us and throvn 
13 
us to the wolves." 
Thus « we find that from the very beginning at different 
point of tiw? two distinct forces - Secular and liberal on 
one hand and Rightist and co^ nmaunal on the other dominated 
the Congress and influenced its decision. The Rightist and 
cottnunal forces got even declared policies and decision of 
the Congress, changed. As ve have seen in previous chapters 
th'^ t only because of these forces the Congress failed to adopt 
clearcut and durable policy towards -'luslifas, Whenever the 
secular and liberal forces prevailed in the Congress they 
tried to eradicate the Muslim grievances and c»ne to a settle-
ment with them. But with the rise of comnunal and Rightist 
16. Itie Madina. June 16, 1947. 
17. D.3. Tendulkar t hi^\ 9^?ffar Khga - f^\\^ 4ff q P^%\},9 
(3andhi Peace Foundation 1967} p. 224. 
18. Ibid. 
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forces the policies -nd decisions of the Congress were changed 
nd the settleiaent '^ Ith the Muslliu League vas rejected. 
Unfortunately, «t the tl:iie of independence, such forces pre-
vailed in the Congress and ev^n impressed Nehru and Qandhiji 
and jot t>v ir support for the partition of India. The haste 
wltfj which the Congress conceded partition fjnd got it in a 
hurry, explains the fact that the leaders were inpatient 
for the independence and the power. Since independence vas 
a settled fact and it *«as surely to come as soon as they 
arrived at any set.lement with the Muslim Leegue on the 
JBinority probleti, these leaders could i-alt for such an agre«>-
tient. But they preferred partition instead of a settl* nent 
with the lusllm League. It seemed that these leaders 
under the pressure front Rightist loboy lost their patience. 
They sacrlfled the unity and integrity of the Country for 
the sake of undisputed r^ uthorlty end monopoly of political 
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